

## FABULOUS AMERICA

*OTHER BOOKS BY ROBERT PAYNE*

THE WHITE PONY

THE REVOLT OF ASIA

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DAVID AND ANNA

SONGS

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CHINA AWAKE

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# FABULOUS AMERICA

by

ROBERT PAYNE

## THE FABULOUS ENGINE-ROOM

*It was by no means mathematics nor the charts of the geographers nor the deductions of reason which helped me to accomplish that which I did accomplish but solely the prophecy of Isaiah about a new heaven and a new earth*

CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, *Libro de la profecía*

THERE NEVER WAS A country more fabulous than America. She bestrides the world like a Colossus: no other power at any time in the world's history has possessed so varied or so great an influence on other nations. The British Empire or the Empire of the Tartars never enjoyed the power or the influence that is now displayed by America at the moment of her greatest crisis, and it is already an axiom that the decisions of the American government affect the lives and the livelihood of the remotest peoples. Half the wealth of the world, more than half of the productivity, nearly two-thirds of the production of the world's machines are concentrated in American hands: the rest of the world lies in the shadow of American industry, and with every day the shadow grows larger, more portentous, more dangerous. There is a sense in which the whole world has now become subject to America, and here is also a sense in which the extreme efficiency of American machines offers free men their only hope for the future.

The stranger coming for the first time on to the American scene cannot avoid being conscious of entering a fabulous engine-room. Uncounted millions of indicators are continually pinning, the needles twisting and turning feverishly. The pounding of the pistons and the glare of the furnaces deafen and blind us. We wait and suffer, ticking off one by one the numbers indicated by the quivering pointers of the pressure gauges, afraid that the boiler will blow up, wondering what purpose controls this overheated engine room, searching through the smoke for the single pressure gauge that will measure sterily the sum total of the rest, though we know already that the giant forces at work



into the flesh of the victim, whose only recourse against his suffering—to destroy the machines—is no longer possible, though the machines might conceivably destroy themselves. It is in this sense that the atomic bomb must be viewed as the logical end-product of the whole of the European tradition, for at the very beginning of Europe men attempted to scale the heavens and discover the sources of power. The Chinese attempted to align themselves with nature; the West attempted to discover the secrets of nature and used all natural sources of power for their own purposes. The old Babylonian legend of the shepherd Etana is relevant to our own times. He attempted to fly into the face of the sun on a chariot of eagles, but the chariot strings broke and he crashed down on earth, blinded and stricken dumb.

Because we cannot retrace our steps, we must continue our journey into the sun. More and more secrets will be wrested from the atom. Fantastic sources of power are already in man's possession, but the vast, deafening, and amazing engine-room, the heir to all the romantic dreams of the past, continues to dwarf the men who built it. Men who suffer, lie on hospital beds for painful operations, weep with joy when their children are born, and weep horribly when they die can find no common denominator between themselves and these terrible machines. Their human dignity is outraged by the metallic dignity of the machine; their individual powers continue to be puny when compared with the powers of dams. The whole intellectual history of America revolves around the definition of human freedom, but the man working on the conveyor belt, at the beck and call of every impulse of the machine, tends to disregard the intellectual history of his country. If he is not the slave, he is not far from being the indentured servant of the machine, bonded to it for a period of years. The irony remains. It was machinery that gave the original impetus to the larger discovery of America. Tractors, bulldozers, hydroelectric plants, and a huge system of canals have reclaimed the land, but nearly half of America lives in fear of drought now that Nature's balances have been changed. The machines rule, but their rule is still subject to the cataclysmic forces of Nature. And at the very moment when the final achievement of American industrialization tends to restore man's freedom by giving him greater power than he ever dreamed

possible, he realizes sadly that this power may well be too much for him.

No one realizes these dangers more than the Americans themselves. While the Russians proclaim that the dangers have been exaggerated, the Americans are concerned that the dangers should not be minimized. The Sunday supplements and the comics have fed their readers for generations on fantastic exercises of power. On a Sunday morning the explosions of whole solar systems become entirely probable, while a journey in a space ship is hardly more than a diverting occupation for the breakfast table. But this is not real power, it is only the fantastic edge of power that enables men to dream away their Sundays. On Sundays the old Puritan crust is broken, everything becomes possible, the wildest and most visionary dreams are commonplace, the power in the wing of a fly could move huge ocean liners across the four seas. The readers of the Sunday comics were perhaps less surprised than the others when it was discovered that these unbounded powers and adventures had become entirely possible, but they were in no happier a position when it came to determining their own responsibility in the new age that had so surprisingly broken out. The delicate balances and adjustments that result from traditional concepts of morality were put out of joint. Prometheus and Superman are not moral figures; they owe allegiance to no man.

The wild dreams were there from the beginning. We can trace through American history the peculiar ambivalence that characterizes modern American man, he is at once the Sunday morning dreamer of anarchic dreams and the most practical of men, the man in love with dreams of power and the man overlaid with a sense of Puritan guilt. In Emerson and Melville we see the two extremes. "Our young people," wrote Emerson, "are diseased with the theological problems of original sin, origin of evil, predestination and the like. These never presented a practical difficulty to any man,—never darkened across any man's road who did not go out of his way to seek them. These are the soul's mumps and measles." Again and again he reverted to the theme of naked power, refusing to recognize that any guilt could ever be attached to it, like the Chinese, he was concerned to prove that power possessed a modest morality of its own. He wrote in his essay on *Power*

The philosophy of Emerson is not the philosophy of America, nor were the purposes of America Emerson's purposes, yet he represented to an extreme degree the survival of beliefs as ancient as America herself. The Pilgrim Fathers were actuated by motives of morality, not of expediency, but their very puritanism involved a conception of free will that took root on American soil and has remained to the present day. It was ultimately their will which produced the machine with all its consequences, but they would hardly recognize themselves as the original builders of the fabulous engine-room.

With Melville we are on safer and more tangible ground. By admitting evil and fearing it, he recognized that abuse of freedom could bring an end to freedom, that unbridled powers of will contained the elements of their own destruction: Ahab must die for his insufferable assaults against the pinnacles of Heaven. Freedom was something to be treasured in common, not the plaything of great souls. The terrible weight of responsibility had fallen upon America, and it seemed to him that slavery must be repugnant to all Americans and that it was the task of America to proclaim the morality of freedom and human dignity to the world. For one, freedom was to be prized for its own sake; for the other, it was a treasure to be shared. There could not have been two more dissimilar views, yet these two contrasting views tug at the American conscience and are always more dangerous when they appear in the same person. Then ambivalence becomes a habit of thought, and anyone who is accustomed to congressional speeches finds himself bewildered by the use of the word freedom to convey two opposing ideas, which include Superman and the humblest Puritan under the same cloak.

In the middle years of the nineteenth century this ambivalence had few social consequences, for the two dissimilar concepts of freedom rode abreast—there were virgin lands to be explored and the frontiersmen were not expected to indulge in the pursuit of social gains. The ruthless massacre of the Indians went on, and though the Civil War implied a suspension of customary morality, human dignity was exalted in the decision to free the slaves. There were still few machines. The mechanical cotton-pickers, later to disinherit the Negroes of the South more rigidly than the slave-owners had disinherited them, were to come later. The first round in the battle for survival of the purely human values came

to an end when Lincoln signed the decree of emancipation. The later rounds were to be altogether tougher, for nothing so simple as a decree of emancipation will free men from the dominance of the machines.

The dream of power had always been part of the dream of America. The great virgin territory could support the whole of the known world and possessed riches greater than those of Europe and Asia combined. In medieval monasteries men had guessed at the existence of untouched lands where life could be lived in freedom from the absolute rule of the State, where wealth proliferated and men were their own masters. In the *Song of Roland* the enchanted land of *Caleferne* is mentioned as a place of abiding peace and fruitfulness not unlike the Abode of the Blessed, and it is no accident that the early adventurers were all deeply religious men accustomed to put their trust in prophecies and see a new heaven and a new earth rising out of the distant Indies. America was fable before it became fact, but the fabulous remained to enchant men long after the frontiers had been pushed back. Even the frontiers were part of the dream, for in their more sober moments men must have realized that if the Americas were indeed the Indies or China, already inhabited and civilized, their prospects of wealth were diminished. The frontiers were like veils through which the dreamers passed, wondering to the end whether the dream would ever cease. The experience of the frontiers was therefore paramount. The fabulous remained until the last corner of America was explored.

The frontier necessarily affected the American character to an extent that could not have been foreseen. It was an experience entirely unlike the explorations of the Russians towards Siberia, though, like Yermak, the pioneers tended to destroy the native inhabitants of the place as mercilessly as the natives attempted to destroy their attackers. At the time of Yermak the hard, northern lands of Siberia offered none of the promises of America, no one could have foreseen that beneath the eternally frozen snows of Kamchatka there were precious minerals enough to replenish an empire. America was more than promises from the very beginning. Melville, writing at a time when nearly all the frontiers had been settled, speaks of Canaan as the living land at his fingers' ends. Canaan she remains, though the oppressed people of the world have begun to lose their faith in America as

immigrant could say in truth that there were no heights of material wealth he could not reach. It was a material age, and the opportunities in America during the eighteenth century were not to be compared with the opportunities that arose as a result of the growth of industrialism. There was wealth in the soil, but the fabulous engines contrived to produce far greater wealth from their machines, machine producing machine, until it seemed that every stick of metal had the power to generate more metal by parthenogenesis, and men began to believe hopefully that it was in their power to make the machines work for them, leaving them nothing else to do but take their leisure. The land flowing with milk and honey began to flow with molten metal; it is only recently that we have begun to realize that the fantastically increasing population of the world has no increasing supply of metals and food to support it. Atomic power, when it comes, will come only just in time.

Just as the march from one frontier to another had altered the character of the original settlers, so the deluge of European refugees altered the character of American feeling. No one comparing the literature of the 1840's with the literature of the 1870's can fail to observe the increasing toughness of those times. With the Civil War and with the appearance in a single period of Melville, Whitman, Emerson, Hawthorne, and Edgar Allan Poe some kind of climacteric was passed. It was the time when the last frontiers were being consolidated, and the last of a great series of mechanical appliances was being invented. The engines changed direction, the pistons pounded with an increasing tempo, the indicator needles revolved more nervously still, while more and more steam filled the engine-room itself so that it became more difficult to observe not only in which direction America was going but also on what foundations America reposed. A period of consolidation set in. Revolutionary fervour was exchanged for a period of conservatism. The same old words, liberty, freedom, and democracy, were being repeated, but they were subtly changing their meaning. For the first time a government founded by revolutionaries began to show signs of weakening, not into tyranny, but into the rule of powerful barons. It seemed for a while that the stages of development had been reversed. Was a kind of feudalism to follow on the heels of a pure democracy?

The term 'freedom of enterprise' had never been accurately defined, but it was a term of incalculable importance to the development of American thought. The English craft guilds were powerful instruments controlling wages, apprenticeship, and conditions of labour: no one could enter them except by direct invitation: many of them concealed in their daybooks statements of mysterious origins, sacred rituals, and the secrets of the trade. The newcomers to America were not faced with these ordeals. They could turn, as Jefferson did, to the trade of printer if it pleased them and take an apprenticeship on their own terms. Once they had crossed the frontier and even before, they could embark on any craft or trade they pleased—the world was their oyster and they could open it with whatever tools lay handy. Immigrants turned to industrial schools, discovering that a mechanics institute or a repair yard in New York was as adventurous and as dangerous as a frontier defended by the redskins. Aggressive individualism was necessary in order to survive. At such a time the immigrants attempt to take from the oyster more pearls than they need, for much the same reason that a Chinese on a two-day bus journey will take with him provisions for three weeks—in no other way can he hope to reach the end of his journey. Amid so many aggressive individualists it was difficult to arouse a social consciousness, and far too many people were trampled down in the rush for the good things that America had to offer. One of the more curious results of the aggressive individualism of the immigrants was that they tended to form close clans among themselves and deliberately put off the moment when they would become English speaking Americans for the benefits of retaining the strength that came with their clannishness. Poles tended to be steelworkers, Jews tended to be clothiers, and the Chinese continued to be launderers, not because they had special aptitudes for these trades, but because the first settlers had already assumed these trades and could protect them. Three-quarters of the immigrants became common labourers who looked to their own main strength in order to survive.

But on the whole, in spite of the rise of the steel, railroad, and meat barons, medieval restraints were little known. Though monopolies arose, they never possessed the sanction of the State, and until recent times the State deliberately removed itself from

of social responsibility government ownership in America has come to stay. What is far more difficult, and far more important, is to discover the precise balance between them and to maintain that balance against the aggressions of both sides. Hardly anything in our present economies is so important as the recognition that a stable balance between government ownership and capitalism is required: the difficulty lies in finding the precise balance. The Russians, by their sweeping condemnation of the American system, show only their complete ignorance of the gathering weight of social responsibility in America. The last word, as usual, has been stated by De Tocqueville in the famous chapter on *Wealth and Physical Prosperity*, where he warns against the dangers that arise when the barons forsake their social responsibility: "Freedom, in these ages, is therefore especially favourable to the production of wealth; nor is it difficult to perceive that despotism is especially adverse to the same result. The nature of despotic power in democratic ages is not to be fierce or cruel, but minute and meddling."

There are Frenchmen who complain bitterly at the bar of history, lamenting that all the glories of the French Revolution have only led them to interminable queues before the iron grills of the post office. If the end of the American revolution were to be the establishment of an exhaustive bureaucracy, controlling every facet of American life, a "minute and meddling" interference, most Americans would readily revolt. But some balance between private enterprise and bureaucracy must be established, for private enterprise itself cannot by definition help those unfortunates who have no enterprise, private or public. The "minute and meddling" qualities of bureaucracy fly in the face of the American tradition, and it is inconceivable that the fabulous engine-room should be wholly under the control of government clerks.

At the beginning the fabulous engine-room was harnessed to an idea. The revolutionaries possessed their dream of power, but they were themselves opposed to forming a powerful state. They had no intention of leading the world in industry or force of arms; they regarded strong states with suspicion, they believed that armed strength led inevitably to despotism, and they were perfectly content in their isolation, sheltered as they were by the Atlantic, to form the smallest standing army of their time. The

dream of power came from the knowledge of the inexhaustible and untouched lands beyond the frontier, but it came with still greater clarity with the consciousness of their individual freedom. The march of the iron men came later, before them were "the winter soldiers," the servants of the free state—descendants of Locke and Thomas Paine, who combined, as Melville and Emerson failed to do, the two opposing aspects of freedom. By the middle of the nineteenth century freedom had split in two, expediency and the purest morality had taken up positions of strenuous conflict, and the fabulous schizophrenia was to remain, to torment the American conscience through all the ensuing years.

It could hardly be helped—it was one of the conditions of American existence, and it is one of the more terrible ironies of the present age that the deep-rooted sense of expediency in America is confronted with the similar expediency born of the same causes, in Bolshevik Russia while among American liberals morality remains, taunting them with its promise of the heights. The main battle is not fought by armies but by the unexpressed consciences of nations. The explosive forces of the original revolution are still exploding and like most explosions they take unexpected courses.

One of the most important of those courses though to the historian one of the most unexpected, was the course away from Europe. Whole generations of European descendants turned their backs on Europe, not in hatred (which would have been understandable) or in indifference (which would have been still more understandable) but in a kind of frenzy of the emotions. The West beckoned—in the West lay all that could be interpreted as freedom of opportunity, conscience, religion, and worship, in the West lay the fabulous uncharted places on the map, the kingdom where each man is king, the golden meadows of the fairy tale. But when Thoreau speaks about the West and compares it with Europe, the voice becomes shrill and a strange disquiet seems to settle on him.

"I turn round and round irresolute sometimes for a quarter of an hour, until I decide, for the thousandth time, that I will walk into the south west or west. Eastward I go only by force, but westward I go free. Thither no business leads me. It is



hard for me to believe that I shall find fair landscapes or sufficient wildness and freedom beyond the eastern horizon. I am not excited by the prospect of a walk thither; but I believe that the forest which I see in the Western horizon stretches uninterruptedly towards the setting sun, and there are no towns or cities in it of enough consequence to disturb me. Let me live where I will, on this side is the city, on that the wilderness, and ever I am leaving the city more and more and withdrawing into the wilderness. I should not lay so much stress on this fact if I did not believe that something like this is the prevailing tendency of my countrymen. I must walk towards Oregon and not toward Europe."

There are good and sufficient reasons for going west, but the search for the lost islands of the setting sun is not one of them. There are too many repetitions, too many evasions to allow us to believe completely in the motive he suggests. Even though the same cry was to be repeated by Melville, who wrote that the course was inevitably westward and China would have more real love for America than England had, it is clear that the deliberate impulses and the clearer vision were giving way to an intoxicated mysticism. The West was a land flowing with milk and honey, but it was also the desert, the place of temptation and trial where some final destiny would be spoken out of the clouds and the angels were waiting in ambush, a place marked on the maps, "Here are Tigers." The cavalcades of wagoners who made the journey were almost completely unconscious of the search for spiritual ends, and nothing is so delightful as to read the careful matter-of-fact reports of the people who made those dangerous journeys. They write as men would write when making any difficult journey; they do not see themselves as heroic figures, though they were indeed heroic; they are tempted by no spiritual temptations, and no angels ever lay in wait for them. "We have come to the snow mountains," wrote one traveller. "James died last night of great sickness. We have lost our Oxen. It will be difficult to cross the mountains." That is all, and it is enough.

Yet these great and fantastic journeys are not performed without spiritual strain; men were walking in no-man's-land. Thoreau and Robinson Jeffers were right when they spoke of the landscape of the setting sun, the traumatic shock that resulted

when the voyagers came in sight of the Pacific, and knew there were no more lands to conquer. Jeffers, at Carmel, hurling his thunderbolts at the Pacific from the vanished frontier of a "perishing republic" is the more recent counterpart of Walt Whitman delighting in the purely European virtues of 'liberty, health, defiance, gaiety, self-esteem, curiosity' on the beach at Pau-monok. Beyond Carmel and the stunted wind-blown pines were there only dreams of annihilation? Was it true that the Pacific was the *bourne* from which there was no return? Why, those intense, aggravating, and continually despondent dreams of incest—not only in Jeffers, but in Poe, Hawthorne, and even Melville—if it were not that there was a consciousness of guilty separation from Europe (But there was no reason for guilt.) Something had happened—some shock on the soul, in Jeffers' words a symbolized 'racial introversion'—man regarding man exclusively, founding his values, desires, a picture of the universe, all on his own humanity, "freedom pushed far beyond the limits of *homo*, the threat of mortality on the forehead of every American because he was the possessor of the Promethean fire. Jeffers speaks in *Even Stella*, a work of extreme poetic brutality and curious prophecy, of 'the mould to break away from, the crust to break through, the coil to break into fire, the atom to be split.' Where was the end of it? Jeffers might answer that the thin line of the receding waves along the shores of the Pacific contained all mortality, the race was doomed, America would perish of its own fire, speaking in the voice of an aroused demon of despair, not knowing or even calculating the effects of prophecy in determining the course of the drama. It was a splendid drama, the curtain ringing down with complete and inexplicable finality, like the curtain in a French opera, which had risen in the first act only after three sonorous drum taps. No bang, no whumper—only silence, and the Pacific would cover all.

As a dream it had everything to commend it, including its likeness of all other dreams that end in darkness and a sensation of falling, but the dream of the tormented poet had not the faintest similarity with the dream of America, which contained as its supreme element vigour and a lust for life under the sun. But in one sense the dreamers had foretold the future—*there were no more lands to conquer*.

But the distrust, the horror, the curious inversions that were

common whenever the American poet turned his back finally on Europe were related to something that was real; Europe was not Eden, but the power that had formed America was European in origin, and the son does not rebel from the father without a sense of some urgent lack. There was no middle way. Eliot and James must return to Europe and take on European nationality; like Canute, they were attempting to stem the tide. Thomas Wolfe, writing *Look Homeward Angel*, hinted at an imaginary Europe as fabulous as the American West, and he too went in search of his dream, finding it most concretely in the vision of the terrible Grunewald triptych described so minutely and with such careful horror in the journals of *The Web and the Rock*. The end was mortality either way. Somewhere in the remote labyrinths of the American soul, coming from the Boston transcendentalists or from the coast of the Sur, there were always these warnings of disaster, suggesting that the American, whenever he thought of America, was still baffled and amazed by the fabulous strangeness of America, and the incredible restlessness of the people suggests a sense of strangeness, of not entirely belonging. A Cotswold cottage belongs to its scenery and to history. There are no buildings in America that give one the sense of permanence that characterizes almost any European cathedral—the Temple of the Virgins in Chichen Itza has an air of permanence more lasting than the Empire State Building. But it is difficult to understand how this restlessness, the lack of permanence that is to be met continually on the American scene, can be accounted as some fault in the American soul; it can mean only that America is still young, still growing, and has no desire to settle down into solidification, and distrusts all that is not flashing and swift—the Greeks were as restless, though they chose to pretend to posterity that they lived their lives away in towns.

From the beginning the Americans modelled themselves on the Romans: the early architecture, the *gravitas* of the revolutionary fathers, the very names of their towns and government institutions were modelled on Rome, the least revolutionary and the most mature of all ancient civilizations. It was an odd but deliberate choice. Partly it was because Rome was in the air—it was a time of grave obedience to the natural law, worshipped by Montesquieu and Rousseau and all the Encyclopedists, but it was also a time of sternness, the consciousness of tasks to be

performed, of grave loads of responsibility toward the future Benjamin Franklin making in full seriousness a list of virtues and solemnly advocating to himself each morning a dose of virtue as another man might advocate a dose of salts, was typical of his time. Puritanism crept in again on the wake of the revolution. The world was hard, relentless, and demanding. It was not enough to watch and pray, the fuel must be cut, the printing machine must roll out the daily exhortations to guard the republic, and there was no time for dreams. But the ambivalence, which goes back to the Pilgrim Fathers, was always there, and it is the same Benjamin Franklin who speaks lovingly of virtue who wrote—for there can now be no doubt that he wrote it—a gay letter to a young man on the seduction of elderly women explaining that all women were the same if their heads were covered with trinkets, and the particular advantage lay in the fact that they were so extremely grateful.

Augustan morality, though officially encouraged, had no roots in America. De Tocqueville observed that the women were pleasant mannered and so experienced that they could travel from one end of America to the other without harm, little has changed since then and every day in America you see the red-cheeked, handsome women he described. When Simonov speaks of the decay of morality in America and contrasts American divorce with the blessedness of wedlock in the Soviet Union, he is encouraging the fallacy of the false equation. It is doubtful whether divorce rates offer any criterion to the morality of a country, though if comparable figures were available, it is certain that both countries would be found almost equally lawless. Customary obedience to the law is not the sign of a young country, in this respect, as in so many others, the Americans have always more resembled the Greeks, who were not oppressed, as the Romans were, with a sense of guilt, cared little for their responsibilities, and delighted in inventions.

Yet, until recently, the sense of guilt was native to America and could not be explained away by the intransigence of the Puritan Conscience. Conscience there was, it was not only Melville who suffered from the numbing anxieties that come with the possession of a pronounced sense of sin, nor is it only Eugene O'Neill who confesses to a passion for describing incestuous relations. The sin did not come entirely from the cutting

of the umbilical cord that joined America to Europe or from the sense of Promethean destinies; it is more probable that it came from the sense of isolation, the knowledge in the early days of the Republic that America was in a very geographical way cut off from the East and the West, a virgin island suspended between two ancient civilizations, without traditions, overshadowed by their greatness. To-day, when America overshadows them both, it is difficult to recapture the sense of isolation that must have coloured the lives of the early settlers and continued long after the Revolution. It was not only the poets and the novelists who were conscious of this isolation and absence of traditions; the Prometheans themselves were conscious of it. Ford, carrying a Cotswold house entire to Dearborn, Hearst, filling San Simeon with the tapestries and religious paintings of half Europe—one the real Promethean and the other the caricature—showed that until recently there was a real dependence on the European motherland. The debate between East and West continued and was resolved only during World War II when it was discovered that the destiny of America lay neither in the East nor the West but on her own soil, or rather, since her armed forces had gone from both coasts, her destiny lay everywhere men spoke and lived for freedom.

Nothing is more dangerous than to speak of destiny without definition. The mystique of power, which allows one man to believe in the destined revolution of the proletariat and another to believe that the Third Reich will endure a thousand years defeats analysis. If vigour, numbers, and untouched resource are the criteria, then the future destiny of the world probably lies in the hands of the Asiatics, who are at once the oldest and the youngest races of mankind. But there is a sense in which destiny is only shadow play, something seen in the shadows and the smoke of the engine-room, a Brocken figure beckoning delusively. The old struggle between East and West, fought out in the American soul, was seen at last to be meaningless; America was not an island suspended between two ancient groups of civilizations, but a vast and resourceful power with no limit to her potentialities.

We understand a nation best through its poetry. It is not that the poets are the unacknowledged legislators of mankind—the poets are indifferent to the laws—but the unconscious motives

and the extent and shape of national power are revealed by them. Reading Shakespeare, it should have been possible to have foreseen the second and third British Empires, nearly all of Russia is revealed in Pushkin. So it was in America, though the poetry was often most subtly expressed by the great prose writers. The harsh struggle, the doubts, the conflicting strains and the loyalties that determine the course of events, all these are demonstrated by the great poets, and it is one of the fallacies of the age that America has not produced great poets and prophets. She has. The splendour of American literature lights the murk of the fabulous engine-room, and it was not only Whitman who possessed the gift of prophecy. A cloud of witnesses, speaking almost the same language oppressed by the same mysteries, speaks of the crisis through which the American soul has passed. There are moments, for example, when Thomas Wolfe and Herman Melville talk in almost identical tongues, the search for an ever vaster land and a less ambiguous life drove Thomas Wolfe to speak of

*"a land more kind than home, more large than earth—  
whereon the pillars of this earth are founded,  
towards which the conscience of the world is tending—  
a wind is rising and the rivers flow"*

while Melville repeats the story of the fabulous pursuit but tempers it with sorrow

'Were this world an endless plain, and by sailing eastward we could for ever reach new distances, and discover sights more sweet and strange than any Cyclades or Islands of King Solomon, then there were promise in the voyage. But in pursuit of those far mysteries we dream of, or in tormented chase of that demon phantom that some time or other, swims before all human hearts, while chasing such over this round globe, they either lead us on barren mazes or midway leave us whelmed."

For ever reach new distances! It is still the voice of Columbus speaking, the old soured prophet bending his knee to Isabella while the voices of Isaiah exalt him and give him courage to bend his knee to no one. If there is an American destiny, it is here. America is not promises, it is the hanging fruit on the tree

within the grasp of every man, the wind rising, the rivers flowing, the Islands of the Cyclades shining beneath the sun. The fore-runners foretold the future, but the future, if the survivors read the legend and keep it in mind, was brighter than anyone could have foreseen.

There are, however, certain conditions. If there is to be freedom, it is necessary to be sure that it is not freedom raised to the absolute power of anarchy: the robber barons must be suppressed; the free men must come into their own; there are at least five freedoms, and the largest of them all is the freedom to be free; there must be no oppression of minorities, no hint of the scandal of exploitation, no trust in expediency. The great dream of the European exiles, who saw a terrestrial paradise, must not be wholly perverted into nightmare. That might come; the machines might, by running in the direction contrary to the intention of the founders, wreck everything including themselves, or men might become, not mechanical monsters, but indelible slaves of the machine..

Trotsky wrote that it was impossible for a Communist state to survive unless the whole world turned Communist. In the same way it is probably impossible for a single free state to have assurance of survival unless all the others are free. The historical task of America remains the discovery of freedom, even in the most elementary sense of the four freedoms, and it cannot hope to endure unless there is this constant assault against the barriers of freedom. It is in this sense that the mysterious theorem of the mysterious Mr. X fails completely. It is not enough to contain tyranny; the boundaries of freedom must be pushed out continually, not with the military arm, which is unavailing, but with the social arm, which is always viable. In the war between freedom and tyranny the professors, the students, and the social workers, the engineers who build up trade in foreign countries, the diplomats, the adventurers, and the travellers have their part to play. The tall man with the steel-bowed glasses standing on the rickety platform at Gettysburg gave a weapon for the conquest of the world more powerful than the atomic bomb, which conquers nothing, since it destroys everything it touches; under government of the people, by the people, for the people, each man is enabled to possess the whole world.

Even if there is no American destiny—for whatever is the

American destiny must also be the destiny of the world—it is still true that America has a special task to perform. The larger, the more intrinsically powerful ideas are concerned with power, but American armed power will not transform the world alone. Yet, reinforced with a social arm as direct and uncompromising as her other weapons, she can still introduce to the suffering nations of the world the sense of freedom that the revolutionary fathers demanded of themselves. Nothing less is worth having. The great challenge is there that America by the power of her social weapons shall re-endow the world with a sense of the human splendour.

The people who disintegrated the atom have now the task of integrating humanity and the reinforcement of the social weapon demands that the people shall be conscious of themselves as social members of a world community. Meanwhile, a beginning has been made. On the quiet summer day in June, 1947, when an elderly statesman stood under the elms of Harvard and said quietly and drily that if the countries of Europe would meet and agree on their economic needs the United States would insure their recovery, he was for the first time directing the whole energies of America into social channels for the sake of the greater power and the more urgent need. In the last instance it was the task of the fabulous engine-room to help to create a fabulous world.

If George Marshall, speaking precisely and a little falteringly on that summer day, reversed in a sentence a hundred and seventy years of American policy, he was also redefining the direction of American power. No longer was that power to be expressed mainly in terms of the right to be free, there was included the right to be assured of a lasting freedom, and this right remains precarious as long as others have no freedom, have no sufficient livelihood and look with fear upon encroachments on their own sovereignty by the great powers. The American dream cannot come to an end until the whole earth is free, and the new heaven and the new earth described by Columbus cannot exist on American soil alone. A wind is rising and the rivers flow, but the winds of blessing and the rivers of fertility must embrace the whole globe before they can be assured of continuous existence on any part of the globe. The landscapes open out, one vista after another, and there is no end to the



journey until the welfare of all the inhabitants of the globe is assured. This welfare cannot come from Communism, because Communism denies the elementary privileges of the individual, but it *can* come from the social arm of America if the Americans themselves will employ that arm to the uttermost. The present hysterical fear of Communism probably derives from a dread of the new responsibilities that America must shoulder or else go the way of all nations which are morally defeated; there are moral arms as well as social arms to be used to the uttermost. But if the new responsibilities are accepted, as they should be, freely and with no effort to minimize the effort and the difficulty involved, the future would seem to be more hopeful than it has ever been.

For it is time to insist that the American dream is no longer America's alone. We are citizens of the whole world, and the whole world is our chosen field. The gardens of New Hampshire are contiguous with the terraced rice-fields of China; the sweat of the American labourer falls into the same earth as the sweat of the coolie running between the driving shafts of his rickshaw. We are men of the world, owning a greater loyalty to the whole than to the segments that history has cut out of the earth with her corroding scissors; to own the whole world and to be the prince of all its fruitfulness is surely greater than to be a citizen of the part. To be American, British, or Chinese is nothing, but to be the free owner of all the wealth of all histories is at least the greater part, and the more consoling part, of the world's glory. We are born by the accidents of place, we grow by the accidents of place and die by those same accidents, but the earth itself is no accident, and its splendours and glories are our inheritance. At this stage of the world's history we are the servants of the whole, grieving or joying over the fate of our neighbours or perishing for lack of neighbourliness. The task is still conquest—that each man should conquer the whole world and make it his own.

"The universe," said Bergson on the last page of his last book, "is a machine for the making of gods." It may well be true—no one else has suggested a better reason for the earth's being or a more comprehensive one. But if the world is to emerge into a state of freedom that has about it something of the godlike, the fabulous engine-room will have to be geared to a greater intensity of production and the social arm will have to become more cunning and still more responsible. New definitions will be

needed. It will not be enough to say that man cannot live by bread alone, it will be necessary to remember that he cannot even live alone, that he is part of an immense community though he lives out his life in loneliness and terror, and his community is the world. It will be necessary to invent new mythologies, and the cartographers will come into their own; it is becoming more and more necessary to map the world of the future and discover the places where men can find rest and vigour, the gardens and the fruit trees and the place of treasure. The new mythologies will probably not be concerned with human individuals, but with great communities of people. All over Asia there are now huge farm co-operatives that are developing new mythologies. The blind flute players of China, wandering among the yellow hills of Shensi, tell the old epics still, but they also tell the new epics—of guerrilla leaders, farmers' lovers, daughters, and sons, in all these epics they celebrate the new dignity of man freed from the bondage of the landlord, owning the soil he tills, fighting against oppressors. We live more by mythologies than by the speeches of senators. Most mythical of all things, because it employs invincible power, is the social army working for the good of the people.

We live in a fabulous and mythical age. The apocalyptic destruction of Germany, the invention of the atomic bomb, the fantastic horrors of the new tortures invented by the Nazis, the giant strides of medicine, the disappearance of whole populations in gas chambers, the speed of flight, the resurrection of great nations, all these have been accomplished in our time—in a very short space of our time. Through this mythical country we came by slow degrees to the place of the abyss, but the lightest bridges will bring us to the promised land. It is no longer necessary that we should have faith in any particular kind of social system, what is necessary is that we should have faith in the dignity of man—the system will follow, or rather there can never be a complete and unassailable system, codification means death, a formula is a death warrant. The free man will curb his freedom of his own accord, the nature of the State will change according to the demands of the time, and gradually the barriers will be broken down. There can be no stable equilibrium in the world as long as there are barriers to travel, there can be no faith in Russia's intentions as long as the curtains of Russia are drawn. In the same way there can be no hope of final peace as long as vast

inequalities of wealth prevail and as long as men are not assured of their sustenance. Meanwhile the major tasks of the social arm are to ensure that men shall possess their own freedom, that the wealth of the world shall be more and more evenly distributed and that the peoples themselves shall increasingly intermingle. It is only in this way that men can come finally to understand one another in terms of human dignity. The final mythology is the mythology of human dignity wherever it is found.

Such a mythology has been outlined by a modern American poet who follows the tradition stated in the Declaration of Independence, in the works of Melville, and in a thousand American poems. In the elegies of Muriel Rukeyser are heard the overtones of the dream of Columbus and the still fiercer and more hazardous dreams of Whitman. Here the mythology of the present is stated with tremendous force and truth:

*"Now there are no maps and no magicians.  
No prophets, but the young prophet, the sense of the world.  
The gift of our time, the world to be discovered.  
All the continents giving off their separate lights,  
The one sea, and the air. And all things glow.  
Move as this sea moves, as water, as force.  
Peace shines from its life, its war can become  
At any moment the fierce shining of peace,  
And all the life-night long many voices are saying  
The name of all things is Glowing."*<sup>1</sup>

It is necessary to insist that a poem of this kind would have been unthinkable at any other time than the present. "The world to be discovered" and "the fierce shining of peace" are the prerequisites of the modern adventure. The end in view can only be the increasing richness of man, at a time when "the name of all things is Glowing," but it is only now that we have the resources for the journey and possess the means to attain the fabulous ends. When on a December night in 1929 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote out with the assistance of Mahatma Gandhi a Declaration of Indian Independence modelled on the American declaration, he wrote into the poem a statement of the new rights that are demanded now that the old have failed to preserve their urgency. The Declaration begins:

<sup>1</sup> Muriel Rukeyser, *Ten Elegies*, New Directions, 1949.

*"We believe it is the inalienable right of the Indian people, as of every other people, to have freedom and enjoy the fruits of their toil, so that they may have full opportunities for growth."*

The American Declaration of Independence and the announcement of the Four Freedoms are no longer sufficient to guide the people of the world, new declarations of independence must be made in incontrovertible human terms. In the Indian declaration, as in the Indonesian which says simply that "the State is founded on divinity," there are no dogmatic claims to an abstract and undefined happiness. the potentialities of men themselves become a right, and the duty of the State is to allow the free play of human potentialities. It is in this sense that the State can have meaning in modern times. The State as an armed bureaucracy must eventually dissolve. The State as a machine for the increasing of human potential must remain.

To this end the social arm of America, once aroused and quickened by the rebirth of the new revolutionary impulses announced by the Marshall Plan with its growing insistence on the weight of the social arm and the potentialities of America placed at the service of the world, becomes the munspring for the adventure, the answer to the challenge, the beginning of a new age. The people are strong enough, the land is rich enough, the fabulous engines are powerful enough to assume the task. On America there rests the hope of the world, and no one can predict what will happen if that hope is forfeited. For a few months or years the world will wait with bated breath to see how the challenge will be taken. There are signs that it will be taken in full consciousness of all the issues involved, there are other signs that suggest that vested interests will be sufficiently powerful to blunt the edge of the social arm. Nothing is more certain than that the fabulous engine-room has it within its power to lead the world to a new heaven or a new hell. Though the decision does not entirely rest in the hands of Americans, the greater part of the decision rests with them. The inheritors of the tradition that was most clearly stated by Beethoven when he wrote "freedom above all" have it in their power to lead the way to increasing freedom everywhere, if they fail, it will mean that they will have turned their backs on the only tradition that has given them strength, and the "summer soldiers" will have come into their own.

## THE STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE

*Shall democracy stop now that it is so strong, and its adversaries so weak?*

DE TOCQUEVILLE.

WHEN HITLER DECREED that the German race should be purified even at the cost of eliminating all impure elements, he ensured that Germany should be deprived of some of the elements of its strength, for it was not true that biologically "pure" races possess advantages over biologically "impure" races. The greatest periods of civilization have always occurred at a time of the mingling of races. The Roman Empire at its height, the Renaissance and the T'ang Dynasty were all periods when the mingling of races occurred as a result of deliberate policy; they were also periods when it was possible to traverse vast distances without danger, and the very fact that travel was possible allowed the races to mingle. They were times of expanding frontiers and comparatively little war; the tribal people on the "limes" entered into the national life of the conquering states and gave their rugged vitality in exchange for civilization. Britons married Romans; the Hsiung-nu married the Hans, Hungarian women flocked to the courts of northern Italy, where they left on Renaissance paintings of the Madonna the traces of their faintly Oriental features. All this was no more than could be expected in epochs where there existed a calm understanding of the forces by which nations continually regain their wasted strength. Nothing is more dangerous than to generalize on the subject of races, but nothing is more certain than that continual intermarriage within the same "pure" stock is reflected in a progressive weakness among the descendants. The experience of the Egyptian and English kings, as well as that of the Kentucky backwoodsmen, suggests that purity of race is always dangerous. This is a danger that is hardly likely to confront Americans. One does not speak of an American race, for the sufficient reason that a distinct American race is hardly likely to exist for some

centuries, and by that time the enveloping process by which the races of the world are gradually forming a single race will be coming to pass.

Great nations of comparatively pure stock have existed, but it is significant that it was not until the Vikings, for example, intermarried with the Gallo-Romans that they conquered England and not until they intermarried with the Moors of Sicily that they conquered Constantinople. There appears to be some startling effervescence of the blood that comes with the intermarriage of dissimilar strains, the products of intermarriage are so often more handsome and solidly built than their parents and show greater intelligence. In South Africa the descendants of Hottentot women and Dutch men are known as Bastards. No two parental types could be more different—the Hottentot is very short, his kinky hair forms peppercorns on his head, his skin is loose, sallow and wrinkled from childhood, and protuberant buttocks give him the appearance of some strange, squat animal—yet the offspring of the intermarriage are often admirable physical specimens and sometimes strikingly handsome. The Pitcairn Islanders, descended from Tahitians and the sailors of the *Bounty*, have acquired classic features and considerable skills. The inhabitants of Great Britain are as racially "impure" as it is possible to be from the waves of Goidels to the waves of Poles who came to settle in Scotland in the war years her history has been one of continual absorption. Absorption itself produces a kind of crystallization and seems to tend towards a state where the best efforts of each "race" within the fabric of the nation are given full play. But though "racism" is not yet dead in America, America herself is the standing example of absorption raised to a degree that has existed in no other nation.

There are no known means of measuring the strength of a people. Equipped with every conceivable kind of intelligence service, Hitler failed dismally to assess the strength of this huge continental power and seems to have declared war against America almost as an afterthought, probably blinded by the fabulous nature of America herself, saying in public and private that America was a state ruled "by demagogic Jew leaders and inhabited by half breeds." The movies may be partly responsible for the incredible assessment. By underestimating the strength of America, Hitler signed his own death warrant, for against

Britain and Russia he might have fought to a standstill, but the weight of American power pushed down the scales in favour of the Allies. And it was no accident that the "pure" race was overthrown by an alliance of all the "impure" races under the sun.

It is not military power or even mechanical power that alone gives strength to a people. A great people armed with every appliance of modern warfare and with an industrial potential outranking all other nations might still panic at a decisive moment in its history. Wars are often won by marginal forces; there have been occasions when the decisive factor in a single engagement has been the steadfastness of a single soldier, and this single engagement may have been the decisive factor in a whole campaign. There are times when accidents rule, when feints succeed beyond every expectation, when a surprise night attack by a small power has destroyed the huge sleeping enemy. These things have happened and will happen again. But, as the militiamen of Valley Forge remembered, steadfastness and a knowledge of the issues involved tend to hinder all enemies. From the time when Trotsky took over the Red Army there were always political commissars attached to every regiment; it is a probably a pity that there are no equivalents to political commissars in the American Army.

And just as wars are often won by marginal forces, so too are revolutions and political campaigns. When *Time* magazine, referring to the single word *Libertas* that Premier de Gasperi ordered to be written on the walls of Italy, commented on the weakness of Christian Democrat strategy in comparison with the Communists, who invented the slogan of a new Garibaldi, attired in a red shirt, it was wrong. Reports from Italy after the election suggested that it was the single word *Libertas* which turned the scales against the Communists.

This beloved word, grown huge like a rock encrusted with a mountain of coral, symbolized the whole of the European tradition and gave point to De Gasperi's remark that if the Communists ruled there would be no more elections. There are times when a single word has power to alter destinies. It was this word, spoken in all the European languages, that led the armies of immigrants to the coasts of America. The ultimate strength of America does not lie in the machines, but in the men who use

them, statistics of mechanical power cannot show whether America will win or lose a war or win the peace, a map showing strategical positions against an enemy may be delusive, the final test comes with the men, the strength of their belief in freedom and the vigour that comes from the mingling of races. It is in this sense that congressional efforts to weaken the freedoms outlined in the First Amendment may cancel out the increases in military power, for if America is the "last, best hope of earth," it is only so because a freedom loving nation will always attract allies against a tyranny. To the degree that America herself is free she will retain advantages against any enemy and to the degree that she becomes a tyranny she will lose them.

The races that form America have not become entirely integrated into the American scene. The Poles of Chicago, the Swedes of Dakota, the Jews of New York, the Mexicans and Spanish descendants of California remain enclaves within the State, but the enclaves are continually tending to break down. Though a distinct and recognizable American character has come into existence, and though something which may be called a racial type is beginning to emerge, tall, husky, broad jawed, adept with machines, impatient of restraint, accustomed to catastrophe—like Japan, America is a country at the mercy of earthquakes, tornadoes, drought, and fire—it is still impossible to point to a distinct American type. Who is an American? The German-speaking farmer in Minnesota, the Ukrainian speaking stockyard worker in Illinois, the Yiddish-speaking bookseller in Brooklyn are not recognizable American types but their descendants are. the mingling of all European races tends to produce a strain that we recognize as purely American, but this same strain would appear in Europe if a United States of Europe were ever formed.

America is Europe with all the European walls broken down, a nation predominantly European in character and suffering from the same diseases that have plagued Europe through her history, and to these diseases have been added others. The Americans have suffered in the past from their sense of isolation, from the vindictive battles they fought against the elements and from the sickness of excessive freedom to exploit their fellow men in the days of the frontier, and again in the days of the monopolists. No report on America can avoid mentioning that there are



each year a million people subject to fraud and larceny, and that in America more crimes are committed for no reason at all than in any other country, and that half the hospital beds and over three-fifths of the veterans' hospital beds are reserved for mental cases. There must be some reason for these things, and much of the blame must be put to the survival of the frontier character and the terrible catastrophes that occur every day and hour in America, and some more of the blame must be put to the uncertainties and hazards of a bitterly competitive existence in a country where the speed of life is the speed of the machine, but it would be the purest folly to imagine, as the Politburo seems to imagine, and as Hitler did, that the physical and nervous strain of American living is calculated to produce an enervated nation, ready only for the attentions of the faith-healer and the psychologist. De Tocqueville observed long ago that there were more quack faiths to be met with in America than in all the countries of Europe combined. There is still an amazing amount of quackery, but in comparison with the population of America, it has little effect: nothing could be more wrong-headed than to seek to understand the crisis of America by an examination of the strange medical nostrums available or the still stranger practices of the morticians of California. Because many advertising agencies are corrupt and because half the Hollywood films are even more corrupt, we have no reason to believe that the great mass of the Americans are corrupt. They are not; and cannot be, as long as freedom remains.

Ultimately, it is not the American land nor any emergence of a purely American character that hold the American people together; even loyalty to the American State and flag is not so powerful as loyalty to the American concept of freedom. But liberty, as Jefferson remarked repeatedly, is a boisterous sea with some waves striking high, some in shadow, others glinting, while all in time reach the shore. To be an egalitarian democrat one must be the most patient of men; it was not Jefferson but Franklin who observed that the Americans were the most impatient nation on earth.

The geneticist has no standards by which he can measure the impatience of the products of all the mingled races of Europe, but the historian has a right to guess that the descendants of Englishmen, Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Swedes, Germans, and

Jews would not be saddled with the gift of patience. Impatience was in the air, the frontiers beckoned, the need to conquer the elements was never so desperately clear. Was impatience a strength? It is easy to think of America in the late nineteenth century and even in the early years of the twentieth as a youth who had outlasted his strength, but the dangers of adolescence are not lasting dangers. Maturity comes early in a competitive age and the dangers of adolescence, even when they occur, are usually regarded with delight by the adolescents themselves. Statutes do not help. If one must deal in generalities—and sometimes it is necessary to deal with them—it may be observed that it is precisely the quality of their impatience that distinguishes the Americans. Those who have lived among the resurgent nations of Asia at the end of the war and then came to America recognize a similar atmosphere, an almost reckless impatience to get things done. Impatience rather than a sickness of the soul, may be the reason for the intense concentration on machinery, just as it may be the reason for the existence of the large number of neurotics and the far larger number of crimes. Iaced by the patient impatience of the Russians. American impatience seemed to labour in a vacuum. There is too little restraint, and often too little certainty, and most curious of all is the absence of affirmative direction. A tyranny finds it easy to say no, it is the task of the freedom loving countries to say yes to all the potentialities of the human spirit, among whatever races or creeds those potentialities may be found. Challenge and response, ebb and flow, the flux of the human tides, the rise and fall of nations depend in the last instance on the affirmative powers of nations.

In this sense it is worth inquiring whether America is affirmative and whether its strength lies in affirmation. A dogmatic Marxist, deafened by the uproar in the Kremlin, but obedient to the orders that flow in a ceaseless flood from those ancient walls, believes that he alone is gifted with affirmation. He is continually saying yes to his captains and believes that he is saying yes to the world when he is merely repeating his acceptance of orders received. He does not enquire into the motives of the captains, and since the ends so singularly justify the means, he will say yes to the most notoriously inefficient means of all, which are mass murder and deprivation of liberties in prison cells. To affirm the Marxist view of history is not enough, he

must affirm the Leninist view and the Stalinist view, creating a triple affirmation, even though one affirmation tends to cancel another and the last is credited with a degree of sanctity which places it on a pinnacle surpassing all the oracles. "Be affirmative. Be patient. Remember that in time, if you obey Radio Moscow, the wealth of the world will be shared among Communists according to their merit, the State will perhaps wither away or become stronger, the reactionaries will die, and the fabulous will come to pass." This is not parody. The Russians derive great strength from the delusion that they are affirmative, forgetting that the quality of their affirmation is not easily distinguishable from dogma on one side and mysticism on the other and that their certainties derive from the legend that they are the chosen inheritors of the earth; in this they are no wiser than those who believe in manifest destiny, whether it is German or American. There are degrees in affirmation. To affirm a course of conduct against all odds, even when it has been shown to be ill advised, is the pattern of a tyranny. Patience, dogmatism, an apparently unassailable and affirmative *Weltanschauung* give them advantages of power that are not possessed by the impatient, undogmatic, and pliant Americans, who are still too likely to say, "Oh, yeah?" to any affirmation more serious than a statement about the weather.

In this sense the American is the loser; he can never hope to achieve except in anger the toughness of the totalitarians; his intense dislike of regimentation and even of authority make him assume soldiering only with distaste. The only affirmation that an American will take to heart seriously is the affirmation of freedom, an affirmation that is more than enough to counterbalance those of his enemies. Because at his best he believes implicitly in the value and dignity of the individual, he is the loser in any mass movement and will enjoin on himself, even when indistinguishable from the mass, as when he is a soldier, some singularities that will make him feel distinguished among them. But if a very great strength comes from a belief in freedom, a very great danger also arises. Over a hundred years ago, observing America in its extreme youth, De Tocqueville observed that "liberty may be conceived, by those who enjoy it, under two different forms: as the exercise of a universal right, or as the enjoyment of privilege," and in speaking of the first of these forms of liberty, he concludes:

‘ From the moment when this notion of liberty has penetrated deeply into the minds of the people, and has solidly established itself there, absolute and arbitrary power is thenceforth but a usurpation, or an accident, for, if no one is under any moral obligation to submit to another, it follows that the sovereign will can rightfully emanate only from the union of the wills of the whole. From that time passive obedience loses its character of morality, and there is no longer a medium between the bold and manly virtues of the citizen and the base compliance of the slave. In proportion as ranks become equalised this notion of liberty tends naturally to prevail.”

Nothing that has been written since the time of De Tocqueville conflicts with the elementary justice of his statement, yet it is impossible to underestimate the semantic dangers of the two conflicting interpretations of liberty. All the advantages that are acquired by a nation determined to be free democratic, and as far as possible egalitarian are lost when there exists a conspiracy to reinstate conceptions of privilege and it is useless at this late date to deny the existence of the privilege of wealth in America, where even to-day less than 8 per cent. of the population earn more than 4 000 dollars a year. The fact that there are similar vast inequalities in wealth in Russia does not affect the issue, there should not be the vast inequalities of wealth that exist in America, and it should not be possible for one man to control whole industries. If, for example it should happen that an Asiatic nation in a war should be asked to decide to form an alliance either with Soviet Russia or America, it would tend to follow America on the grounds that America offers a greater example of freedom, but it might tend to follow Russia on the ground that Russia offers on the whole a more egalitarian democracy. It is not possible in Soviet Russia for a man to acquire by the accidental discovery of oil wells the power represented by two hundred million dollars, and there is more than one millionaire in Texas who has acquired this power. This is not to suggest any illegality or moral indignation that men can acquire these powers in America and still less is it to suggest that the fathers of the Revolution demanded an egalitarian democracy. But it is necessary to insist that democracy in the present age suffers

checks and restraints whenever there are vast inequalities of wealth and that some means are necessary to destroy great privilege for the same reason that the American government is bound by its own laws to destroy monopolies wherever they exist.

Just as the word democracy as seen by the Russians means the rule of the people, i.e. of the proletariat, i.e. of the governing bureaucracy that has taken upon itself the charge of the proletariat, i.e. of a dictatorial bureaucracy that has nothing in common with the rule of the people, so freedom may mean, in Lord Acton's words, "the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion," or it may mean "the enjoyment of privilege." Since the announcement of the Four Freedoms, which are not so much freedoms as rights, the confusion has grown worse. And because men live and fight under the unsubstantial banners of words, to which they attach vast meanings, the danger increases. Where there are two entirely opposing conceptions of freedom—it is significant that for the Communists freedom bears the meaning of "privilege"—it is necessary to determine which is the meaning to be assumed by America. "This is the voice of freedom," General MacArthur remarked on returning to the Philippines. The cynic may remark that the Philippine peasant was indeed freed from the Japanese, but it is not so certain that he was freed from the feudal landlords of the Philippines. There are a million possible connotations of freedom, but freedom from the exorbitant demands of the extreme right or the extreme left, from the rule of the robber barons and the rule of the dogmatic bureaucrats must from now on be included within any viable definition. There can be no real freedom in Russia where a man is free to vote only for a single party. For the same reason it is unlikely that real freedom can emerge in a country where fantastic riches and fantastic poverty live side by side.

The theme of American freedom is a power in the world. The South Americans, the Asiatics, the unsubmerged nations of Europe, and even the Africans have looked since the American Revolution, but most desperately now, to America for leadership in the struggle for emancipation, and it would be the greatest disservice to the nations of the world if America refused to assume

this leadership. The imperfect, because ambivalent, freedom of America confronts the perfect tyranny of Russia, and though a blunt weapon is far better than no weapon at all, it would be folly to throw away the whetstone and not make it sharper, for the strength of the people depends precisely upon their exercise of freedom. The Americans are strong and may become stronger, but they will not become stronger unless they recognize that the exercise of freedom involves the exercise of the social weapon, which is the encouragement of freedom wherever it can be found.

How strong, then, are the Americans? No final equation is possible since there are so many different forms of national strength, though it must be insisted that the strength of a massed army, navy, and air force is no more than a reflection of the strength of the people. If physical vigour were a criterion, the Americans would possess greater strength than any nation except Sweden, but against this must be set the seemingly unimportant but disconcerting fact that the consumption of aspirins has quadrupled in America in ten years while the consumption in Sweden has increased only by a quarter. As Lennie discovered in *Of Mice and Men*, physical vigour may be a liability rather than an asset, and chronic nervousness does not help a nation at war. There can be no ultimates of physical vigour: a brutalized Chinese soldier may march further and fight a more bitter battle on vegetables and rice, on an income of 30 cents a month, than a mechanized soldier who has good food and the finest military equipment. If it is true, as some authorities are convinced, that in the next war the machines—the atom bombs, and the bacteria—will cancel each other out, in which countries are the people with the most staying power? Reading Dr. Kinsey's report, it would be easy to be convinced that American sexual vigour would be greater than that of Russia, for there is presumably a correlation between staying power and sexual vigour, but we lack comparable figures for the Russians. How do we measure when a nation or a civilization is becoming effete? Reading Dr. Toynbee, must we conclude that the Dark Ages are upon us and all civilizations except the most brutal and determinedly acquisitive are doomed to extinction? The growth of nations and civilizations obeys a law more complex than a simple equation between challenge and response: the fantastic portrait of the cliff-climbers has little enough to do with out present urgencies.

Here we come to a landscape where there are few definitions to help us. It is almost certainly true that the real strength of a nation, like the real strength of a man, lies in the strength of its friendships and loves. On the retention of the alliance against all Hitler's rages depended our victory. What of the next war? What of the armed peace, which must remain until the wisdom of a general demobilization descends upon us like the flames of Pentecost? The alliance between America and the sixteen free states of Europe has been confirmed, but what is the validity of an alliance between a country superbly capitalist and sixteen countries that are, in a lesser or greater degree, socialist? Mercifully for the sixteen states, and mercifully also for America, the alliance is based on the common interest of the preservation of essential freedoms and rights and is not only a weapon forged against the Communists. If it were, it might suffer the same fate of the Spanish Republican Government, which failed, not only because it was opposed by the superior equipment of Fascist states, but because it contained too many discordant elements who could be massed together only under the ensign of anti-Fascism, which is too negative an ensign to be worth dying for. The same fate will overcome the Grand Alliance of the seventeen states unless something entirely positive is put in the place of anti-Communism, for merely to fight for survival in a world so weary and war-torn as the world we live in is not enough. The real strength of America and of the Grand Alliance will only emerge when a positive pronouncement of aims has been assured. It is not enough to feed the hungry nations for a while; they may be hungry again and turn in despair to whatever political philosophy assists them most to believe that the millennium is near. The single word *Libertas* scribbled in chalk on the walls of Italy may not work its magic again; other words will be needed. Even the preservation of essential freedoms is not enough; their expansion will be required if the Communist wave is to be rolled back to its obscure origins. Much, much more than lip service to the goddess is required. There must be acts of humble service and understanding and meditation; the guns cannot be assured of victory when the uncertainties of power are so manifest. We may never know who drops the first atomic bomb, but we may know who are our friends. Sterling and dollar diplomacy failed to hold Singapore in 1941 and

Panama in 1948 the Malays were bought by the Japanese and the Panamanians rebelled against their own government, and both were key points, of incalculable importance to the Alliance

The end of power is still friendship and the sense of community. It is in these dangerous, uncharted, and extremely humble regions that American strength is most usefully exerted. In these regions the "Friendship Train" performs a greater service than the European Recovery Programme and techniques and mechanical skills acquired by foreign students in America have a more lasting effect than guns. It is in these regions that we find ourselves perpetually reminded that the word "freedom" comes from the same Anglo-Saxon root as the word 'friend,' and that power as pure supremacy is an invitation to disaster by the way of *hubris*. If Mr. Luce's American century in which 'All power for the Americans' takes the place of the battle-cry 'All power for the Soviets,' ever comes about America perishes. It was Hitler who first observed publicly that the mechanical means were available for the conquest by one powerful nation of the world, forgetting that no mechanical means were available for the conquest of hearts, though there exist sufficient for their extermination. The esoteric dream was mapped out even to the extent of the number of divisions which were to hold China: twenty-four thousand technicians were to hold down four hundred million determined peasants. It is unlikely that any other power will ever possess the same hopes.

But there are other conquests more lasting than purely military conquests, and some hint of the real strength of America is given in an executive order issued by the President to the Lend Lease Administration, General Eisenhower, and the Department of State, which read:

"No one will go hungry or without the other means of livelihood in any territory occupied by the United Nations, if it is humanly possible to make the necessary supplies available to them. Weapons will also be supplied to the peoples of those territories to hasten the defeat of the Axis."

Weapons were sent in uncounted numbers, and in a very real sense they were the weapons of freedom, but it is not by weapons alone that freedom is guarded. Other more formidable and more complex machines are required: the other means of livelihood



are as important as food, for without them there can be no hope of freedom. In a hesitant way these weapons have been sent to the unsubmerged countries of Europe—libraries have been built up; occasionally professors have been sent abroad; there are schemes in operation for the exchange of students; but few Germans have come to America on scholarships since the end of the war, there have been no sociological surveys of the peasants in northern Greece, Iran, or China, since the war no universities have been built up on foreign soil for the use of foreign students, and in general the sociological weapons have not been used. Food and machines have been sent abroad in vast and merciful quantities, but self-help demands that the real strength of America should be made visible, and this real strength does not lie wholly or ultimately in guns. There is always the choice between guns or butter, but neither in themselves breed a taste for freedom. "If it is humanly possible to make the necessary supplies available to them"—it is precisely the human possibilities that must be examined. When Mr. Jimmy Durante says, "Leave da people da hell alone," he is stating an important thesis of democratic government, but it is not a valid extension of this thesis to let people who are starving and frozen alone, nor is it a valid thesis to allow them to believe, as so many people do, that America is intolerant of everything except its own mechanical power and is concerned only with establishing military bases. There are other kinds of bases. There seems to be no reason why schools of freedom should not be opened, nor why for every soldier sent abroad into a foreign state there should not be one free man, sociologist, scientist, student, or workman, to represent the permanent interests of peace and the permanent expansion of the barriers of freedom. Though Albert Camus insists that "mankind's long dialogue has just come to an end," he can bring no evidence in support of it. The dialogue continues; it continues to the last torture chamber, the last scaffold, and the very doors of the incinerators. We live in a world where murder is legitimate; it is the better part of our strength and faith to fight the exercise of its legitimacy and to do it as free men, and if possible as peaceful, but always as men conscious of our duties to the world. Those who possess rights have the duty to make these rights known and then to ensure that others possess the same rights; there are no other safeguards. The ultimate strength of

America appears precisely here, not in the inchoate plans of the Burnhams and Lutes to make an American century come into existence by the exercise of military power.

It is significant that the most ambitious military project for the American government of the world came from an ex-Communist, the Burnhams, the Malraux, the Koestlers will always attempt to employ the ideological methods of Communism against the Communists and fail because their minds have been case-hardened by the formulas of power and because they see power only in terms of dominance. Free men see power in every act of friendship, every exchange of gifts, every scholarly and scientific progress. The war for freedom can be waged as bitterly as a military war even on sociological levels, but it needs unuring patience and the ability to see power in all its forms, not all of them are spectacular.

In the struggle for freedom Americans have advantages that are denied to other nations. Unlike National Socialism, the American way of life (which is not unbridled free enterprise only) is for export. It is a simple way, based profoundly on the ordered communities of the old New England settlements. There are other characteristics of the Americans that give them a singular advantage. It is not unimportant that Melville was a sailor, Thoreau a pencil maker, Whitman a painter and a carpenter, and Eugene O'Neill has been a sailor, a mule-tender on a cattle boat, a clerk in a mail-order office, and a cub reporter for a Connecticut newspaper. There was from the beginning an American tradition of venturing into all kinds of trades and mingling with all kinds of people. It has given them at their best a natural feeling for the shapes and configurations of people and things, a ruggedness without solemnity, and a sense that "each man is as good as the next." An inveterate optimism accompanied the Americans throughout their history until about the year 1921, or perhaps earlier, for the first signs of the "terror from across the waters" were announced in Mr. T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land*, with its vision of the hooded hordes swarming over endless plains and the falling towers of all Europe. It was at this time that the Americans realized that their self-confidence had been broached, and from Europe there came to them "the very fine and twisted fears" that had held Europe by the throat.

A new age had come. It became necessary to revise the foundations upon which America reposed.

It was part of the irony of those times that America, the strongest of existing nations even then, should have been conscious of some inherent and undefined weakness. It was seen dimly that America and Soviet Russia had more in common than most people suspected. John Reed saw in Soviet Russia the same forces that produced the American War of Independence. It was a simplification which could hardly be avoided once Lenin had postulated that Communism was only another name for the electrification of all Russia. The Americans, with their mechanical genius, were warmly welcomed at the birth of the Soviet Revolution, and both the Americans and the Soviets could dismiss with scorn the faint reproaches heard from Europe, which said that both America and the Soviet Union were still in the nineteenth century, the one deifying force and energy, the other accepting almost in its entirety a mechanistic view of the world and a curious incomprehension of the rights of man. There were at least some similarities that could not be dismissed so easily. But the Russian Communists, who demanded that the Russian people should be atheist though they were deeply religious, that they should surrender all their property to the State though the peasants had possessed property only for about seventy years, were essentially bureaucrats compelled to wage continual bureaucratic warfare against the Russian people, who since the earliest days of their history had fought against the inflictions of bureaucracy. The irony lay in the deliberate introduction of tyranny a few months after the government of Prince George Lvov had banned tyranny for ever. A thousand strands of contradictory impulse moved the Russian people and if they worshipped machines and fought desperately during the wars of intervention, the impulses were still complex in spite of the simplicity of their slogans. In comparison with the Russian mentality as revealed by her great novelists, Americans were generally simpler, more devout, and more uncritical; American minds did not, except in infrequent cases, move with the impetus of lightning flashes hurled across the heavens; they were more rooted to the earth, and more concerned with human issues. Americans did not believe in the messianic prophecies of Marx, not only because they had never examined the prophecies but

because they would not normally attach importance to prophecies, even though the Mormons left Independence, Missouri, at the call of a prophecy that was incredibly true. It was part of the strength of the American people that they thought out their spiritual foundations deliberately and ponderously, and having put their trust in freedom, refused to alter anything except the most minute details, with the result that Roger Williams, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and in our own day David Lilienthal seem to be speaking at the same time and place of identical things, and all of them are speaking of something mythical that has never been entirely obtained, though it is almost within reach. When David Lilienthal said—

"The fundamental tenet of Communism is that the State is an end in itself and that therefore the powers which the State exercise over the individual are without any ethical standards to limit them. This I deeply disbelieve. But it is very easy to talk about being against Communism. It is equally important to believe those things that provide a satisfying and effective alternative.

"Traditionally, democracy has been an affirmation and affirmative doctrine rather than merely a negative one. I believe—and I do so conceive the Constitution of the United States to rest upon, as does religion—the fundamental proposition of the integrity of the individual, and that all government and all private institutions must be designed to promote and to protect and defend the integrity and the dignity of the individual, that this is the essential meaning of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights."

he was not only employing the language of the Founding Fathers to controvert Senator McKellar, a Crump-machine front man, who was as incapable of understanding the generous impulses of the American revolutionaries as George III, but he was placing himself precisely and accurately in the main line of the American tradition. There was nothing in the least new in the expression of his opinions, only, as the years had gone by, greater weight and deliberation had been placed on the idea of the human integrity that the Founding Fathers had taken as a matter of course. Just as in Europe the glorious architecture, the rituals, the panoply, and hereditary rights had maintained an

unbroken tradition, so in America, in spite of all the evils of boss politicians, it was the tradition of human integrity and freedom that formed the solid core of belief. If the destiny of America can be explained in moral terms, it may be explained only as a broadening, an elevating, and a resurrection of all that is meant by human dignity. It is the main strength and the main weakness of the Americans that they believe implicitly in morality, the basic morality of mankind against the heaven-shrieking immorality of tyranny. When Thomas Paine threw his thunderbolts at the King, he threw them in the name of celestial freedom, and it seemed to him, as indeed it was, perfectly appropriate that celestial rather than earthly freedom should be invoked.

The ageless debate, the continual interpretation of the differences between tyranny and freedom continues, though the voices of the debaters are now provided with sharper cutting edges. It is not in any sense a recent debate; it began long before Job found himself at the mercy of powers greater than his own. Essentially it revolves around the meaning of the word "freedom." "As I would not be a slave," said Lincoln, "so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy." It was not the whole story, as Jefferson had discovered previously when his strictures against slavery were edited out. Something more clear-cut than tautology is required. Whitman's panegyrics, though by far the most insistent and the most beautiful, were not "the standard to which men can repair," if only because there were too many standards in his poems, all vociferously fluttering and veering in the wind; yet he was by far the most eloquent and sincere, and with Melville he was the first to enlarge upon the "glory of democracy" and the very humanness that lay in the heart of American freedom at its finest. The original Declaration of Independence was written in the language of the philosophers; with Melville and Whitman it received the imprint of the human spirit. It is important to remember that the continual debate on the terms and meanings of democracy was entirely distinct from prophecy. There is no insistence on the imaginary iron laws of history that give reverberation to *The Communist Manifesto*. The generation that produced Locke could not think in terms of iron laws, for history was seen to be far too various to be obedient to a continuing pattern: not movements, but the behaviour of men was seen to be the criterion. And so it is

that when Marx discusses the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, treating them as  $x$ ,  $y$ , and  $z$  in some formal equation, saying, for example, as he says in *The Communist Manifesto*, that the task of the bourgeois society was to destroy feudal society root and branch preparatory to its own destruction in the final phase of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, he was implying that a whole society would commit suicide of its own will simply in order that the law should be obeyed. But what happens when the Tables of the Law are not obeyed? What happens, for example, if the developing pattern of society breaks down the walls between societies? When he wrote in the Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* that "no social form perishes until all the productive forces for which it provides scope have been developed," he was inventing a law that has nothing in common with the experience of history. Societies have perished before they have completely developed, either by the invasion of tribesmen from abroad or by treachery from within. The encompassing patterns of history are too variable for iron laws, and it was the particular genius of the Anglo-American concept of history that it provided the greatest possible freedom of development, not the laws of history, but the moral laws were rigidly invoked.

It is in this territory that the conflict between Communism and democracy becomes most acute. If history obeys unyielding laws, the purposes of morality are forfeit and "celestial freedom" becomes a meaningless phrase without the faintest resemblance to anything that exists in the minds of men. A blind and unrelenting law demands blind and unrelenting obedience. In such-and-such a fashion the proletariat will take power from the bourgeoisie, in such-and-such a fashion national differences and antagonisms will perish—the blind law remains, operating in a vacuum, the arms of the windmill continually revolving, though no breath of air ever comes to touch them.

There are still other ways in which the Communist definitions of history fly in the face of the Anglo-American definitions. When Marx wrote—

"National differences and antagonisms are to-day vanishing ever more and more with the development of the bourgeoisie, free trade in the world market, the uniformity of industrial production and the conditions of life corresponding thereto,

but with the victory of the proletariat they will vanish still faster, so that with the disappearance of the classes within the nation the state of enmity between nations will come to an end,"

the first part of his thesis was true, but the second part introduced the same messianic visions that have clouded all Communist issues, and it was the strength of the Anglo-American idea that it was directed precisely toward "the development of the bourgeoisie, free trade in the world market and uniformity of industrial production," not because this was the law of history, but because the conditions of the time demanded the widest possible markets. The very real strength of America lay precisely here—in the pliancy and feverish experiment and the basic sense of morality that ruled and continued to rule where all iron laws failed. And the final issue was freedom, under whatever disguise, and freedom by definition opposed the ancient laws on the iron tablets; man, not law, was the measure of all things.

But if there was strength there were also weaknesses in the Anglo-American pattern. The urgency of the moral laws was not always recognized, and Anglo-American expediency could work for profit as ably as the G.P.U. But the significance of the moral law should not be minimized: the Civil War was fought very largely on moral issues, and if we are to imagine the scope of this civil war in modern terms, it would be necessary to invent a civil war on Russian soil between the Russians of the west and the G.P.U. in control of the slaves in the east. The issues of morality have not been faced by the Communists. When Maxim Gorky wrote to Lenin pleading that enough blood had been shed in the Revolution, he was answered with vituperation, and when Stalin was asked why it was necessary to murder so many *kulaks*, he answered that everything that opposed his programme must be resolutely crushed to extinction, but even the evil have their martyrs, and mass murder provides no solution to the development of historical problems except to cancel them completely, and by cancelling men nothing is gained and everything is lost since their potentialities are cancelled with them. The moral law implies mercy and understanding, and though mercy and understanding are the hardest of human virtues to acquire, they, also, have their place in history for the same reason

that a mother is merciful and understanding to a helpless baby And just as there are no iron laws that describe the infinite possibilities of the growth of a human being so the British and Americans refused to subscribe iron laws to the development of their historical evolution

Any examination of the strength of the American people must include an examination of the underlying 'gospel of freedom' that informs them That freedom in America has many disguises that some of these disguises are pernicious and indevolent and resemble the masks of witch-doctors that even in America tyranny masquerades as freedom and freedom herself is compelled to masquerade as tyranny does not concern us now, for we are concerned with the evolution of an idea that is native to the Americans The supreme hoax of the Communists was to invent a murmur language in which freedom meant the freedom of a single class to do as it pleased which in turn could mean only the freedom to tyrannize, and this resulted from an interpretation of history that gave validity to the class and none to the individual It is in this sense that Communism deliberately begs the question of tyranny and does not even attempt to solve the difficult equation between the individual and the State Democracy chooses a more difficult and winding course; suffers greater hazards, allows too often the emergence of the petty tyrant, but sets checks and limitations to the power of government, and to an extent now unrealizable in Russia allows the growth of the individual according to the patterns of individual growth, not to the patterns of government And by allowing so great a trust to the individual, democracy offers him the recompense of his own free development, while tyranny must bind and constrict him so that whenever he pushes out a new branch or leaf, the branch or leaf must be lopped off the poets must be silenced, the labourer must never move without government permission from his place of residence, the musician must write according to motifs supplied by the government, and the inevitable gigantism which displays itself in all tyrannies demands that men should stand, not only in the shadow of the machine, but in the shadow of the miraculous Father who leads the revolution The iron law becomes mythology and nightmare, a new created god demands the allegiance of all men, but no throne is so insecure as a mythic throne, and the mythology is constantly changing, may move



left one moment and right the next, or by the laws of synthesis change unaccountably in a moment of its opposite. Against all this the slow simplicity of the American theme, hardly changing, rooted on the point of honour that is human dignity, remains steadfast. The robber barons, the bosses, and the huge corporations can make no dent in it. And though greater depths of meaning and untold thousands of associations have formed accretions upon the words democracy and freedom, there is no essential difference between the statements of Americans a hundred years ago and their statements of purpose to-day. Common Cause, an organization that has recently examined the meaning of democracy, defines it as simply and purposefully as Whitman when he wrote the definition which, after Milton, still remains the most wonderful of all; and there is nothing surprising in the fact that the prosody of Whitman, the rhythms, even the juxtaposition of words derives from a Shakespearean sermon on mercy, which in turn derives from the thirteenth-century anthems of the Victorines:

“Liberty relies upon itself, invites no one, promises nothing, sits in calmness and light, is positive and composed, and knows no discouragement. The battle rages with many a loud alarm and frequent advance and retreat—the enemy triumphs—the prison, the handcuffs, the iron necklace and anklet, the scaffold, and lead balls do their work . . . the cause is asleep . . . the strong throats are choked in their own blood, the young men drop their eyelashes towards the ground when they pass each other . . . and is liberty gone out of that place? No, never. When liberty goes, it is not the first to go nor the second nor third to go. . . . It is the last. When the memory of the old martyrs are faded utterly away . . . when the large names of patriots are laughed at . . . when the boys are no more christened after them but christened after tyrants and traitors instead . . . when the laws of the free are grudgingly permitted and laws for informers and spies are sweet to the taste of the people . . . when you and I walk abroad upon the earth strong with compassion at the sight of numberless brothers answering our equal friendship and calling no man master, and when we are elated with noble joy at the sight of slaves . . . when the soul has ecstasy over the word and deed

that put back a helpless innocent person into any cruel infirmity when the swarms of cringers, suckers, doughfaces, lice of politics, planners of sly involution for their own preferment obtain a response of love and deference from the people

when it is better to be a bound booby and a rogue in office at a high salary than the poorest free mechanic or farmer with his hat unmoved from his head and firm eyes and a candid and generous heart and when servility or oppression on a large scale or a small scale can be tried on without its punishment following duly after or rather when all life and all the souls of men and women are discharged from any part of the earth—then only shall the instinct of liberty be discharged from that part of the earth "

What is certain is that the meaning and application that are given to the words freedom and democracy will decide the destiny of America, and since the meaning changes but slowly and is clear to most Americans, it is on the application that everything will depend, and a great part of the real strength of America is jeopardized whenever the application fails. How democratic, then, is America? It would be easy enough to provide sufficient quotations from even the most reactionary Press in America to show that the application of democracy has been a progressive failure, that every conceivable tyranny has at one time or other been practised in America, that men are lopped and chiselled into shape by iron economic forces, and that the Four Freedoms are significantly lacking in America, as they are lacking elsewhere. "The distinguishing feature of 85 per cent of the jails of the country are filth, the herding together of convicted criminals and persons awaiting trial, the mingling of well with foully diseased individuals the prevalence of bedbugs and lice," wrote a distinguished penologist in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* in September, 1931. *The Reader's Digest* for August, 1936, contained the deliberate statement that "through public neglect and legislative penny-pinching, state after state has allowed its institutions for the mentally sick to degenerate into little more than concentration camps, with scores of deaths of patients following beatings by attendants." John Gunther in *Inside U.S.A.* says simply that "what the poll tax really means, in the words of Jennings Perry,

is that the majority of people in seven states have no voice in Government." Carey McWilliams in *Ill Fares the Land* records that "in the Southern states the net annual cash earnings of hired workers, whether share-croppers or wage-hands, only occasionally exceed \$100 per worker and even with perquisites seldom exceed \$150." There is now no doubt at all that third-degree punishment is officially encouraged by the police, that Negroes in many states are still treated as slaves, that boss rule remains in many state capitals, and that complete equality, as De Tocqueville said, continually eludes the grasp of the people who, when they think they hold it fast, "see it flying, as Pascal says, with eternal flight." There is no egalitarian democracy in the strictest sense in America, and there are all the unsolved evils of mechanization. A towering indictment can be made against American practice. But though America is infinitely harmed by its non-practice of democracy, it is infinitely strengthened by its practice wherever it occurs. A transitional stage seems to be occurring now. Instead of boss rulers, cities are being increasingly governed by city managers. Neither are purely democratic, but the city manager has at least the advantage of offering more efficient government. The greatest havoc in the fabric of democracy in America has been caused by bossism, which has occurred and can only occur when the people abdicate their democratic responsibilities. At the same time the greatest good results from the increasing determination of the people to destroy bossism, and any indictment must take into account the gradual elimination of the bosses. Democracy, which surpasses all other systems in its demands on the time and energy of its citizens, suffers in America from the fact that Americans are impatient to use their own time for their own ends, and from the fact that a sense of community of interests is difficult to achieve in an industrial civilization. But no one can doubt that the main current is toward the elimination of the evils that arose as a result of the frontier civilizations of the last century. If America were perfect, its perfection would be incredible; only the shallowest congressmen deny the imperfections of America. The test, as always, is whether the poorest citizens are given their full rights. The migrant workers of America are not given their full rights, but there is increasing evidence to show that the federal government is attempting to challenge the rights of their employers. Most

important of all, the increasing power of the federal government to intervene on all matters that concern the social welfare of the nation is a factor that must be reckoned with. Nothing is easier than to compile statistics showing the inequalities of the social distribution of the nation, but it is necessary to recognize that increased aid for old-age pensioners, increased grants for education and the tremendous burden of social insurance suggest that America is slowly becoming a social rather than a Socialist state. We cannot turn back Socialism. Even in Soviet Russia a certain amount of private enterprise remains. Clearly the balance between private enterprise and Socialism will not be the same in every country, and in a highly industrialized community like America private enterprise will always have the greater share, but the fact of private enterprise does not invalidate a state from being a social state. There is a sense in which both Russia and America are Socialist.

Nothing is so remarkable as the continuing legend that America is a capitalist country and all Americans are capitalists. It is true that finance capitalism still occupies the major part in industry, but of the classic capitalist system governed by free competition and the law of supply and demand, only a vestige is left. The monopolies act like the Soviet monopolies, until recently their power within their own chosen sphere was illimitable and the rewards were beyond reckoning. Yet already the restrictive laws against monopolies are beginning to work toward a solution which means inevitably that they will break up into socially more useful units, and some of the natural monopolies will go into public ownership.

It is necessary to insist on the comparatively small place occupied by classic capitalism because the legend of free enterprise remains. The tragedy so often is that enterprise is not free, that the monopolies remain in spite of the restrictive laws, and the quasi monopolies in oil and aircraft production possess vast lobbying powers in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The two extremes of the tragedy of modern America do not meet, the socially irresponsible monopolies and the destitution of the poorer sections of America are tragedies at poles apart. The classic failure in housing after the war, largely brought about by the determined efforts of vested interests to forbid housing except on levels where huge profits could be made, remains as a hideous

and continual reminder of the unsocial aspect of private enterprise even when no monopolies exist, and even Senator Taft's suggestion that the Government should be empowered to build 10 per cent. of the required housing but no more, leaving the rest to private enterprise, suggests a shocking incomprehension of social issues. These social issues are clear-cut and sharply defined without the slightest ambiguity, and free enterprise fails whenever it disregards and becomes intolerant of the social issues involved. During the war Mr. Charles E. Wilson, President of the General Electric Company, stated the obligations of private enterprise to the defence of the nation:

"The components of the private enterprise system should take the initiative in defining the obligations the whole system will and can positively assume, while it defines those obligations which it will actively support government in assuming."

What is needed now is something far more significant—a declaration by private enterprise describing the limits where the system can act freely and those other limits where the system must act within the order of social responsibility. Clearly, housing is within the order of social responsibility.

All this is germane to our study, for the stresses to which Americans are put clearly affects the strength of the people, and there can be no greater stress than that which comes from living in a community where there are five essentially different types of enterprise. The vast influence of the public service, the increasing number of public servants, the continual battle waged by the Government against monopoly, and the increasing limitations in the classic capitalist system have altered the map of American production, and they have even begun to alter the American way of life. An expanding bureaucracy is increasingly being felt, and it is a sign of the times that the Veterans Administration, with 210,000 employees, has more people working for it than there were in the entire Army and Navy in the early 'thirties. Meanwhile, there is increasing recognition, due largely to the failure of the housing programme in spite of the "socialization" by the Government of investment risks through F.H.A., H.O.L.C., and other devices, that planning by the Government and some degree of socialization of housing is necessary. There will not be a Socialist state, but there is every reason to believe

that a social state may come about, and some of the unfortunate effects of the New Deal should not blind us to the necessity of a social state. Free enterprise and monopoly capitalism have enjoyed a long run, neither have proved that they were actuated by social motives, and it is time that they either proclaimed the social motive and held fast to it, or went out of business, for assuredly the failure in housing was a test case, and the failure was so irresponsible that it seemed committed with a fatal instinct of self-destruction.

But if it was a part of the great strength of America to tolerate the abuses of untrammelled free enterprise and the still more untrammelled monopolies, it was also part of their strength. Capitalism does not under normal circumstances permit full employment, or the planned use of raw materials, or the co-ordination of re-equipment in industry, but it does possess the primary advantage of being susceptible to every change in the money market, shocks can be taken that would normally result in general impoverishment under socialist conditions. At times of great economic crisis, capitalism therefore becomes weak and disorganized. The shock vibrations are felt throughout the economic structure, and State intervention hardly distinguishable from State Socialism enters the scene. But it is difficult to understand why social capitalism should not be the next stage of the complex development through which capitalism has passed. There are already indications that this can come about, is coming about, and will stay for a long while. The profit sharing scheme of the Lincoln Electric Company, the Nunn-Bush scheme, the Caribbean Fisheries Company, the Venezuela Basic Economy Corporation and the International Basic Economy Corporation are indications of the method to be pursued. Mr. Eric A. Johnston said, "We in business must liberalize or face the threat of economic liquidation. The law of life applies adapt or die." It was a significant admission, for it implied that labour was not a commodity and business possessed a social responsibility that it had not acknowledged until recently. The question still remains whether the cut-throat ethics of business and the possession of a social consciousness are entirely compatible within a business organization. That some steps have been made in this direction, that labour is co-operative to all profit-sharing ideas and works committees and that capital must evolve into a

social instrument or perish are all undeniable. What is also undeniable is that the first major test of capital under social conditions after the war demonstrated an extraordinary failure on the part of capital to assume social responsibilities; the houses were not built. And it still remains true that capitalism is not geared to the social community and that the creation of artificial wants may be criminal when real wants are not satisfied. Among the real wants is the want of labour to be employed, with the result that the deliberate creation by a planned economy of a pool of unemployment, as suggested by Senator Flanders, would itself be an anti-social act, and what is surprising is not that the suggestion has been made, but that it so closely conforms to the pattern of Soviet Russia, where the slave camps take the place of the "unemployment pool."

"The bourgeoisie [wrote Karl Marx in *The Communist Manifesto*] during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had ever a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?"

Even in the history of capitalism written by capitalists there has never been so disarming an admission of capital's triumphs, yet it is necessary to understand that these triumphs were not essentially capitalist triumphs, though many of them would not have been accomplished so easily or so well without a classic capitalist economy. It is essential to recognize that Marx was writing at a time considerably before the emergence of finance capital in the sense it acquired around the eighties of the last century. What is remarkable in Marx's statement is not so much his panegyric on the bourgeoisie, as the fact that it was torn from him, that he could not refuse, in spite of the revolutionary fervour of the times, to admit the supremacy of an age of bourgeois advancement. But we do not answer Marx by insisting that the rising standard of living in America is a sufficient reason for the continuation of capitalism in its present form, nor is it sufficient

answer to compare United States and Soviet prices in terms of hours of work, nor is it sufficient to say that the "hidden hand" of prices costs and profits "does the job," since the hidden hand is no more than mysticism. The comparison with Soviet communism is an irrelevance. It must be accepted from the beginning that a purely bureaucratic tyranny is not the form in which a great nation should compare itself. What is at stake is still liberty and democracy and neither survive under untrammelled free enterprise. The purposes of liberty and democracy are not followed if a large black market in steel exists since steel has social uses nor do the scandals of the Chicago grain market assist the purposes of liberty and democracy for a man has a right to be fed at a reasonable cost.

The tremendous achievements of American capitalism—the fact that there are over 3,700,000 business firms, over 6,000,000 privately owned farms and more than 60,000,000 employed workers—should not blind Americans to the necessity of improving capitalism by giving it social purpose on a far wider scale than it has ever accomplished and nothing is so suggestive of the final failure of capital in terms of social progress as the statement that "full employment would be incompatible with the free-enterprise system which carries with it the right to a normal float of unemployment" a statement made recently at the Investment Bankers Association. Since by any Bill of Rights a man has a right to work, what is "a normal float of unemployment"? Ultimately, unless capitalism achieves a social purpose, it will fail, and in its place socialism becomes inevitable, with the result that free enterprise is so restricted that it assumes hardly more significance than the right to trade in pots and pans. But a failure of capitalism is not in the least necessary and will come about only as a result of the fanatic blindness of the capitalists themselves. The principles of free enterprise are not in question; what is in question is the *conduct* and it is only by assuring that its conduct is above reproach that it will be able to endure. Very recently Mr. Austin S. Igleheart, speaking at the annual dinner of the Traffic Club of New York, estimated that thirty-five million, rather more than half the working population, were still unconvinced of the merit of the profit-and-loss, free-enterprise system and he added that only one worker in five gets any information at all about profits, wages, and the employer's



financial condition. Management by its folly and indifference was beginning to reap the whirlwind.

It would be the gravest folly to underestimate the crisis in capitalism. As long as capitalism refuses to accept social responsibilities, the crisis will remain, even though it is astonishingly true that 7 per cent. of the world's population living in the United States is doing roughly 40 per cent. of the world's work in providing food, clothing, and shelter. But capitalism has not yet recognized that labour is not a commodity; it is still impatient of restraints, even human restraints, and it is not true, as J. M. Keynes said, that "avarice and usury and precaution must be our goods for a little longer still, for only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight." There may be, almost certainly are, other ways, and these other ways do not include State tyranny, or avarice raised to the level where it is assumed to be a virtue, or even State Socialism. This is the problem of human skills and ingenuity. If we could devote to the technicalities of economic organization a fraction of the resources and human ability that we devote for destroying the economic organization of enemies when we are at war, the problem would be solved. Meanwhile, the frames of reference are clear. We must so arrange our economy that, in Mr. Eric Johnston's words, "wealth comes to the many and not the few." The achievement of America is to have brought this about within the continental frontiers of America on a scale never reached by any other country, even though 20 per cent. of the population is living on a weekly income of slightly more than sixteen dollars. But the restless, continually dissatisfied Americans cannot be expected to accept such inequalities with equanimity, and that these inequalities are not being accepted with equanimity is suggested by the huge and rising strength of the labour unions with their 10,000,000 paid-up membership and a combined wealth of three hundred million dollars. The unions are fast reaching the stage when, in spite of internal dissensions, they are likely to exert far-reaching political powers; the capture of the British Government by the trade unions remains of immense significance to the American worker. It is therefore all the more necessary that capital should formulate a new policy while there is time, for American labour has it in its power to capture Congress and the Senate. What is surprising is that until recently no concerted

efforts were made toward a capture that will become inevitable unless capital subscribes to the social demands of the majority of the workers

In the end we are faced with the fact that we cannot measure the strength of a people statistically. Even the figure of a rising birth rate is useless for our purpose, since the rise of the birth-rate under Nazi Germany showed only a spurious confidence in the power of German organization to rule the world. Two factors, however, remain of prime importance. First the mixture of races by which so many skills of so many different kinds have congregated in America and secondly the awakening of political and social consciousness, an awakening occurring with such speed and such prodigious refinement of purpose that it may be discovered, after all, that those who are the latest on the field derive the greatest benefits. Meanwhile it is essential to recognize that the mixture of races, the rise of capitalism and the advance of labour all spring from the same source. There could have been no mixture of races without the promise of freedom, no rise of capital without the employment and sometimes the abuse of freedom, and no advance of labour without the consciousness of a still greater freedom.

Whichever way one turns the fact of freedom is there, and the real strength of America lies in the uses of freedom, and the real weakness lies in the abuse of freedom—a most uncomfortable word—for it challenges implacably and is empty of meaning unless it has social content. It was not true that democracy is "a great word whose history remains unwritten, because that history has yet to be enacted," but Whitman was on surer ground when he wrote, "I can conceive of no better service in the United States henceforth by democrats of thorough and heart-felt faith, than boldly exposing the weakness, liabilities and infinite corruptions of democracy." With one third of the nation ill clothed, ill fed, and ill sheltered, with some eleven million families (about a third of the total) receiving some form of Government assistance, with 40 per cent of all United States workers completely excluded from unemployment, old age, and survivors' insurance, with capital refusing to face voluntary controls and labour intransigent in demanding higher wages when nothing is so likely than that higher wages will only increase the strains of the inflation, there are a sufficient number

of things sapping at American strength to make men wonder for the future. There is a blind side to the heart; there is an amazing political immaturity on the part of the workers; there is far too much corruption in high places; yet only the blindest fail to perceive the growth of a new strength that has little to do with the fantastic extent of American industrialization. Marianne Moore speaks somewhere of real toads in imaginary gardens; in America there are real men in fabulous engine-rooms, and nothing is more certain than that their final strength lies in freedom everywhere.

For America is young, though only a few years ago she was old. A new fervour enlarges the land, and as Europe and the world grow weaker, sick with despair, or else as in the Far East leaping across centuries of age into still another youth, America redresses the weakness of others, her symbol no longer the frontier woodsman with his axe, or the capitalist, but the train of friendship and the fireside talk. All physical barriers have been crossed; all frontiers have come to an end. The weakness of Europe and the numbing tyrannies of Russia liberated the potentialities of a nation that was about to rest on its laurels or ride miserably along the road of reaction into the terror of economic despotism. The last war was undecisive, but the present war against tyranny, which began in August, 1945, will decide all things. To this decision the renewed idealism, strength of purpose, and lust for life of the Americans seems to be dedicated as never before. "The last, best hope" may become the first. In a sense it is as simple as a phrase of Washington and as complex as a formula for uranium fission—that lust for a real freedom that at last is beginning to dominate the American scene.

## ON AMERICAN POWER

*We live on an edge of land, an inch or two deep, and were we to struggle with the land, it would be like struggling with the Dragon, but our way is to follow the Law of Heaven, and by conspiring to love the earth take her nourishment, and the Dragon will not roar at us, but be quietly obedient to our propoies*

TAI WAN HSU

FOR SEVEN THOUSAND years mankind has sought a more abundant life on earth, but wherever he goes he seems destined to meet with failure. Only in countries where the earth has been quietly tamed, leisurely planted and leisurely reaped, do we discover an attitude toward the earth that suggests that men have been careful to take no more than they need. Even in China, the scarred and broken slopes and the yellow dust are evidence that man's attempted conquest of the earth has been turned into a rout. We tend to forget that the most important battles are not fought by men, they are fought between seeds no larger than a pinhead and a crust of earth.

It is one of the terrible ironies of history that at the moment when the Americans have suddenly leaped into the vitality of adult life the American earth shows for the first time signs of being exhausted. In war men are expendable, but we dare not expend the earth. The topsoil, the minerals, the coal, the oil of America—all these are being expended at a fabulous rate. The useful area of the country is already shrinking away, and in the foreseeable future it may be necessary for the Americans to do what the Chinese have done for centuries—they may have to grow their wheat on mountains.

This is not, however, as desperate a venture as it might seem, the wealth of America in natural resources is being drained away, but almost as fast as it is being drained, new resources of agriculture are being applied, new mines are being opened, and new oil wells dug. When in 1909 President Theodore Roosevelt's

Conservation Committee reported that six million tons of phosphate ought to be applied to the land every year, he was offering a counsel of perfection. Forty years later, when hardly more than three million tons were being produced and a third of these were being exported, the situation was one to make the gods despair. The gods have been despairing continually, but the productivity of the American land remains as formidable as ever, though at present America loses two and a half million tons of phosphates through the harvesting of crops and grazing and another three million tons through erosion every year. Even this is not the end of the story. The washing away of the soil by improper cultivation costs America nearly four billion dollars a year and altogether three billion tons of earth are swept away every year. The Gulf of Mexico gets rich while America gets poorer, but what remains is still a fabulous empire.

The earth is in a state of famine. We cannot hope to feed all the inhabitants at the levels at which they should be fed. The population of the earth increases alarmingly. Between 1900 and 1940 it increased by nearly six hundred million, and during the ten years from 1930 to 1940 it increased by two hundred million. The rate of increase is therefore accelerating at a rate far greater than the acceleration of the productivity of the earth; the old theorem of Malthus has returned to torment our dreams. In America the drift away from the farms, the hundreds of acres of developed land in the West that are in danger of becoming desert because more land is being brought under the plough than the developed water supply will support, the tenuous hold of Southern California, the practice of "square farming on round land," the reckless use of streams, and the burning off of dry vegetation in the springtime are all signs of warning. The physical wealth of America lies in its topsoil and its mines; the mines are running out and the topsoil is thinning down; yet, this, too, is hardly the whole story, for the conservators are at last at work in earnest. "At the rate we are going," said Dr. Kenneth A. Reid, executive secretary of the Isaak Walton League of America, "the rain and snow have ground away three inches of soil since our country was founded and there are only six inches left. Our descendants won't have enough dirt to plant turnips." Fear has begun to set men to work in earnest about the problems of the land.

The problem of topsoil is probably the most serious immediate

problem to be faced with regard to conserving American energy, and even America's industrial power, for one cannot build huge machines and skyscrapers in the middle of a Sahara. Conservation, applied strictly, can save all but a fraction of the soil that is being swept into the sea, it can completely prevent the recurrence of the "dust bowl." But the problem remains urgent and even greater effort will have to be made, if the examples provided by the waste deserts of Persia, Arabia, and North Africa are not to be followed. too many people have now flown over North Africa, seeing faintly through the sand the dim edges of the granaries of Rome, to be acquiescent any longer to the destruction that comes from carelessness. Rome surrendered to the Goths largely because she had lost her granary by a fatal carelessness. North China, once golden with abundance, is now golden with sand. Worst of all, as Dr. Lowdermilk has pointed out, is the dispersal of populations, so that the land is left untenanted and the herds break down the pitifully weak terraces. The dispersal that arose in Europe and Africa as a result of the invasions of the Goths and the Arabs has been mirrored in America. There are vast centrifugal immigrations. There are great population increases in Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, and California in the West, and in Florida and New York in the East. A great belt, roughly corresponding to the Louisiana Purchase, stretching from Montana in the North to Alabama in the South, shows a gradually dwindling population.

The drift from the farm is indicated by the fact that 8,594,000 households are now described as rural but non farm. America is splitting in two, and there are now two great centres of gravity, one lying near the coast of California and the other within the triangle Chicago-New-York-Houston. And perhaps it was inevitable that at a time when the frontiers of America have all been claimed, and she looks outward beyond the seas towards further frontiers, that the division should take place. In point of economic and industrial power there are in fact two centres of gravity, and two capitals. For much the same reason the Roman Empire under the Goths had capitals in Ravenna and Rome.

But if the effects of the migration do nothing to repair the land, and are therefore to some extent extremely dangerous, they are still more dangerous when they are regarded from the point of the view of the cities, where crimes, divorce rates and

relief are continually increasing. The breakdown of the family, the higher cost of living in the great cities and the dislocation of the school system are also inevitable products of the great migration. At the end of 1947, according to the Department of Commerce, the large family including six or more related persons constituted only about 12 per cent. of all households.

Since so much of the technological civilization of cities is "technology for waste," the danger of such migrations is felt at full force during times of depression. But a far greater danger lies in the abandonment of the habit of agriculture. Such a consequence is not important when there are foreign supplies of foodstuffs to be relied upon, as happened when the farmers of Italy migrated to Rome and were fed on Egyptian corn. But Americans cannot continue to be fed and for all the more reason cannot continue to feed Europe, China, Korea, and Japan if the drift away from the farm becomes much greater. In spite of technological advances in agriculture, a very large number of farmers are still required, and there is still far too little attention being paid to soil conservation.

Meanwhile, the battle is by no means lost. The experience of the Jews in reclaiming old and neglected lands to new production, the system of terracing that makes China resemble from the air a most beautiful configuration of blue, green, and white silk, and the introduction on a still more advanced scale of such projects as the Tennessee Valley Authority offer hope for the future. Land can be won from the sea, as the Dutch discovered in their Zuyder Zee project, or from marshes, as the French discovered when they reclaimed the sand dunes and swamps of Les Landes. Meanwhile, conservation measures in America have already increased the yields by 35 per cent. as an average, and it seems reasonable to hope that the figure can be increased to 60 per cent.

In other countries conservation may yet save the day. The Jordan Valley power and irrigation project may bring an abundance of food not only to Palestine, but to the whole of the Near East. Dr. Lowdermilk has stated that the Tigris-Euphrates Valley of Iraq is the greatest potential single reclamation project in the world, capable of supporting forty million people with a high standard of living. It is possible that the race with hunger may be lost, but it is least likely to be lost in America if the

power projects are well advanced—the Missouri Valley project will irrigate more than five million acres in the Plains area, and the Columbia Basin, the Colorado Basin, and the St. Lawrence Seaway projects will reclaim further millions.

In the race for food even the mysterious has its place. In April, 1948, naval scientists of La Jolla, California, stumbled upon vast layers of life two thousand feet deep in the ocean, swarming with unidentified living things, which reflected sound, disappeared at night, could not even be obtained in samples, but seemed to consist of a belt of protein five hundred feet thick covering three-quarters of the earth's surface. The Californians who complained that the valleys of California needed only the desalinated water from the sea to become a paradise more fabulous than the paradise it already is could take comfort from the spectral protein, meanwhile, they refused to be put out of countenance by the statement that to take the salt from sea water remained for the moment a practical impossibility.

But the shortage of food remains and it is intimately connected with the shortage of water. Los Angeles engineers have calculated that the last newcomer crossing the Rockies heading west will arrive in 1968 unless new sources of water are acquired. Arizona is affected perhaps more desperately—underground supplies are being exhausted by overpumping with the result that two-thirds of the water supply of the state has gradually withered away—the life blood of the earth is disappearing. It is the same in the Panhandle, where water is sometimes worth more than the same amount of oil, and the Middle West and the East are gradually being affected in the same way. Los Angeles, doubling its population every ten years, incapable of living on the resources of the dusty Los Angeles river and fearful of the desperate results if the Metropolitan Aqueduct is cut, now takes water from sources three hundred and fifty miles away. If the pipe lines are cut, industry perishes. Not only would there be insufficient water, but there would also be a power shortage far greater than that which compelled northern California into a rationing programme. Property would become valueless overnight, and very soon Los Angeles and all the twenty nine cities that comprise the county of Los Angeles would be buried in sand like ancient Carthage. It may happen yet, but it will not happen as long as there is continual planning and as long as two pipe lines remain.



Yet strategically nothing is more dangerous than relying on pipe lines: it was by the cutting of the Johore-Bahru pipe line that Singapore fell.

Water, steel, and oil form the industrial backbone of the nation. Each one of these is being expended at a rate that may threaten disaster. There are a million more oil furnaces in operation and three and a half million more motor cars on the roads than in 1941. The nation is using 150,000 more barrels of petroleum daily than it is producing, a difference that is made up with difficulty by imports and the use of reserve stocks. Even though exports of oil have been almost halved, the bottleneck remains, and the very real weakness in oil production may be seen from the statement of Mr. James Forrestal: "It now appears that the United States military and civilian needs for a major war effort would exceed by at least 2,000,000 barrels a day the foreseeable production of the continental United States," while Mr. Max W. Ball, Director of the Oil and Gas Division of the Interior Department, says that civilian consumption of oil, reduced about a third during the last war, would have to be halved if war came now. The position may not be quite so perilous as these figures would seem to indicate; experimental operations for producing shale oil and liquid fuels from coal and agricultural products are already in production. Meanwhile, the fabulous engine-room is run on oil, and its military policy is necessarily dictated by the availability of oil, with the result that Saudi Arabia has become one of the nerve centres of the world. Mr. Harold F. Sheets, a former board chairman of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, has stated publicly that the need for the preservation of Saudi Arabian oil in American hands is one of paramount military importance. "Even if not a single drop of Middle Eastern oil were ever produced, our concessions there would remain invaluable, for the simple reason that Russia's oil-fields are within short bombing range of these areas." This is a reason that is hardly likely to commend itself to the Russians, or even to the Arabs, who would be compelled to consider the fact that Russia might bomb Saudi Arabia in reprisals, but the simplicities of the statement suggested the urgency of the theme; not only oil, but permanent military concessions near oil-fields are becoming necessary. It is here that we are faced with appalling dangers. Oil, or rather the scarcity of oil, the danger of its drying up and

the terrible dependence upon oil in an industrial society—all these things are as much potential causes of war as opposing ideologies, and nothing is so remarkable as that no effort has yet been made to put oil under the control of the United Nations. The time has come when the oil fields must be placed beyond the bounds of national rivalry.

The real strength of a country lies in its potential power—not the power that it manifests openly, but the power that it can exert at moments of crisis. It is not even necessary to imagine that these moments of crisis should be wars. It is perfectly possible to conceive, at a time of peace, that the strength of a country would be revealed on more humanitarian levels—if there were vast floods in China, it would be a measure of the strength of Great Britain, for example, if she brought aid quickly to the ravaged countryside. There is the strength that is employed in construction and the purely negative and therefore ultimately useless strength of destruction. So far atomic energy has been employed almost entirely for purposes of destruction, but that it can be, and will be employed for purposes of construction is no longer in doubt. If three thousand mile range atomic rockets are certainly capable of being produced, it should be equally possible to produce power such that a train will be able to move three thousand miles without stopping and without refuelling. Atomic energy, the most fabulous of all the discoveries in the fabulous engine-room, may very shortly ease all the intolerable tensions that have arisen as a result of our present uses of fuel. If atomic furnaces and breeders produce power cheaply within a reasonable time, the crises in Saudi Arabia may no longer be necessary, and the power race between Russia and the United States may lose all meaning. Nothing has ever brought us nearer to world government than the discovery of uranium fission, and nothing, as the scientists of Los Alamos realized as they stared in a thick sweat toward the tower of the first bomb, brought us nearer to the end of the world.

Meanwhile, the potential power configuration of the world is rapidly changing. Where there are the greatest supplies of uranium, there will presumably be the greatest potentials of power, with the result that Canada, Czechoslovakia, and the Belgian Congo may very well become the future centres of industry. Alternatively, if the production of power by means of

"breeders" becomes almost illimitable, the power quotient will no longer have any meaning, for (a) every country will be able to enjoy the maximum of power, and (b) any country will be able to destroy every other country. In the brief interval between the production of the atomic bomb and its employment for constructive purposes, the weightiest problems concerning power and its employment confront us, and for the first time by sheer necessity of survival we must confront the most terrible of all issues—whether we propose to survive—for nothing is more clear than that there is no defence against bacteriological or atomic attack.

There is a sense in which it is perfectly true to say that continental America can be destroyed simply and efficiently by a state no larger than Monaco. It has been calculated that for an expenditure of slightly more than eighty dollars the whole of New York could be destroyed by bacteriological warfare; it could also be destroyed at an expenditure of unknown billions of dollars of atomic energy. Since bacteria and uranium face each other on such equal terms, it would appear to be eminently desirable to set about real disarmament. The first report on atomic fission has stated the issues more clearly than any that came after it. Dr. Henry D. Smyth, in his book, *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*, says:

"As to the future one may guess that technical developments will take place along two lines. From the military point of view it is reasonably certain that there will be improvements both in the processes of producing fissionable material and in its use. It is conceivable that totally different methods may be discovered for converting matter into energy. Since it is to be remembered that the energy released in uranium fission corresponds to the utilization of only about one-tenth of 1 per cent. of its mass, should a scheme be devised for converting to energy even as much as a few per cent. of the matter of some common material, civilization would have the means to commit suicide at will."

The reckless dream of power that began centuries ago in Babylon and Egypt arrived at its fatal maturity on December 2, 1942, when man achieved the first self-sustaining chain reaction and initiated the controlled release of nuclear energy, and it is

not in the least surprising that the controlled release of nuclear energy should have taken place on American soil, for in the very strictest sense the Americans are the heirs of the European tradition. But it is worth remarking that the centuries-old pattern of development need not and may not be continued much longer, for nuclear energy has changed already and will change still more in the future the whole pattern of conduct and behaviour. It is not only a question of the disasters that may result from the use of atomic energy or the spreading of a single millilitre of polio-virus. What is at stake is the fact that American reserves in water, steel, and oil are running out.

For the immediate purposes of America oil is more important than atomic energy. In spite of synthetic oil experiments, very little has been done to enlarge on these experiments sufficiently to replace natural oil with oil from agricultural products. The Chinese could resist the Japanese on oil derived from sugar beets and urine, it is in the last degree unlikely that America will be able to exist on synthetic products alone. It is much more likely that oil will be produced from natural gas, coal, and shale and that the experimental stage will pass soon into the stage of full production, very much as it did with the Germans, and if vested interests oppose the planning of these synthetics, so much the worse for vested interests, since no other sources are available except those sources that are outside the continental United States. The proved oil reserves of America are considerably less than thirty billion tons which would last at most eighteen years. The oil reserves in Saudi Arabia and Iran are unknown, though they would appear to be prodigious, but it cannot be expected that they would last more than a few days in a time of war—they would all be destroyed by one side or the other. It is necessary to insist again that oil must be placed as soon as possible under international authority. It is only in this way that the inflammable situation which confronts us in Iran and Arabia and is likely to confront us wherever oil interests contend, can be resolved. Meanwhile, it would seem to be in the highest degree dangerous to embark on foreign adventures of any kind for the sake of oil when in fact, the reserves of solid fuels that remain in the United States are still large. Mr. Arnold C. Fieldner of the United States Bureau of Mines has calculated that there is sufficient reserve for at least a thousand years. The tragedy may well lie here, for

if water and steel are running out, but sources of solid fuels remain when they are no longer necessary as a result of atomic power, America is the loser; the prodigious efforts to seek oil elsewhere may have been unnecessary after all. But it is worth remarking that the menacing situation in which human society has shrunk into one community with a common fate is a situation that would have arisen at the end of the last war even if uranium had never been split. Oil showed the enveloping pattern of naked power already, and the relentless search made by each country for fuels showed the disastrous effects of power politics. It is not true that the Fascist War began in September, 1939. It began on the day when Mussolini advanced into Ethiopia in search of oil.

The strength of the American nation does not wholly lie in its industrial resources. It is significant that when the Marshall Plan was put to work the first instalments of the plan were made in wheat, and in a world half starving, food itself had become a power. The Friendship Train, which preceded the Marshall Plan, was in a very real sense an expression of American power, for it is clear that no such train could ever have been put together by any other nation, with the possible exception of Burma, Java, and Siam, the three countries with large surpluses of food products. In this sense the Friendship Train is as much an expression of American natural resources and her power as the cultivation of the Middle East oil-fields is an expression of American weakness. In spite of water shortages and the absence of sufficient fertilizers, and in spite of the migration of people from the farm lands, American productivity still dazzles the world. The real effective strength of America was shown by the food and coal that she sent by air lift to Berlin, not by her military power. There is a very real sense in which naked power cancels out, but the power to bring food and sustenance remains paramount. It is for this reason, though there are many others, that it has seemed so disastrous on the part of American policy to put so much reliance in Greece, Turkey, and China upon the import of arms to these places—arms that inevitably secured the reactionary governments in the possession of naked power but did comparatively little to give the people social power. The importance attached to the weapons of naked power, the singular corruption of the governments of these three countries, and the hopelessness

of obtaining social advances under them contributed to the atmosphere of growing despair, the battle against Communism is not fought, or cannot be fought, with weapons that make the people indifferent to America, their own government, and every other government. Ambivalence is dangerous at all times, it becomes still more dangerous when the same problem is attacked in two entirely opposing ways. "What makes me tick? Is it power I'm after, or am I a St. Francis in disguise, or what?"

The statement is attributed to Mr. John L. Lewis, but it could be attributed with even greater reason to the men in the State Department who proposed an admirable programme in western Europe and an entirely different programme in eastern Europe and eastern Asia.

If the strength of a nation is related to its power of survival we are confronted with the fact that the military and industrial arms must be welded to a social purpose. For it is never enough to talk of democracy only. It was not the industrial power so much as the agricultural and moral power of America that helped to win the elections of Italy for the Christian Democrats. It is a strange commentary on the state of our existing tensions that the letters sent by Italian Americans to Italy and the train of food and the single word *libertas* inscribed on the walls of the Italian houses did more to enhance America's purposes during the Italian election than all the machines, all the desperate subterfuges of the oil men, and all the political and military strategy at the highest levels. This matter is important, because it tends repeatedly to be overlooked. Just as people abdicate their responsibility to governments so governments and particularly the military arm of governments, tend to abdicate their responsibility towards the people. Because they have confronted one another and attempted to terrorize each other with weapons of naked power, it is not enough to describe the military purposes of America and Russia as errors, they are not errors. The early Schoolmen of the Church, in describing the utmost horrors of evil, were concerned to use the word *skandalon*. In their battles for oil and for strategical positions, and in their determination to dispose of instruments of naked power, both Russia and America are guilty of heaven-shrieking scandals. To think in terms of industrial power and not of men, to establish buses of offence by stratagems of disguise, as when the Saudi Arabian

oil-fields are taken over by the Americans or the North Iran oil-fields are taken over by the Russians; to rely blindly on weapons, without a thought that weapons cancel out; to continue a war so cold that a whole generation is frozen with fear at the thought of the action of some irresponsible fool in pressing the button that will decide the fate of the world; all these are largely the sins of the military arm of the government, and it would seem in the highest degree necessary that soldiers should be inoculated with the moral and social purposes to be obtained. It is for this reason that one dreads so desperately in America the abdication of social responsibility by high military officers; the significance of General Meyers' trial is at least as great as the significance of the trial of Colonel Dreyfus. What is at stake is the whole existence of the social state, which has no chance at all to rise as long as it is at the mercy of the military arm and the stark new weapons.

What is the chance that the new weapons will be employed in future wars? It is at least theoretically possible that no country will ever dare to employ them for the same reason that no country except Japan, and then only on purely experimental levels, employed poison gas during the last war. But this argument, which might affect poison gas and bacteriological weapons if these were the only mass weapons available, fails at Hiroshima. Atomic bombs *have* been employed, and since they have been employed, it is in the highest degree unlikely that fear of retaliation will prevent them from being used. *The pattern has already been set.* We are so much the slaves of existing patterns that it is doubtful, in the next few years, whether the minds controlling the military arms of governments will be able to think outside the range of naked power. The ceaseless experiments on rockets with atomic war-heads, the continual experiments in bacteriological warfare are evidence of the desperate determination to survive, but they point the way to the fact that survival will become almost impossible. The paradox remains; we find ourselves more and more in the position of the hanged man who leaps and contorts his body in a desperate effort to escape, but his very leaping and all his contortions only make his death more certain. As long as the military have overriding powers in America and Russia, social power must go by default.

It cannot be too often repeated that the power motive in war

has now exhausted its usefulness and that other motives must be brought forward if we are to escape the extremes of disaster. It is here that America is particularly vulnerable. It is tempting to regard the deficiencies of other states, and there are very serious grounds as we shall see later, for regarding the Soviet State as a tyranny more intolerable than any that has existed before. That is to say it is even more intolerable than Nazi Germany, but unless America can contrive, as she easily could, a social philosophy as hardheaded, as practical and as hopeful as the Communist dream, all her vast resources of power become potentially valueless.

We have to learn that the bomb that fell on Hiroshima ended a long and arduous epoch and 1945 was a year comparable in the magnitude of its historical changes to the year 1325, when Dante died and there died with him all the hopes of a universal empire. In this same year gunpowder was used for the first time in European cannons and simply because gunpowder had the power of mystery and was most successfully employed by the emerging national states rather than by the Holy Roman Empire or the Papacy. Europe split and suffered its tragic history of differences. The myth of sovereignty like the myth of the effectiveness of naked power haunts us still and we have so grown accustomed to living within national frontiers and thinking in terms of gun power and bomb power that we are in danger of forgetting that these are all essentially powers of destruction in no way related to powers of reconstruction. What is needed is the bomb that will build and the realization that all efforts of offence fail unless they are backed by a knowledge and consciousness of the social order that is to replace the social order destroyed. It is easy to destroy; every day we learn the difficulties of construction, for we have refused to realize that in the last instance only the community is sovereign and an uncritical confidence in the organic relation between free enterprise and democracy has led us to fantastic efforts to envisage a social system in Germany and Japan founded upon the American system, though no three countries could be more dissimilar in their evolution.

It is here that we are faced with an almost insoluble problem. In a very real sense, the military mind is a purely mechanical mind. Certain objectives must be taken, certain arrangements of



forces acting against certain other arrangements of forces will have such and such an effect. In America, particularly, the question of morale is largely solved, as it must be solved, by providing the soldier with every conceivable safeguard: he is given the best rifle, the best clothing, and the best food. All these are entirely necessary. But he is not given a clear picture of the democratic objectives of the struggle. In the war against Japan and Germany the issues were clearly stated as the defeat of Japan and Germany, and these issues were clearly understandable, for both nations had announced that their objective was the conquest of the world, and the fact that they would eventually have had to fight each other and probably destroy each other did not in the least minimize the threat to the national existence of America, Great Britain, or Russia. But the employment of naked power against Russia offers far more subtle problems, for even if no bacteria and no atomic bombs are employed, a social philosophy will be employed by the Russians, and since that philosophy embodies something of the hopes of the oppressed everywhere, the Americans have nothing of commensurable power to put in its place, and naked power divorced of meaning, intention, or purpose is naked indeed. And if it should happen that, in despair of discovering an American purpose, America should succeed in acquiring a world empire in some way similar to the world empire invented by Mr. James Burnham, the cause of America will be lost, and it will be absolutely necessary to rule the world with totalitarian powers, and with those powers alone; and such an empire will have no meaning for the oppressed.

It is possible that we are now attending the last classic drama of all; the drama played by Prometheus and Epimetheus in rivalry for heaven. It is conceivable that the two great mechanistic powers will be compelled by the nature of their own physical strength rather than for inherent moral reasons to assume the position of actors in the struggle for the world. It is necessary to insist that they can only assume the position of actors, for the real battle is not fought with weapons of steel, or even with weapons of uranium or with weapons of psittacosis bacteria, and it would be meaningless if it were fought with the ideological weapons that the two nations now possess. For the battle to have meaning, it will be necessary that American democracy should be far more socially conscious, far more responsible, and in a

very definite sense far more religious than it is at present it would be necessary for Prometheus to realize that he is his brother's keeper and that freedom does not mean freedom to exploit, but on the contrary it can only mean freedom to destroy exploitation wherever it is found. These two powers of vast and overreaching strength face each other with the tranquillity of despair, so wounded and benumbed by the first blows they have exchanged that only the annihilation of the other will seem of any purpose, and both quietly determine to annihilate the other with the weapons of naked power. The coloured clouds of atomic powder rise over New York and Moscow, the reservoirs are contaminated with botulism, psittacosis bacteria is released by long-distance radio on enemy territory, clouds of atomic dust from underwater explosions make coasts uninhabitable, and the rockets with the atomic warheads begin their silent journeys. The richest areas of both countries are destroyed and made uninhabitable for years. The libraries and the universities of each nation become atomic debris, in great cities only a few bank vaults survive. All this happens within the first half-week of hostilities. Is it to be expected that Epimetheus and Prometheus will have allies? It is in the highest degree likely that every nation, even the satellite nations of Russia, will do everything in their power to avoid being conscripted in a war between giants unless they are completely satisfied with the announced purposes of the giant. *For the most part the war between Russia and America will be fought between Russia and America alone, and if there is fighting within the boundaries of other countries that fighting will be against the expressed or unexpressed will of the populations of those countries.* The countries that have elevated naked power to the heights of efficiency, more ruthless and more destructive than any power that has yet existed, will be faced with a silent and hostile world only too happy at the thought that the giants will destroy one another, and the world will be utterly contemptuous of the two powers in their death agonies, for the same reason that a Greek chorus by the very nature of its calling must be contemptuous of the deserved fate of the hero. Perhaps half of the countries that remain neutral will be destroyed, certainly it will be impossible for every country to avoid the impact of these giants, and we are compelled to foresee the likelihood that if a means of destroying the whole world is found, as it is very likely to be found, the

national leaders of a nation on the point of defeat will think nothing of destroying the whole earth; then for a few weeks or months or years the clouds of atomic vapour will roll like coloured scarves around the body of the earth, and to an inhabitant of Mars looking through a telescope the earth would seem unchanged except for its increasing brightness, for the earth will glow with radioactive vapours.

It must be recognized that these dangers actually exist and confront us at every moment. The irresponsibility of politicians is well known; the irresponsibility of military leaders is hardly less. We are faced with a crisis of responsibility, not a crisis of pure power. When the last emperor of the Liang Dynasty threw all the paintings, books of poetry and rich costumes of his court into the bonfire and then threw himself into the blaze saying, "The arts of the Liang Dynasty perish with me," he was doing no more and no less than Hitler was prepared to do, or any dictator in the future will be prepared to do.

We shall have occasion to refer to the pathology of power in later chapters, and here it is only necessary to suggest that leadership in an atomic and bacteriological war is fraught with the most evident dangers, among which is the fact that a war of this kind has never been fought before; there are no rules, almost no precedents, and for the first time this will be a war mainly concerned with the annihilation of civilian populations, who are powerless to defend themselves. The evil of such a war is such that only the highest and most deliberate moral purpose can justify it, and if by some miserable chance one of these giants decides to pull the switches in the belief that the other is about to launch an attack, he can do so only at the risk of committing a sin more vicious than any that has ever been committed, and it is in the highest degree likely that the punishment for the sin will follow. It is in these regions that a kind of moral theology insistently obtrudes, and every kind of expediency resolves itself into pure dilemma. But this war need not happen. An announced social purpose, a real belief in the four freedoms, and a determination to make them operative, and America will provide herself with allies sufficient to outnumber all enemies immeasurably. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the situation suggest that America may very likely fail in providing the social power which must go with naked power if a peaceful victory is to be won.

When the Communist Government of Czechoslovakia ordered that all those who were dismissed from office should immediately proceed to the mines, and when Hitler ordered that the Jews should be incinerated, they were employing processes by which dehumanization reaches its term. The mines, where there is no fresh air, no sun, no semblance of any orderly life, where the vegetation is deathly white, and where men are at the mercy of the accidental and the illogical, are perhaps the symbols of our age. It is not only that we tread our way in darkness, but we are continually employing powerful engines to undercut our footholds. Nothing is more significant of Russian tyranny than that it should follow the example of the Syracusans and employ many of its most talented intellectuals in the Siberian camps, and nothing is more typical of the strange ambivalence of America than that she should send to Russia vast and intricate machines in exchange for gold dug by these Siberian prisoners, gold that is completely valueless—so valueless indeed that it is simply buried again in the earth, and while these curious exchanges are progressing, both countries arm themselves to the teeth and take part in a frozen war. The dilemma remains. Just as the rhythms of the internal-combustion engine have so affected our lives that there are many people who no longer feel secure unless they are driving an automobile, so the rhythmless, inaudible, and far more powerful engines of the future seem destined to dehumanize us still further, with the result that human responsibilities will be even less often assumed and illogical wars will more easily take place.

In a large continental nation power is inevitably centrifugal, not only because the nation feels itself sufficiently powerful to expand to its furthest limits, but because there was until recently the gravest need to guard the frontiers. The Romans sent their most reliable legionaries to the 'limes', the Chinese sent their best armies to the desert frontiers and for the same reasons (though it may not be the conscious reason) the Americans and the Russians have established their greatest industrial bases near their coasts. But the nature of modern war demands the greatest possible diffusion of industry, and neither in Russia nor in America has this taken place. In this strange twilight hour all the things that desperately demand to be done are not done, and all the illogical, senseless, dangerous, and vulgar things are

continually being done to the sound of meaningless phrases and hideous prophecies of doom. In the conservation of American power, far too little, for example, is being done in regard to synthetic fuels, while far too much is done in regard to whittling away the only great contribution of America to the world—the concept of freedom outlined in the American Bill of Rights. In the conservation of Russian power every effort is made to keep the Russian people within their walls in spite of the fact that every nation that has so far buried itself in this way has found itself at a grave disadvantage, for the natural powers of the people cannot expand within limitations of fixed frontiers and the constant presence of the secret police. At such a time the historian or the theologian is confronted with the possibility that we may have escaped history altogether and that we are living outside real time or real space, in a world of illusions, a curious and ever-changing magnetic field where the two poles are represented by Moscow and Washington. The historian or politician cannot say, “A pox upon your houses,” for he is swayed by the magnetic currents; he can only pray for the day when the electricity is cut off and the magnetic currents no longer flow and there will be quietness between those poles, for it would appear that the task of bringing those poles together is beyond the capacity of any man or any group of men. Between those blind physical forces he has as much freedom as a fly in a spider web.

But it need not be like this. If American industrial power were harnessed to a people devoted to their freedoms and the encouragement of freedoms everywhere, if there were no oppression of minorities, if the arguments in the Senate and the House of Representatives continued with a full consciousness of the issues involved, the certainty that there would be no necessity for war would be greater. An industrially strong America inhabited by a people undecided upon their motives cannot be relied upon by her potential allies, which number even now eight-tenths of the world, but if the utmost of the social power of America were exerted, most of the problems which affect our world might reasonably disappear. With American social power a whole world can be won; without it the whole world is almost certainly lost.

## TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS

*There is nothing more common than to confound the terms of the American revolution with those of the late American war. The American war is over, but this is far from being the case with the American revolution. On the contrary, nothing but the first act of the great drama is closed. It remains yet to establish and perfect our new forms of government and to prepare the principles, morals, and manners of our citizens, for these forms of government, after they are established and brought to perfection*

DR. BENJAMIN RUSH, *Address to  
the People of the United States*

IT MAY WELL BE that the main problem that confronts the world is simply the fact that the population of the world is increasing at a rate that makes it impossible to ensure food for all, and no other problem is so important as the fact that the earth and men are both starving.

It is necessary sometimes to remind ourselves that these simplicities remain and never to forget that the wounded dust bowls of America, Africa, and North China are as important in their way as the wounds of men—wounds that can be healed only with the greatest care and self-dedication. What is at stake is the dignity of man and the dignity of earth, and both have been wounded by machines, by carelessness, by lack of planning, and above all by wanton abuse. What is needed, if the issues are to be faced, is that millions upon millions of men, who are now working unproductively, uselessly, and tragically in the armed services and the industries catering to useless and unproductive wants should be set to work replenishing the earth. It is time that the powers paid serious attention to the uses to which the earth has been put. Though there have been innumerable discussions on fields of influence, there is no record of any discussions between the world leaders on food, population, or soil erosion, and the earth continues to be wasted, and almost nothing is done to

prevent the earth from being squandered more and more remorselessly. There is no general plan of conservation under the United Nations, and the earth, which is our dwelling and our food, will apparently only be replenished by the bodies of men, who have been led by their insane governments to accept as perfectly normal a situation that has tragic overtones of the starkest kind.

But if the earth is squandered at will so that it tends increasingly to follow the pattern of the treeless, sandy plains of North China, which were once the granary of an empire, men have been squandered at the will of the same insane governments, and more desperately still we are confronted with a situation in which the whole meaning of man, his dignity, and the sense of his historical purpose are put in jeopardy. That man has *certain* inalienable rights was the dominant theme of the American revolutionaries, who took their cue from the sanctity of man according to the European tradition, a tradition that accorded to man a place higher than the angels. Men have not always been conscious of these rights. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness would have seemed a strange trinity to the Greeks, who claimed for themselves: life, but only at the will of the gods; liberty, but only within the code, which allowed slavery of the conquered; and splendour, which meant that the dignity of man must be upheld. The Church, by inventing a theocentric universe, destroyed the pattern of man's final dignity, which was discovered again only at the time of the renaissance. To-day, in a very real sense, the Church has given place to the machines in throwing a huge, dominant, and pervasive shadow over men's lives, and just as the Church ruled through its priests, technicians of the heavenly machine, so we to-day are ruled even more succinctly, and incomparably more efficiently, and with far greater suffering by the mechanics of our latter-day machines. It is in this sense that the man in the leather coat acquires his formidable mastery of men's minds. And it is not gold but machines that have become our actual currency, however much we pretend for a few remaining years that the possession of great hordes of buried gold is a sign of wealth. The gold is perhaps a sign of the world's poverty, but it is in no sense a sign of America's wealth, though that wealth is considerably greater than the wealth of the rest of the world combined, for the wealth

of a nation is no more than a simple coefficient of its men and its machines.

But while the machines invade the territory that was once claimed wholly by the Church, they also invade all of the territory previously occupied by man, and it is largely because of the dominance of the machine that man's freedom is in such desperate plight. The ways of the machines are not men's ways though they contribute to men's purpose of leading a more substantial life. The machines are necessary, but just as some balance must be found between the claims of private enterprise and the claims of the social State, so a balance must be found between the territory invaded by the machine and the territory that remains the proper place of man. We are faced with the classic example of the roadway, where the automobile has assumed an almost proprietary right and men can walk only along the pavement and can cross only at the dictation of mechanical lights, with the result that if the man is ill and in a hurry to go to the doctor he has no way to cross the road for no automobiles will stop at his bidding, but he must stay there obedient to a machine that measures out time and those other machines that measure out space. If it should happen that he should decide to cross the road in his urgency, he is at the mercy of the accidental—a split second will determine his fate. It is no accident that political parties in action are described as 'machines', the same mindless phenomenon which characterizes the internal-combustion engine often characterizes a political party when it is geared to action, and exactly the same phenomenon is observed in large enterprises. The conveyor belt leads in the direction of the proteus, the strange lizard like animal that inhabits the darkest caves, has lost the power of sight and shows only by the violent scarlet of its tufts of gills that it once ran riot in the sun.

It is time that man's dignity should be upheld. When Richard the Lionheart went into battle he carried a banner on which were inscribed the words, *Splendor Dei*. To-day, we must announce the splendour of man. It is man's dignity that must be upheld, for without a singular delight in this dignity we shall assuredly all in the end be dehumanized upon an eroded earth, blindly fighting for survival among atomic mists or bacteriological clouds. It is because we need so desperately at this age a rebirth of man's dignity and of reverence for the earth that the rights of



man become vastly more significant than they have ever been before.

There occurred in January, 1942, an event so important and so deeply connected with the future of America that it seems strange, at this late date, to find that it has been almost forgotten. The war had been going on hardly more than a month when the National Resources and Planning Board submitted to Congress the first statement Congress had ever received attempting to define the extent of American freedom. The terms of the report are not at first sight exciting, yet all the adventure of the world is contained in them. The report stated simply:

"The translation of freedom in modern terms applicable to the people of the United States here and now must include:

"1. The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive years.

"2. The right to fair pay, adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable services.

"3. The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care.

"4. The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment and accident.

"5. The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from compulsory labour, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority and unregulated monopolies.

"6. The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent, free from the spying of secret political police.

"7. The right to equality before the law, with equal access to justice in fact.

"8. The right to education, for work, for citizenship, and for personal growth and happiness.

"9. The right to rest, recreation, and adventure; the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in an advancing civilization."

There is no physical reason why these rights should not be enforced. The capitalist will observe that the mere guaranteeing of these rights means an advance in federal authority and some degree of socialism. Men are not equal before the law if the possessor of riches has towering advantages over poor men in the

courts, there can be no freedom from fear of sickness until medical services are considerably cheaper than they are to-day. There are times when free enterprise is itself "an irresponsible private power," the continuing tendency of large industries to form monopolies and cartels bearing witness to an exorbitant deprivation of human rights. Stated in the naked form they received when they were first announced, the nine rights, though not exhaustive, constitute in themselves a possible amendment to the Constitution. They are stated to be applicable to the people of the United States here and now, but there is no reason why they should not be similarly stated on behalf of the whole world, and every reason why they should be included in a world charter, for it cannot be too often insisted that it is upon the interpretation of rights that the course of the future depends. Years ago Elihu Root observed that when foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose, when foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. And the danger of war lies precisely in the continual misinterpretation of the beliefs by which America lives, and this is a danger the Americans have not always avoided. It is inconceivable that Russia would dare to attack America if the American purposes of freedom were understood by the rest of the world, if in fact liberty was ascendant on the soul of America and encouraged everywhere. Ascendant liberty still has the power to command, still flourishes on rootless soil, still breathes the hope of an enduring world. It is not only that the hope of the future lies with it, but all else is intolerable wastage and despair. America, the inheritor of the laws of Magna Charta and the British Bill of Rights, of the French Revolution and the revolution of the Colonies, has no business to be afraid of a system of government that derives from Karl Marx. Her only cause for fear should be that there may not be time to put her own house in order and give substance to that liberty the world is crying for.

But if the message of the National Resources and Planning Board was important, of still greater importance was the report of the President's Committee on Civil rights published five years later.

"Twice before in American history," wrote the draftsmen of this great report, 'the nation found it necessary to review

the state of its civil liberties. It is our profound conviction that we have come to the time for a third re-examination of the situation, and a sustained drive ahead. Our reasons for believing this are those of conscience, of self-interest and of survival in a threatening world."

And perhaps there is nothing in the whole book quite so deliberate as the sense of the doom it promises if the rights of the people of America are not acknowledged, whether they are oppressed or oppressors, immigrants or members of the oldest stock.

This book, written simply and briefly, with its final recommendations listed under six headings, gives nothing at all that is new, but everything that was known before is placed in a new perspective. The famous Chapter Twenty-six of Dr. Gunnar Myrdal is seen, as it has been seen before, to be the necessary indictment of justice attempting to take comfort from arrogant blindness. In this report no attempt is made to conceal the issues. Occasionally a vague or pious word enters like a stranger, and we wonder *discreetly what it is doing there, but the impact of the book remains*. The report states boldly that the old conception of the rights of man is now shopworn and must be changed. There are tasks that urgently need to be performed, otherwise the whole survival of America is endangered not at some remote period in the future, but in a matter of months or a few years. The danger of Russia is hardly mentioned, but the danger of an inefficient, culpable, and intolerant social system is emphasized: "We have had mob human slavery. We have had mob rule. We have had religious persecution." This report, which appeared at a time of reaction and witch-hunting and the deliberate inculcation of the most dangerous prejudices by some popular newspapers, proceeds to ask angrily whether these idiocies must remain. Remembering how the lynching of a Negro in a small town in Missouri in January, 1942, was used by the German and Japanese radios at a critical moment in the war, as a weapon of quite extraordinary power, the committee describes how this single lynching had "repercussions that echo from one end of the globe to the other, and the world looks to the American national government for both an explanation of how such a shocking event can occur in a civilized country and remedial action to prevent its recurrence. The United States is not so strong, the

final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable, that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record "

What is clear is that the murder of a single Negro was not at issue, what was at issue was the whole trend and advance of the American way of life, and when it is discovered that the federal government is absolutely powerless even to make murder a crime, except in the District of Columbia and the few places where Congress holds exclusive power, the potential allies of America, who are numbered by millions and include all the dark-skinned races of the earth, may reasonably ponder why it is that the division of power between the federal government and the states could not in this instance have allowed a general definition of murder and a general and easy method of bringing murderers to trial. But neither the punishment nor the crime are so important in the eyes of Asiatics and Africans as the principle that mob violence can rule unchecked and that the government is powerless to enforce its ruling. It is not only the Africans and the Asiatics who are involved. If mob violence of any kind is countenanced, there is *prima facie* evidence of a dangerous insecurity. The Bill of Rights guarantees the life, liberty, and happiness of American nationals. Could not some action be taken under the Bill of Rights? The answer is that it can be taken only with the gravest difficulty and only with the gravest difficulty can the rights of man be safeguarded for there is no machinery to safeguard them and there are altogether too few clauses in the Constitution from which Congress can derive power to protect civil rights and liberties. The famous 1896 dissent by Justice Harlan that "our Constitution is colour blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" is not law, it is still merely the opinion of a single famous Kentuckian.

It is unnecessary at this late date to inquire into the monstrous abuses of the law in relation to Negroes or indeed into the abuses that prevail in America where any oppressed or poverty-stricken classes exist and the intolerable treatment they so often receive from the police, but it is worth suggesting that the whole future of America is in a very close way bound up with the concept of human rights, and the authors of the report were not in the least exaggerating when they said that it was a question which affects America's survival in a threatening world. When in the summer of 1920 Mr. Charles Evans Hughes said, in an

address before the Harvard Law alumni, "We may well wonder, in view of the precedents now established, whether constitutional government as heretofore maintained in this republic could survive another great war even victoriously waged," he was doing no more than emphasizing the totalitarian nature of all war, for nothing is so easy for a government as to abrogate the rights of people on the first day of a war, and nothing is so easy, as De Tocqueville had foretold, than for a democracy to progress by simple stages toward a form of despotism. But the question did not arise; constitutional government was on the whole maintained; the forms were obeyed, but the contents and the practice imperceptibly changed, and it was not always remembered that constitutional progress is the tenderest of flowering plants, with the result that the achievements of centuries can be blighted by a single frost. Frozen by fear of Communism or by the still more causeless fear of a Negro republic south of the Mason-Dixon Line, there were many men who saw in a sacrifice of liberties the opportunity for building a stronger and more imperial State, forgetting that the strength of America lies almost wholly in respect for those liberties that could be so easily abandoned. A long history of intolerance, brutality, and hatred and a too often merciless treatment of Negroes, Catholics, Jews, Mexicans, Japanese are the signs of America, but they are not the enduring signs. What is enduring is the protracted search for liberty, the hope in the air, the promise of liberty regained.

Liberty itself is heady wine and invents its own rhetoric. It follows that nothing is so contemptible as the statement of the United States Supreme Court in the case of *Chambers v. Florida*: "Under our system courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement." The statement is not true; the figures of displaced persons allowed entry into the continental United States since the end of the war makes havoc of the overreaching rhetoric, while the fact that involuntary servitude existed in Alabama as recently as 1944 only adds to the falsity. That there is prejudice, that only very recently have Negroes found themselves in a situation where they are even beginning to be treated as equals, that hotels are still restricted, that there are gross and deliberate denials of equal

rights to health services, education, public services, and accommodation, that the practice of segregation is still justified on the deceitful theory that the two races are "separate but equal," that prejudice has grown almost until it carries all the characteristics of a habit—all these are for the most part accepted as being wrongs, but what is not often realized is that they are heaven-shrinking wrongs and with every commission of these wrongs the foundations of America tremble

It is precisely here that we are faced with the basis of American democracy. All the platitudes, all the disavowals, all the sense of justice that informs the Americans and the whole tenor of the Bill of Rights become meaningless unless there is a deliberate effort now to restate the case for the Negro. It is because the conflict between the American social system and the social system of Russia grows keener every day and because it is a conflict entirely different in scope from any that has ever been, that the issue of the Negro becomes a dominant one, and all efforts toward a reinterpretation of the Bill of Rights must be measured by the actual status of the Negro. The new and emergent states of the Far East are ruled by dark-skinned men who watch with an air of casualness but actually with distaste the plight of the American Negroes, and because the Negroes have not yet acquired even a semblance of social justice, they can hardly expect that they themselves will be treated differently. When Army Secretary Kenneth Royall stated before a group of distinguished Negroes, "I'm from North Carolina. I know the Negro," he was stating a fallacy: one does not know the Negro best by having lived in a state where he is oppressed. All the arguments that can be brought against the Negroes, all the subterfuges by which their lives have been made insecure, and all their desperate efforts to reconcile themselves to the existence of a perpetually hostile world, and every sentence in every Bill of Rights becomes meaningless when Negroes can be spoken to in this way by high Army officials. But the Negro is no longer powerless. Deliberately and consciously, with wide-open eyes, he has gone in search of education in the knowledge that there alone lies the way to an increasing social purpose. Nearly 65,000 Negroes have graduated from colleges in the last twenty years. In 1947 there were 706,000 Negro high-school students and 74,094 college students, while ~~dispersed among~~ these are

some of the 1,000,000 Negro veterans of the war. From the beginning the American Negroes had thirsted for education, and in the period of reconstruction, from 1861 to 1871, they had laboured to become educated, only to discover that nearly all their efforts were unavailing. It may conceivably have been a blessing in disguise that their efforts failed; a vast *babu* culture might have arisen as a result of the disproportion between Negro opportunity and Negro education, but with the end of World War II education itself had become the ultimate issue, comparable with the trend toward education in East Asia. Indeed, it is no longer possible to dissociate the problems that face the new nations of Asia with the problems that face the Negroes, and the fact that the American Negroes in their determination for parity have invoked the threat of *ahimsa* suggests more than a nodding acquaintance with India and South Africa, where the pattern of non-violent protest was first put into operation. To understand the awakening of the Negroes it is necessary to understand the awakening of Asia: both spring from the same formidable causes.

If there are no traditional patterns that help us to solve the problem of a dual civilization where two entirely different races are mingled together without touching, like two collodial solutions in suspension, the mere fact that there were no traditions might have worked for a greater understanding between them. The challenge was there: an entirely new and revolutionary concept of freedom had arisen in America at the time of the revolutionary war, and as far as the Negro was concerned his only reward in freedom was that he was regarded constitutionally as possessing three-fifths of man's estate. By the end of the Civil War he was regarded theoretically as possessing five-fifths, but even this theoretical increase did not justify his existence in the eyes of his masters, and until very recently the problems of adaptation were never completely examined. But for the Negro and the white man, if they chose to live together, there was no other problem. The fact that the Negro in the white man's eyes is "uppity" and always claiming his rights is irrelevant to the main theme, which is, and always will be, the necessity of obtaining some formal concessions from both. Nor is segregation anything more than an irrelevant effort to solve a problem by disregarding its existence; for the same reason the Jews had been

enclosed in their Ghettos. Indeed, the problem of the Jews in Europe and of the Negroes in America arose from similar causes, and no solution to the problem was ever found because no conscious pattern of adaptation was ever discovered. Yet already in America the outlines of the future pattern of adaptation can be seen. It is ultimately a pattern that must be expressed in terms of the three-quarters of a million Negroes who are now at school. Only a conscious plan to increase the franchise of education for the Negroes offers any hope for solving this most categorical problem. Segregation itself is a sign that the problem is not being faced, and just as prisons do not provide any real answer to the problem of criminality, but on the contrary are often the causes of continuing criminality, so segregation makes the Negro problem more acute and more sharply defined.

The ambivalence of the American attitude is nowhere more clearly visible than in the Negro problem. Even Lincoln was capable of that attitude, an attitude that has been consecrated by Mr. John L. Lewis when he asked whether he was a St. Francis in disguise or whether he wanted power. Compare, for example, the two following statements by Lincoln:

"Your race suffers greatly by living among us, while ours suffers from your presence. When you cease to be slaves, you are far removed from being on an equality with the white race. But for your race among us, there would not be war. It is better for us both to be separated."

"Let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man, this race and that race being inferior, and therefore must be placed in an inferior position. Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout the land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal."

It is no purpose of the present inquiry to suggest the causes of the ambivalence on this issue. That a man may say two entirely opposite things in a lifetime is not remarkable. What is remarkable is that Lincoln should have convinced himself so completely on the issue of slavery as to determine to wage a war on that issue alone, because it was that issue which lay at the heart of all the tragic possibilities of dismemberment and ruin.



of the Bulge were not more surprised than the future Americans will be when they see the Negro untrammelled by any bondage, able to put his whole potentiality at the service of the country. It is not only morality that cries out for change, the whole economy of America is affected by the economic waste. Mr. Eric Johnston, when President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, stated the issue so forcibly that it is difficult to believe that any argument whatsoever can be brought against his contention.

"The withholding of jobs and business opportunities from some people does not make more jobs and business opportunities for others. Such a policy merely tends to drag down the whole economic level. You can't sell an electric refrigerator to a family that can't afford electricity. Perpetuating poverty for some merely guarantees stagnation for all. True economic progress demands that the whole nation move forward at the same time. It demands that all artificial barriers erected by ignorance and intolerance be removed. To put it in the simplest terms, we are all in business together. Intolerance is a species of boycott and any business or job boycott is a cancer in the economic body of the nation. I repeat, intolerance is destructive; prejudice produces no wealth, discrimination is a fool's economy."

And if the economic waste is formidable, so too is the waste in potential allies. A bedrock of suspicion has formed over the centuries, which can disappear only if the conditions that gave it substance are made to disappear. As long as the suspicions remain, any alliance between America and a race of dark-skinned people will be jeopardized. America is indicted on her treatment of the Negroes. No other nation, except Russia in her treatment of prisoners, equals America's record of oppression against a minority group. The report of the President's committee says bluntly:

"The dignity of a country, a continent, or even a major portion of the world's population, may be outraged by [American discrimination]. A relatively few individuals here may be identified with millions of people elsewhere, and the way in which they are treated may have world-wide repercussions.

We have fewer than half a million American Indians; there are 30 million more in the Western Hemisphere. Our Mexican American and Hispano groups are not large; millions in Central and South America consider them kin. We number our citizens of Oriental descent in the hundreds of thousands; their counterparts overseas are numbered in hundreds of millions. Throughout the Pacific, Latin America, the Near, Middle, and Far East, the treatment which our Negroes receive is taken as a reflection of our attitude toward all dark-skinned peoples."

Because there has been a revolt throughout Asia, and the increasing power of Asia is now manifest to the world, stark necessity compels a change in the relationship between the Negroes and the whites, but though the necessity is clear and uncompromising, it is far from clear how this change can be brought about. It is clearly not brought about by the publication of the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, nor by government pressure in its usual forms. Something far more effective is necessary, and there would appear to be a grave necessity to form a government office, separate from the office of the Secretary of Labour, that will deal wholly with the Negro problem. Since the question as it concerns Negroes is intimately connected with education, discrimination of Negroes by colleges can be effectively outlawed by law. Negroes must be included in reasonable proportions within the scope of the Taft Education Bill, the "reasonable proportion" meaning that the Negroes shall have as much right to advanced education as the rest. Since, to a very large extent, the appeal of the anti-Negro leader is directed to the prejudiced, the resources of films and radio should be employed, and some means of breaking down the reluctance of Hollywood to show Negroes as human beings should be found, for it is clearly not enough that action should be taken on the plane of government power only. The President's Committee, at the end of its report, recommends "a long-term campaign of public education to inform the people of the civil rights to which they are entitled and which they owe to one another," and suggests that it is a task which will require the co-operation of the federal, state, and local governments and of private agencies, yet it is the private agencies—films, radio, and newspapers—that

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could most effectively instil democracy into people. Meanwhile, the fiery crosses still burn, and the wistful voice of the Grand Dragon still talks of blood in the streets, with the result that the Negroes are still frightened out of their wits and though they increasingly tend to disregard the voice and two-thirds of the registered Negroes have been known to vote in towns of Georgia, they vote in fear and trembling. The denial of human rights to the Negroes has more consequence to America than the decisions of the Politburo. When the Governor of Mississippi declared at the Southern Governors' Conference held in February to oppose the civil rights programme —

'Militant leadership on the part of Mississippi, the most democratic state in America, will spread like wildfire across the entire south and sweep before it all those who stand as enemies to our institutions and our way of life,'

he was repeating a statement that had been heard a thousand times before from the lips of all the Grand Dragons, but the statement remained perilously untrue, for in this 'most democratic state' only 5,429 votes out of a population of over a quarter a million, were needed to send Mr Rankin to Washington in 1946, while his fellow congressmen from a state like Illinois were compelled to secure a total of 137,877 votes. The 'most democratic state' was actually the least, and there was included among the enemies of the institutions and the way of life in Mississippi the blazing hope of an awakened America.

But if there have been immense and terrible failures, there have also been successes. The Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot legally keep Negroes from voting in the primary elections. A Negro governor has been appointed to the Virgin Islands. The Methodist General Conference has voted unanimously to have a Negro elected to its judicial council. A judge in Pennsylvania has refused to extradite a Negro to face 'Georgia justice,' saying bluntly that "this court does not intend to make Pennsylvania a haven for fugitives but enlightened public opinion must condemn as cruel and unusual punishment the action of Georgia authorities in chaining prisoners, in compelling them to work at hard and painful labour from sunrise to sunset, in beating and shooting them in placing them in unlighted holes in the ground and on occasion murdering them in cold blood."

Even more hopeful signs are coming from the Negroes themselves, and if the decision to invoke civil disobedience against segregation of races within the armed services seemed dangerously inappropriate to the times, the decision to appeal to the United Nations was on much firmer ground. In language of studied gravity, the appeal of the Negroes to the United Nations stated:

"We number as many as the inhabitants of the Argentine or Czechoslovakia, or the whole of Scandinavia. We are larger than Canada, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Hungary or the Netherlands, and while we rejoice that other smaller nations can stand and make their wants known in the United Nations we maintain that our voice should not be suppressed or ignored."

This appeal was in a very profound sense a declaration of independence. To say, as Mr. Rankin said, that an appeal of this kind comforts Russia is to avoid the issue; it is possible that it does comfort Russia, but it should comfort Americans still more. More than half of the Negroes in the United States are tillers of the soil, and three-quarters of these are sharecroppers and day labourers. Just as the early revolutionaries were politically oppressed by England, so the fourteen million Negroes are oppressed by their rulers. What is most terrible of all is the similarity between the treatment of the Negro and the treatment of the Jew in Nazi Germany, and nothing is so like the German law against intermarriage as Article 14 of the Mississippi Constitution:

"The marriage of a white person with a Negro or Mulatto, or person, who shall have one-eighth or more of Negro blood, shall be unlawful and void."

Meanwhile, it is not only Mississippi that forbids intermarriage; eight Northern states similarly forbid it. Racial discrimination goes to extremes. In Oklahoma you must use the telephone booth appropriate to your colour; in Florida the school textbook of a white child must not be stored in the same cupboard as the textbook of a Negro child. More portentous of future harm is the fact that a great insurance company which is developing a residential area for United Nations employees in New York is insisting on reserving the right to discriminate against future

residents on the grounds of race and colour, the Kashmir Brahman and the princes and peasants of Bali must not consort with Caucasians even when they are about the affairs of the United Nations.

What is certain is that we must grow accustomed to the realization that we are outnumbered and outflanked by people whose colour is darker than our own, that tremendous harm has already been done in treating Asiatics and Negroes with undeserved contempt, that a time of reckoning may come when, though we cry *Pecora*, no quarter will be given, for the contempt has reached down in their souls. We can no longer content ourselves with the thought that men with coloured skins are inferior to us, the Japanese were contemptuous of our power, and with a little less contempt, they might have bided their time and conquered us all by attacking India and Singapore and refusing to allow themselves to commit the insanity of attacking Pearl Harbor. Once, in the course of World War II, a Negro held the balance of power in his hands. He was a small, bright-eyed, and learned man named Felix Eboué who elected to stay with De Gaulle in 1940 when he was Governor of Chad. France, Morocco, Syria, Indo-China, and French West Africa were following the way of Petain and Laval, and tremendous pressure was being placed upon the Governor of Chad to follow the same road. The control of Central and afterward West Africa passed into the hands of the Allies only because Felix Eboué had willed it. If the Germans had reached Dakar, the consequences to the Allies would have been disastrous, a catastrophe parallel to their presence in Vladivostok, for they would have been able to control the sea routes between Dakar and Brazil—routes that were used continually by the American transports to the Far East. But the benefit to allied arms comprised more than a free passage over the Atlantic. Except for the staunchness of Eboué, Marshal Graziani's Libyan army, the Duke of Aosta's Italian army in Ethiopia and the German armies of Rommel might have affected the conquest of the major part of Africa. It was the first time in the known history of the world that a single Negro held in his power the destinies of nations. It may not be the last.

If the Negroes have suffered continually in America, other minorities have also suffered, and if the Negro case seems to be unanswerable, the case for the Red Indians, the original

inhabitants of the land, would seem to be on even firmer ground. The Navahos, who numbered only nine thousand in 1868 and now number more than sixty thousand, living in deserts where the eroded soil is only sufficient to allow each Navaho on the average to raise ten sheep, have been mercilessly exploited, and the solemn covenants between the Navaho nation and the administration of President Andrew Johnson have been forgotten. At the time of the Reconstruction, the Navahos, like the Negroes, were swept with the urgent desire for education, and Article VI of the amazing treaty reads:

"In order to ensure the civilisation of the Indians entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is admitted, and they therefore pledge themselves to compel their children, male and female, between the ages of 6 and 16 years, to attend school. And it is hereby made the duty of the agent for said Indians to see that this stipulation is strictly complied with.

"The United States agrees that for every 30 children between said ages who can be induced or compelled to attend school, a house shall be provided and a teacher competent to teach the elementary branches of an English education shall be furnished."

The covenant was not kept. The Indian service estimates that there are 24,000 Navaho children between the ages of 6 and 16 years, and of these only one-fourth of the number are at school, not because the Navaho children do not desire to go to school, but because the problem of managing schools over a vast desert hinterland of 24,000 square miles has been thought too great a task for the government. Meanwhile, an appalling death-rate (half of all Navaho children die before they reach their fifth birthday), a high tuberculosis rate (fourteen times that of the rest of the nation), and endemic malnutrition continue, even though 15,000 Navahos worked in war plants during the war and 3,600 served in the armed forces, and it should have been patent that they were in possession of special rights. Sixteen thousand Navaho children received no education in spite of the treaty, and disease is spreading among them unchecked. The recent grant of citizenship, by which the Indians of New Mexico are allowed to vote, is clearly not enough.

Once again the danger is not that the government will forget

—the government cannot forget—but the people forget only too easily that they have responsibilities to the Indians. When Max Dressliff, a wealthy retired Indiana furniture-maker and a dyed-in-the-wool Republican, objected to the presence of 105 traders who maintained an economic stranglehold on the reservations, charging interest rates up to 120 per cent, and suggested that the Indians should be given training facilities and that the traders should be removed, one of the most bitter Press campaigns of recent years was brought against him with every kind of innuendo that he was a Soviet agent intent on sovietizing the Navahos. The theme would have been ridiculous if it were not so heart-rendingly sad. Irresponsibility could hardly reach further, and though President Truman has put forward a programme to improve the health, education, and economic life of the Navahos at a cost of eighty million dollars over a period of years, the harm in irresponsibility had already been done. The calamitous starvation during the winter of 1947 was man-made and had been years in the making. In order to stop erosion, the Indian Bureau drastically reduced the number of sheep from over a million to less than three hundred and fifty thousand—the destruction of land was prevented at the cost of destroying the Navaho living. What is clear is that the Navahos should be given the rights that are due to all Americans, the Indian Bureau should be abolished and a new bureau established under the Federal Security Administration and the hospitals should be placed under the United States Public Health Service. A once proud and formidable nation, who only eighty years ago fought a running battle against the United States Army so vigorously that they were not deprived of their original lands until the government had spent one hundred million dollars in forming an army against them, should not be allowed to live in sequestered poverty.

There are other races within the borders of America who suffer from the same lack of common privileges. The Mexican Americans in Texas and the Western states suffer from the same intolerance as the Negroes. It is not only that they are considered to be of lower intelligence than the whites, but they are refused the opportunity to raise their standard of intelligence. There are at least two million Latin Americans in the United States, and the greater proportion of them are migratory workers earning less than two hundred dollars a year, they live in a state of

enforced poverty, without sufficient schooling, rarely able to vote, deliberately manoeuvred into the position of migratory workers, their infant death-rate three times as high as that of Americans generally, and their tuberculosis rate seven times as high, an astonishing figure considering that the tuberculosis rate of the Negroes is only twice the average of the whites.

It is here that we are faced with the practical meaning of a Bill of Rights. If a man is entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, he is entitled to "a minimum standard of decent life," and it would follow from this that a man has at least the right to be sheltered and to obtain food and medicines at a reasonable cost, or, if he cannot afford these things, the government should help to provide him with them. The right to health is at least as important as the right to happiness, for without health happiness cannot be enjoyed nor can liberty be employed. It would seem therefore that the underprivileged should have the right of free or near-free treatment in hospitals. Two-thirds of the families in the United States cannot afford the cost of serious illness. Voluntary health insurance is clearly impracticable when there exist large groups who do not earn enough to pay for voluntary insurance. The complete silence of the medical profession when confronted with the declining health of the poorer members of society remains as evidence of a sense of guilt that can only be exorcised when the doctors are provided with a social conscience and resolutely obey their oaths. Meanwhile, Mr. Bernard Baruch's demand for more and better doctors—in more places—more general practitioners, more hospitals, more group medicine, a new Cabinet post for health, education, and social security, and a watchdog committee to help guard veterans' medicine against politicians is itself a medical Bill of Rights. The urgency of the plan can be seen in the fact that at least four million men were rejected as 4F during the war.

The strength of the American people is not so strong, their endurance at the present critical period is not so great that it can afford to have so many sick members in its midst. What is needed, and needed <sup>now</sup> urgently, is a complete reorganization of medical facilities, a new emphasis on group medicine and preventive medicine, greater numbers of nurses at better salaries, and a whole programme of expanded physical rehabilitation for the people. When the House of Representatives refuses the sums



necessary for such a plan, it invites slow suicide, the nation simply cannot afford the loss of so much health among its poorer people. A Bill of Rights remains the very basis of the State, and the fact that nearly three-quarters of the population is in some way or other underprivileged is a mark not of the failure of the principles, but of the failure of the government and the bureaucracy to implement the promise of the Founding Fathers. Where there should have been passionate remonstrance and a vast effort, there was too often a niggardly appreciation and a kind of intolerance that is not far from criminal carelessness. The bright promise, which is also the promise of the world, was allowed to become tarnished. Who is to blame? Once again it is a question of individual responsibility, the burden each man carries on his own shoulders, though he seems so often not to notice that it is there.

If the Bill of Rights failed so often in its application regarding the commonest right to live a decent life, it failed still more to safeguard liberty of speech. If there be any among us who wish to dissolve the Union, or to change its republican form," said Jefferson, "let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Justice Brandeis spoke even more to the point when he said, commenting upon the examination of subversive doctrines: "Like many other rules for human conduct, it can be applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment, and in the exercise of good judgment, calmness is, in time of deep feeling and on subjects which excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and honesty. Calmness was not, unfortunately, the prerogative of the gentlemen who formed the Un American Committee, and the world was confronted with the strange spectacle of the American Senate and House of Representatives showing all the signs of delirium before the encroaching shadow of Communism when there should have been a sense of growing elation at the thought of how easily, and with what splendour, the American way of life could take up the challenge proposed by the Communists. A hidden weakness was revealed in the garrulity and unashamed vulgarity of the members of the Un American Committee, thrown into that state of near hysteria that was itself a sign of freedom made vulnerable by the displeasure of those who should have been her prime defenders.

The extraordinary significance of the interrogations of the Un-American Committee should not be minimized. For the first time the American concept of freedom was challenged. In the hysteria that followed World War I, the same secret and hidden weakness was suddenly revealed, to be demonstrated in the legal murder of Sacco and Vanzetti, but at that time there was no real pervading challenge coming from Russia, the American way of life was not endangered, and the nation had not experienced the terrors of a desperate war involving the whole earth. Now, when there was real danger, a handful of Communists were suddenly given the power to speak openly and defiantly to the tribune of the people, and those unnecessary speeches were faithfully reported by the Press, in the same way that the unnecessary speeches of the Nazi leaders on the point of death were reported. To give hostages to freedom by allowing the enemy to say his last word, even if he is to be extinguished afterwards, is not the tactic of a freedom-loving people so much as a tactic of folly: the Communists have gained enormously, and Congress has suffered an inevitable loss of prestige, not because they allowed the Communists to speak openly (for that was a virtue), but because they attacked Communism with vituperation when there are at hand infinitely sharper weapons. "Depend upon it," said Burke, "that the lovers of freedom shall be free." Unfortunately, the statement is not necessarily true. Freedom must hide itself when the supreme congress of the land behaves with indifference toward her cause. In the words of the President's Committee:

"To expect people to reject totalitarians, when we do not provide mechanisms to guarantee that essential information is available, is foolhardy. These two concerns go together. If we fall back upon hysteria and repression as our weapons against totalitarians, we will defeat ourselves. Communists want nothing more than to be lumped with freedom-loving non-Communists. This simply makes it easier for them to conceal their true nature and to allege that the term 'Communist' is 'meaningless.' Irresponsible opportunists who make it a practice to attack every person or group with whom they disagree as 'Communists' have thereby actually aided their supposed 'enemies.' At the same time we cannot let these

abuses deter us from the legitimate exposing of real Communists and real Fascists. Moreover, the same zeal must be shown in defending our democracy against one group as against the other."

What was surprising was that the issues were not met. Against Communism and against all forms of totalitarianism only total freedom—the largest possible freedom under the law—is availing, and this freedom can only be interpreted in terms of the freedom of the mind to think as it chooses to the utmost limits of the mind, unless it endangers the State in the most direct sense of suborning the foundations of the State; and then, like the reverse of the medal, there is the freedom to grow, to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness without the restrictions of poverty, ill health, and underprivilege. On these two fronts American freedom still offers the highest hopes for the future, but the most insidious dangers are already present in the air. Those who love America most are beginning to wonder whether in the event of war America will enter it without her most brilliant weapons armed, but without freedom she cannot win a war or make a confident peace.

These issues are perhaps more serious than any others. The fate of the world depends upon America, and Americans must take warning that they, and they alone, possess the power to conquer the world with the idea of freedom and so allow all men to secure the rights which are theirs by the fact that they are men. For a few more months or years the people of the world will watch the actions of Americans with hope, hoping against hope that the tide will turn, for if the tide of freedom does not turn, there is no more hope in the world.

## AMERICA AND EUROPE

*Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. . . . At this critical point in history, we of the United States are deeply conscious of our responsibilities to the world. We know that in this trying period, between a war that is over and a peace that is not yet secure, the destitute and oppressed of the earth look chiefly to us for sustenance and support until they can again face life with self-confidence and self-reliance.*

SECRETARY MARSHALL at Harvard, June 5, 1947.

THEY SAY THAT ON that June day he spoke, as he nearly always speaks, in a very soft and almost inaudible voice, gazing steadily at the notes before him, playing with his spectacles, and never for a moment looking at his audience. There are times in American history when soft words have been uttered with all the apparent carelessness that heroic tradition demands: so Lincoln had spoken at Gettysburg, and Washington before him, with no hint in their manner of how they would affect the lives of millions. On that June day, for the first time in history, America through her Secretary of State stated that the cause of the destitute and oppressed of the earth was her cause and was part of the policy of her government.

The European Recovery Programme has been attacked at great length by the Russians, and it was still more forcibly attacked by Senators and Congressman who were concerned with problems that have nothing to do with the recovery of the world, or the recovery of America. There were vested interests that would derive profit from its abandonment; there were associations that insisted that a programme of this kind should be accompanied by provisos, of which the chief was that the European nations should allow themselves to be used as advance bases for American aeroplanes. The National Association of Manufacturers

insisted that countries embarking on a programme of socialization should be penalized, and Mr. Truman so far forgot himself at a Press conference as to say that rationing and price controls, which are among the characteristics of the Socialist states of Europe, were methods employed only in police states, so that it became doubtful whether even the President, with all his abundant channels of intelligence, was aware of the great social changes taking place in Europe. Yet if there were startling misunderstandings, there emerged a very clear-cut picture of Europe in its toils. The European Recovery Plan was precisely what it set out to be—a plan to assist the economic and social recovery of Europe. It was a plan of large dimensions and very great courage, and if it was not entirely satisfactory in its methods and its omissions, it was loose enough to allow considerably more scope for revision than had been expected. It is not only the fate of Europe that hangs in the balance but the fate of all the Americas, and the E R P is not a weapon pointed at the Russians so much as a deliberate effort of social responsibility. The self-help of Europe was seen to be essential, the aid forthcoming under the plan was to be based upon a necessary minimum, and if the problem of Europe was seen to be a special problem, though in fact it was the same problem that affected East Asia and the rest of the world, the plan possessed a maturity which had long been lacking in the deliberations of the State Department. The plan, however, failed to take into account three of the most pressing needs of Europe—lack of sufficient land, overpopulation, and the desirability of creating a federal Europe. The third of these was to come about in embryo later, the second could only be resolved when an increasing number of displaced persons moved out of Europe, the first was for the moment insoluble.

The history of Europe is the history of a heavily overpopulated continent without a frontier. The 550 000,000 living in Europe in 1939 were the descendants of 100 000,000 living there at the middle of the seventeenth century, and even in those days men complained that the land was overpopulated and could hardly support the people. The great expansion of Europe began with the introduction of the machine age. Since 1800 the population has tripled, the curve rising sharply at the end of the Napoleonic wars. By the time of the Franco-Prussian War there occurred so great an acceleration in the increase of population

that disaster would have followed if the frontiers of America had not been open. In the twenty years following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 two million Germans, a million Englishmen and a quarter of a million Russians emigrated to America, and over a million Irish and half a million Swedes and Norwegians came at the same time. In the forty years from 1880 to 1920 four million Italians followed them. When the gates were shut by the Exclusion Act, Europe was compelled to turn to its own resources, and the process of repopulation went on as before.

It was to such a Europe, harried by war, split in two by the Russian advance to the Oder, a quarter of her industries ruined by bombing, her population continually increasing, and her colonies wrested or about to be wrested from her, that the Marshall Plan was offered, in the full consciousness that the plan, in spite of its fantastic cost and its still more fantastic danger, was no more than a palliative, an attempt to put a shattered half continent on its feet.

It is possible and even desirable to regard the Marshall Plan without any reference to Russia. The Russians, who claim to see in the plan an effort to break the spread of Communism, might have taken part in it, and enjoyed the comparative abundance that would have been offered them, but on the plea that national sovereignty would in some way be affected, Russia desisted and attempted to make all the states that were within her orbit refuse to take part in it. The strategical error was realized too late, and with increasing bitterness, for it was seen that if the Marshall Plan succeeded, it was more relevant to the future of Europe than the secretive and colonial plans of the Cominform. But even if Russia had remained behind her own borders far from the Oder, some such plan would have been eminently necessary, and somehow or other it was necessary to build up again what was left of shattered Europe. Except for E.R.P. there was no other way.

No one knows how much America contributed to peace during the last century by providing a vast European outlet. In the nineteenth century the *Pax Americana* was as real as the *Pax Britannica*. Dr. James's "moral equivalent" for war lay in the excitement of opening new colonies and pushing back the American frontier. But the British, French, Belgian, German, and Italian colonies did not exhaust the strength of their young

manhood or summon so many adventurers as the United States, Canada and Australia remained until recently grotesquely underpopulated and the huge empire of India was ruled by no more than a few thousand Englishmen. The heartlands of America summoned the youth of Europe, offering every imaginable adventure. The task of the generation following the recent war is to discover in the air, on land and at sea further "moral equivalents" for war.

Meanwhile in the interval that follows a long war, the immediate problem of reconstruction has first place and it is to this immediate problem that the Marshall Plan with its programme of aid limited to four years addresses itself. The period of four years was chosen carefully: *it was the period which it was expected would be needed for the development of large-scale atomic power plants.* It is possible that the figure was erroneous: it is possible that the development of the atomic power plants will come about in an even shorter space of time. In the most final sense therefore, the Marshall Plan is interim aid. Thereafter with the amazing productivity of power at the command of engineers, assistance to the extent envisaged for Europe may never become necessary, for production by cheap power on a scale never hitherto accomplished will alter the whole shape of industrial enterprise, and it would seem likely that the question of overpopulation will no longer have the immediate importance it possesses to-day.

But the European Recovery Plan was not entirely American pump-priming. Vast sums had been spent since the end of the war. The United States had authorized 5.9 billion dollars for the Bretton Woods financial institution, 3.4 billion dollars for U.N.R.R.A. and other grants in aid, 3.6 billion dollars for relief, 9.2 billion dollars for loans and property credits, and finally 17 billion dollars for the 4 year programme of E.R.P.—a total of 38.1 billion dollars: a figure that can be readily understood when it is realized that this represents twenty dollars for every man, woman, and child on this planet. That such a figure must cause severe strains on the American internal economy is not in doubt, but some clue to the remote objectives of the plan become clear when we understand that the Plan necessarily underwrites an expanding programme of exports to Europe. In January, 1948, Secretary of Agriculture Clinton B. Anderson said that the American farmers were producing one-third more

food and fibre products than before the war and would continue to need European markets. "We are going to have abundance of agricultural production, and for many years to come we will need sizable export markets." The plan could not have been put into operation unless there existed this economy of abundance. It possessed at least one merit that was pure expediency, for, as Secretary Anderson remarked, "the prospect of a collapsing European economy, providing little outlet for U.S. farm products, would not be pleasant to contemplate." But if in one sense the plan aimed at American survival, the survival of Europe, and the containment of Soviet Russia, it was also, to a very extraordinary degree, a plan revolutionizing the scope of America herself—there was a sense in which the plan could be regarded as a singular assumption of responsibility and a return to the early dreams of the Pilgrim Fathers and of Melville: "We are the heirs of all time and with all nations we divide our inheritance." And still more decisively the Marshall Plan enables the great dream of a Western European Union to come about.

It was not the main intention of the founder of the Marshall Plan to bring this dream about. Concerned largely with the growing pressure of Russia and the economic tensions of America, the plan of Western union came almost as an afterthought; yet it is precisely Western union that offers the surest guarantee to peace. A whole host of prophets and poets have urged Europe to unite or perish. It was the cry of Dante in *De Monarchia* as it was the cry of Victor Hugo. What we know as western Europe, consisting of Greece, Italy, Spain, France, large parts of Germany, Holland, Belgium, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries, have grown up possessed of a common legendary culture; neither Germany nor the Slavonic states have completely taken part in this grouping of cultural forces, though Poland and Austria were outlying members, and in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century Russia had seemed about to claim her privileged place among them. This region of earth, heir to Magna Charta and the cathedrals of Chartres, Ravenna, Palermo, Toledo, Salisbury, and Rome, heir too of a common humanism and a culture derived from Greece and Rome, a great wheel centred about France, could, by union, exercise a power it was incapable of wielding if disunited. Within the borders of the prospective union 159,000,000 people lived in fear



of war and might, by uniting make war between Soviet Russia and America impossible by holding the balance of power

There are problems enough to face if the union ever assumes the role that history, with its wandering hand seems clearly to have marked out for it. Not all but nearly all these countries are Socialist, and therefore in the Russian view more sinister than the capitalist government of America. There are problems of aspiration and economics and the role to be played by America, more urgently still, there are problems of race and history. If the Walloons and the Flemish distrust one another even now, will the Italians and the French love each other more? If there were a Western union trade between the European states would be as free as trade between the states of America with inevitable hardships to some traders and great benefits to others. A European parliament would by necessity have to be formed and it is reasonable to suspect that the sources of power in Europe might be placed under a single European Valleys Authority. There are other complications of a still more urgent nature. Though the Brussels fifty year pact has been signed and Mr Winston Churchill has made his appeal for unity at The Hague, the menacing shadows of Russia and America are seen as shadows and not as the blazing light of some future awakening. The logic of the strategy of the two greater powers confuses the issues of the emergent power of Europe, and in the last instance America is feared only a little less than Soviet Russia. America is not identified with freedom, nor, on the evidence, is there any compulsive reason why she should be, though the seeds of freedom are known to exist in America. A real identity of interests is still lacking. It is too often assumed that the lands and caves of Europe are hardly more than stakes in the struggle between two greater powers. It is not only the Americans who have shown signs of nervous excitability in their foreign politics, the whole foreign political history of Europe between the two wars is evidence of a catastrophic excitability of temperament. Alliances are not formed between *prima donnas*.

Yet the dream of Western union does not depend on the armed power of America and could not in fact be supported by American armed power without danger of becoming nightmare. What is needed here, as elsewhere, is the sociological arm of America and a restatement of American aims for freedom. If Western

union were simply to supply on a larger scale the kind of base the Americans have acquired in Greece, Western union would have no historical future except that of some unsubstantial colony, and Western union, if it ever came about, would be as unimpressed by the possibility of colonial status as it would be terrified at the thought of being the continually imminent battlefield, contending with some reason that complete annihilation is a state to be avoided. Nothing is lost and everything is gained by calling a conference of freedom, where a definition of a Bill of Rights, to be agreed upon by America, the European nations, and whatever other nations wished to contribute to the proclamation, would be promulgated. Almost as important as the union is the Bill of Rights, which forms in effect its constitution, but even more important than the union is the decision by the American people to inform themselves of their responsibility toward the rights of all people everywhere. If the administration continues to support reactionary governments, its intentions in Europe and elsewhere will continue to be suspect. What is needed is quietness and time—time to build, time to think, time to encourage. Appropriations are simple to make; it is infinitely harder to understand the responsibilities and disciplines of freedom and to use them as weapons against a potential enemy. What is necessary is that America should recapture some of the courage and fundamental good sense of her past. The hope of the world lies among those who pray for change and desire it, and the real danger to America is that she might become over the years the least revolutionary power, hating change, and therefore more likely than ever to support the spurious governments of Greece and China.

There was a sense of fatality in Europe through all its ages; no fatality ever fell on America until recently. It is necessary that America should understand that the new responsibilities which have fallen on her mean that she should behave as a government not toward governments, which are temporary, but toward whole civilizations, which are (*pace* Dr. Toynbee) as eternal as anything can be. If America is to become the kingpin round which the rest of the world revolves, the responsibility for discovering the real and exciting motive by which the people of foreign nations live becomes all the greater, and nothing is solved, and much is lost, by basing a foreign policy on the idea

of 'containing Soviet Russia.' The barrenness of such a purpose, which carries no inspiration, no real comfort, should be convincing to all the fight must be taken to the enemy's ideological camp, or the arms might as well be laid down.

The question that haunts the European mind to-day is whether American foreign policy will hold to its course, whether it is capable of holding to a deliberate policy for any length of time, and whether it is in fact seriously informed on the ideological strength of Russia and therefore able to oppose it with the massed might of her resources of films, radio, and propaganda of all kinds, for nothing is more certain than that the Russians are waging ideological war and America is not waging ideological war with any real sense of responsibility. It is clearly insufficient to outline a programme that the National Association of Manufacturers will approve. It is perhaps useless to describe once again over the radio the advantages of the American way of life, the huge productivity of America and her armed strength. What is needed is something more firmly based on the theme of the necessary implementation of freedom. To leave the information programme in the hands of private companies may suggest a sensible effort to console private enterprise, but such an action has nothing whatsoever to do with the real urgencies of our time, the Department of Information in Moscow works deliberately under the orders of the Government of the Soviet Union, and must so work, according to the nature of the case. So, too, the Marshall Plan in Europe will fail unless every conceivable resource of film and radio is employed under government order. It will be necessary to refer to this again later, but at this point it must be insisted that the responsibilities of the Marshall Plan are not completed when appropriations have been signed and goods have been sent over to Europe, these are no more than the veriest beginnings. There must be films explaining the tasks ahead, and it is entirely useless to allow the National Broadcasting Company, or any other company, to underwrite the American theme. American failures in Panama, South America, China, and the Philippines suggest an almost irremediable weakness in the social field and an incapacity to understand how other peoples think and behave in their daily lives. Above all, a weakness in understanding the very nature of freedom is becoming increasingly apparent. The naive belief that Communism

cannot survive a balanced budget would appear to be ineradicable. In an extraordinary passage of an extraordinary speech, Mr. Marshall said, "We are inclined to be extremists, blowing hot and cold, fluctuating between vigorous partisanship or complete indifference as regards the same situation," and he continued, "Our international affairs in regard to a number of matters are either in such a delicate state of negotiation or in such complete stalemate that it is inadvisable for me to engage in public discussions, except in so far as it may be necessary to keep the people of this country reasonably advised of the general situation." It would seem in the highest degree unlikely that the State Department has credited the American people with any sense of freedom if the affairs of the State Department must be so resolutely concealed from them, and there would appear from this speech a general reluctance to inform either Americans or the world of the real purposes at issue, and this reluctance in turn would appear to spring from a curious fear of the people. But some general overall programme could quite easily and openly be fashioned, and on the basis of this general overall programme the people of America and Europe could be continually informed. What is needed here is an American radio operated by a reinvigorated State Department and an American propaganda bureau, also operated by State Department without any equivocation or any attempt to conceal itself under the name of information. All free enterprise is endangered by the absence of these things, and if free enterprise objects to the formation of a deliberate bureau of propaganda under government auspices, so much the worse for free enterprise.

Such an effort of propaganda is particularly necessary in Europe, though it is almost equally necessary for Asia, and one of the stranger and least regarded aspects of the Marshall Plan is the curious imbalance of the American effort towards Europe and Asia. It is possible that the greatest danger of all lies in China, not because the Chinese Communists can now be regarded as certain winners over an effete and stagnant Kuomintang Government, but because no effort has ever been made on a satisfactory scale to attempt to influence the Kuomintang Government towards reform. It is absolutely necessary that the American radio should express continual sympathy and encouragement to the oppressed people of the world. It might even be necessary

to discard entirely the fantastically erudite and meaningless theory of "containment" and put in its place a more comprehensive and dynamic philosophy. Just as Vansittart assisted the Germans by invoking a theorem that placed the whole burden of guilt upon the German people, so the theory of "containment" may be assumed to be at least partly responsible for the recent successes of the Russians. A dynamic philosophy lies close at hand. "The nation is ruined by want of calculation and a worthy aim," wrote Thoreau at a time of grave indecisions. The worthy aims are known.

The disease of despair is contagious, the greater and more enduring contagion of hopes remains to comfort the world. What is needed is not a leader but men with clear aims and clear consciences, and these can be found. Ideas, hopes, the belief in a rejuvenated world, these are the things men believe in, and for the most part they are utterly unconcerned about the politics of power, knowing only too well that we have already reached the limits of power—men know already consciously or unconsciously, that it is not in the power of America alone to destroy the world, but they know that it is in the power of America alone to set the pattern of a future freedom. It is in these regions that the failure of American propaganda becomes intrinsically criminal and disastrous, for there is no greater crime than to offer a hope and then to be continually disguising that offer with provisos and injunctions and a whole battery of amendments when what is wanted is the clarity of freedom expressed in terms that can be understood. Booker T. Washington used to tell a story of how the captain of a ship lost at sea prayed for clear water, while all his shipmates were dying of thirst. He signalled to a friendly ship in the distance, which signalled in reply, "Cast down your bucket where you are." The men were still dying of thirst, and some were dying in extreme agony. Once again the captain asked for fresh water to be sent to him, and once again the friendly ship replied, "Cast down your bucket where you are." At last the captain cast down his bucket, which came up full of fresh, sparkling water from the mouth of the Amazon. It would seem that the plight of America is very much like the plight of the ship's captain. By making certain that freedom is encouraged everywhere and tyranny is fought, the advantages are beyond price, but if the ambivalences that arise

from the deliberate use of naked power and no other weapons continue, the price may be the extinction of the Republic. The time of ambivalence has passed; only the most complete reliance on freedom can save us. What is needed is not a counter-Comintern, which would be an admission of defeat, but an offensive alliance of the free men of the world on terms of equality. What is needed is that we should win the kind of war that the Communists are waging, and we can win it more easily by being entirely in the open. In this war all deceptions will fail us, while all deceptions help the enemy.

Meanwhile, we need a re-examination of our own weapons. The films can help vastly, but so far they are a hindrance to victory. To the philosophy implicit behind the extraordinary technical arts of Hollywood there is only one answer: it was given more than two thousand years ago by Hierocles the poet when he said, "Pleasure as an end is a harlot's doctrine." Only a small minority of available films can be employed: new films must be made. There is need for far more encouragement for responsible journalists and writers to travel to and from Europe. There is need for as many American information services as possible. There is need for far more American newspapers in Europe, and it is wholly necessary, for example, that American publications in Germany should neither give the appearance nor in fact be subservient to the military government. If, by insisting on the very real benefits of freedom, and by encouraging freedom wherever it can be found, America assumes deliberate purposes, it will be necessary to destroy every vestige of support for reactionary governments.

As a political programme the Marshall Plan falls short of nearly all its aims. Dollars cannot buy liberty, democracy, or peace; they cannot even buy free men, and they are most certainly the cause of making men less free. But the significance of the Marshall Plan remains, for it signifies a very real awakening of the American sense of responsibility. The rehabilitation of Western Europe and the effort to bring about Western union are both necessary, but they are small issues indeed compared with the issue of creating an awakened democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. All theories of an Atlantic empire fail before the theory of these awakened and purposeful democracies; what is needed is not an Atlantic empire based on American arms, but the gains that are

derived from confidence among allies. Expediency fails in Europe as elsewhere. The aspirations for freedom of the Europeans must be heard, and these aspirations are equally valid whether they come from Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, or Greeks. To announce that American armies will occupy Germany until Europe is at peace, or to signify to the Austrians that no peace treaty will be signed until the Russians are far beyond the frontiers of Austria is to play the Russian game. We dare not offend the just aspirations of people, and if we offend them on the grounds that the Russians may invade their states, we simply give currency to Russian hopes. Americans dare not allow the Europeans, the proudest of people, to believe that we have an interest in them as cannon fodder only. The veiled dubieties of pre-war power politics have no urgency in the realm of freedom. Military governments have no place there. But honest propaganda has a place, and so too has the union of Western Europe, for the same reason that led Washington to say, "If a weak state with the Indians on its back and the Spaniards on its flank does not see the necessity of a General Government, there must I think be wickedness or insanity in the way." With the Russians at their back and the Americans on their flank the Western Europeans have a right to a general government, but the hope of the world still lies in an identity of interests between Europe and America.

"Europe must federate or perish," said Prime Minister Attlee. "Europe must unite herself if she wishes to recover and live, and if she does not want American assistance to be a gesture without future or a humiliating charity," said President Auriol of France. Unity is in the air and will come about for sound historical causes, and not the least is the common cultural tradition of the Western European nations. The Russians have reached the line that once in the early Middle Ages divided the empire of Charlemagne from the amorphous tribesmen of the East. There is no need to believe that the Russians will be able to pursue their dream of acquiring power over a whole continent, the drive has been halted, what remains in the period of the coming years is consolidation and the slow processes of driving them back. And this can succeed only if our purposes are entirely just, if we never give hostages to reaction, and if we fight with every available weapon for free nations in a free world. Just as the New Deal

gave the Americans a short breathing space in which they could think out their problems anew, so the Marshall Plan has brought a short breathing space, but it is necessary to insist that the time is short and the Americans have not even begun in earnest the ideological war against the injustices of Soviet rule.



## AMERICA AND RUSSIA

*We alone, we who guard the mystery, we alone shall be unhappy*

THE GRAND INQUISITOR

*in The Brothers Karamazov*

IN THE YEAR 1848, when Karl Marx published the astonishing document known as *The Communist Manifesto* summoning the French proletariat to revolt, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of France was an aging diplomat, Count Alexis de Tocqueville. He looked older than his years, he was tired and ill and had only ten more years to live, and he seems not to have observed the existence of the choleric young Jew then living in isolation in London, whose name was to acquire thundering reverberations of power by his study of the social conditions of Victorian England. A few months after accepting the post of Foreign Minister, De Tocqueville resigned to complete the second of his epochal volumes on the nature of social change, but his survey of the *ancien régime* and the French Revolution disclosed little that was new. Just as Karl Marx filled *Das Kapital* with the full strength of his genius, so De Tocqueville filled *Democracy in America* with almost the whole of his amazing fund of insight and understanding, leaving little for his future works. In a strange way, Melville and Emerson had symbolized at the same time the two extremes of the American temperament, and in a very similar way Marx and De Tocqueville symbolized the two extremes of revolution.

These two formidable antagonists, both lawyers by training, possessed of powers of penetration, rhetoric, and the gift of writing with dramatic force in an equal degree, confront each other still across the centuries. Whether we like it or not, they are part of the air we breathe, and the fabulous engine-rooms still obey their unspoken commands. It was their concern to uncover the springs of action and to determine the tendencies of their times, and because they were indefatigable and remorseless in

their determination to reveal the real causes rather than those that appeared to be most easily susceptible to investigation, their evaluations have a continual and increasing relevance to the tragedy of our times. Nothing could be more mistaken than to imagine that the declared conflict between America and the Soviet Union springs from an inevitable antagonism between private enterprise and State Socialism. The roots lie deeper in opposing philosophies of history, in opposing moralities, even in opposing conceptions of the nature of man. The age-old European debate between freedom and authority was continued in the persons of the two lawyers, who could hardly have realized that the definitions they pronounced in the middle years of the nineteenth century would retain their validity a hundred years later.

The great majority of men are children of their age, the victims of its dominant ideas. It is only occasionally that men like Melville and Emerson, De Tocqueville and Karl Marx arise with the capacity to crystallize new ideas, which become dominant in time. Macaulay, for example, produced no such effect on his age. He believed implicitly in the social concepts of Victorian capitalism, and it could never have occurred to him that capitalism would inevitably give place to new instruments of power. The machines might run faster; there would be more of them; it was even conceivable that a time would come when New Zealand or Australia would show greater industrial progress than England herself; but it was inconceivable that the method of exploitation would change. Karl Marx, reading Heraclitus and Hegel, convinced that all things were in a state of flux, realized that capitalism was no part of the permanent organization of mankind, but a passing phase bearing in it the seeds of its own destruction. This simple discovery led him to re-examine the evolution of governmental power and to establish that whenever there were seizures of power by one class against another, the technique of the successful revolution obeyed the same fundamental laws. These laws do not concern us here. What does concern us is that he believed the underprivileged proletariat were ripe for a seizure of power, and the proletariat were capable of introducing a classless society where the privileges were shared equally with the duties and where government, in the words of the Chinese philosopher, would become as simple as cooking little fishes. It

was this dream that inspired Lenin to the belief that within a few months after the accession to power the Russian state would wither away. Marx, by a singular error, underestimated the staying power and the prodigious changes that were to occur in the fabric of capitalism, and though *The Communist Manifesto* is written with uncommon power and deserves the serious study that it rarely receives in America, it contains errors of judgment couched in terms of messianic prophecy, which have done much to discredit his assumption of omniscience. It was expressly stated in *The Communist Manifesto* The Communists turn their attention chiefly to Germany, because that country is on the eve of a bourgeois revolution and because the bourgeois revolution in Germany will be but the prelude to an immediately following proletarian revolution. This prediction, like so many others, was incorrect. There has never been a bourgeois revolution in Germany. But though Marx thought continually in terms of revolution, he did not always assume that the revolution would be accomplished with violence. In a speech to the First International in 1872, he said, 'We do not claim that the means necessary for bringing about the social revolution must be the same everywhere, nor do we deny that there are countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, where the workers will be able to achieve their aims by peaceful purposes.' Eight years later he wrote to Hyndman "If you say that you do not share the views of my party for England, I can only reply that the Party considers an English revolution *not necessary*, but—according to historic precedent—*possible*. If the unavoidable evolution turns into revolution it would not only be the fault of the ruling classes, but also of the working classes.' Marx was the apostle of a social change that was sorely needed, but the 'inevitable' pattern of the *Manifesto*, the constant employment of phrases like "the unavoidable evolution" when he meant only that some kind of change was in the air, together with the singular obtuseness of his prophecies in spite of the real delicacy of his examination of the causes of social change in the past, all these suggest the pounding of pistons in the engine room when the screw propeller is thrust out of the waves. Yet it would be the greatest possible mistake to disregard his findings. The proletariat were ripe for revolt. Vast and abrupt social changes *were* necessary. The theoretician who had evolved the doctrine of Communism after

a long study of the Hegelian philosophy of law is not to be dismissed lightly; he remains the prophet of the millennium when the classes shall be destroyed, and of all men he was probably the most dissimilar to the bureaucrats who are now in control of the Soviet Union.

With De Tocqueville the process of discovery was entirely different. Marx, studying statistics in the British Museum library, fascinated by the prospect of a new world kingdom where the workers ruled, breathing the intoxicated air that once filled the lungs of Amos, seems to belong to an altogether different universe from the one inhabited by De Tocqueville. The French nobleman, rich from birth, chary of prophecy, incapable of quick decisions, contemplated quietly and without horror the levelling processes of democracy and smiled a little at the strange and sometimes insoluble problems that confronted the new-born democracy. Where Marx was quick to observe that everything changes, De Tocqueville was oppressed by the suspicion that, though everything changes, most things come back in time to the place they originally occupied. "It is believed by some," he wrote, "that modern society will be ever changing its aspect; for myself I fear that it will ultimately be too invariably fixed in the same institutions, the same prejudices, the same manners, so that mankind will be stopped and circumscribed; that the mind will swing backwards and forwards for ever, without begetting fresh ideas; that man will waste his strength in bootless and solitary trifling; and, though in continual motion, that humanity will cease to advance." It happened that when he did prophesy, he prophesied with terrible accuracy. It was De Tocqueville who first observed without the flicker of an eyelid that "there are two things which a democracy will always find very difficult—to begin a war and to end it." He said, at a time when world wars were almost inconceivable, that wars under democracy would always be world wars. In 1830, when Russia and America must have seemed to be remote outposts of civilization, largely inhabited by Tartars and Red Indians, it occurred to him to set down his opinion of the portentous powers that were to be generated by these two nations:

"There are at the present time two great nations in the world which seem to tend towards the same end, although

they started from different points. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed, and while the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place among the nations, and the world learnt of their existence and their greatness at almost the same time. All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power, but these are still in the act of growth, all the others are stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty. These are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which the human eye can assign no term. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens, the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm, the principal instrument of the former is freedom, of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same, yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

Here for the first time the destinies of America and Russia are unambiguously confronted, and some hint is given of the methods by which they will exercise their power. But the humble, deeply religious, and inquiring mind of Alexis de Tocqueville was not satisfied simply to point out the contrasts, he was conscious of the immutable dangers to which democracy lies exposed and of how readily a democracy can be exchanged for benevolent tyranny. In the last amazing chapter of *Democracy in America*, written with a heavy heart and with an intense straining after clarity, he acknowledges for the first time the possible development of democratic despotism in a survey so important that it must be quoted in full.

"I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation is an innumerable multitude of men all equal and alike, incessantly endeavouring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest—his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to

them—but he sees them not—he touches them, but he feels them not: he exists but in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country. Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications, and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute, minute, regular, provident, and mild. It would be like the authority of a parent, if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood: it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided that they think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government willingly labours, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and sub-divides their inheritances—what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living? Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range, and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. . . .

“After having thus successfully taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp, and fashioned them at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided: men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.

“I have always thought that servitude of the regular, quiet and gentle kind which I have just described might be combined more easily than is commonly believed with some of the outward forms of freedom; and that it might easily establish

itself under the wing of the sovereignty of the people. Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting passions, they want to be led, and they wish to remain free as they cannot destroy either one or the other of these contrary propensities, they strive to satisfy them both at once. They devise a sole, tutelary, and all powerful form of government, but elected by the people. They combine the principle of centralization and that of popular sovereignty, thus gives them a respite, they console themselves for being in tutelage by the reflection that they have chosen their own guardians. By this system the people shake off their state of dependence just long enough to select their master, and then relapse into it again."

Not the least of the services of De Tocqueville was that he recognized the dangers inherent in the democratic system and prophesied with singular accuracy one of the gravest of the dangers we face to-day. We are too apt to oppose democracy with tyranny, forgetting that unless the people possess ceaseless powers of referendum on all important issues democracy degenerates by its own fatal impulses into just that kind of benevolent despotism that De Tocqueville described, and the path from this benevolent tyranny to the government described by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World* slopes downward and is very slippery. Nor is it sufficient, in the light of the increasing centralization of government power, to take a Gallup poll or any other kind of measure that affects only a small cross-section of the people, as an indication of what the people desire. Continual reference to the people is the mark of a free democracy, and without it the "immense and tutelary power" acquires by default the very powers that should be conserved by the people. It is no injustice to the existing democracies of Europe and America to say that they are at least halfway toward the democratic despotism that seemed so unsatisfactory to De Tocqueville for the reason that "the nature of him I obey signifies less to me than the fact of extorted obedience." Imperfect democracies confront the imperfect tyranny of Russia, and they are imperfect not because they are capitalist or socialist, but because the people have either not assumed their responsibilities of government to the full or have been dispossessed by law or custom of the right to take their

full part in government. But nothing is so dangerous as deliberate imperfection consciously accepted and consciously practised, and as democracy fails by default, the most ghastly tyranny of all—ghastly for the very reason that under a technological society it is only too possible and therefore very close to us—enters the scene as a very present menace.

But De Tocqueville's contribution to an understanding of democracy is not limited to an understanding of its dangers. Though he never actually defines democracy, the whole work includes a continuing definition. The practised eye observes cleanly, meticulously, and with that abundance of wisdom which arises from a deliberate sense of responsibility. The religious, rather than the social feeling informs the work. A religious respect and tolerance drew him to America, and in the most famous and wonderful passage of all he insists that the equality for which America was striving could be understood only by placing oneself *in statu dei*, for "we may naturally believe that it is not the singular prosperity of the few, but the greater well-being of all, which is most pleasing to the sight of the Creator and Preserver of men."

In a very real sense the last chapter of *Democracy in America* rivals *The Communist Manifesto*. Both offer programmes, suggest dangers, argue according to the fall and rise of societies, and see continual evolution; but one is hardbitten, merciless, contemptuous of everything except the man-made laws of history, while the other, though greedy for certainties, implacable against evil, and tormented by a profound sense of justice, possesses a serene belief in the power of democracy to rejuvenate itself. The contestants are the author of *Das Kapital* and the author of *Democracy in America*. Though there have been enormous changes in America, and the evolution of Communism in Russia has taken the form of a devolution of some of the original tenets of Communism, the final battle is joined between the still-heard voices of two dead men. It is a battle for the conquest of the world.

We are accustomed to thinking of battles in terms of armies that approach one another on the field, or in terms of aeroplanes that swoop down and destroy whole cities with bombs, but the battle between De Tocqueville and Marx cannot be fought in military terms. What is at stake is the conquest of the world's conscience, not the physical earth; it is a battle that can only be



sought in the minds of men, and receive its solution in men's minds. The unarmed forces of De Tocqueville and Marx appeal to the social consciousness and to man's desire to improve the opportunities of living. One states bluntly, in words that are not wholly dissimilar to the extraordinary theoretic stratagems of a Toynbee or a Spengler, that iron law rules, and that even man's social consciousness obeys these laws, the other states that man's human dignity is at stake and that only by a democratic system (and *a system* not by a democratic despotism) can that dignity be maintained. One appeals to Hegel's definition of 'freedom as necessity,' the other to Aristotle's definition that freedom is to be governed and to govern. Though both appeal to the social consciousness, they appeal in entirely separate ways and employ separate methods with the result that the two conflicting forces fail to meet. It is for this reason that until recently it was quite possible to imagine totalitarian Communism and American democracy living separately and safely in the world together, for if there was no contact between them there could be no conflict.

But Marx is not the final arbiter of the present dispensation in Russia, it is not Marxism but Leninism and Stalinism that confuse the issue, just as it is the rise of the big monopolies and the abolition movement, both unforeseen by De Tocqueville, that confuse the issue in America. Between Marxism and the fundamental democracy envisaged by De Tocqueville there is no conflict, but as Russia reverted to her nationalistic tendencies, acquired long before and resurrected at the end of the war, and assumed complete control of the huge machine of international Communism, conflict became inevitable, the battle can no longer be fought only on intellectual levels. As De Tocqueville has foreseen, the power of Russia confronts the power of America, and, like ourselves, he was unable to foresee the end of the conflict.

Leninism derived from Marxism a theory of history, a contempt for the bourgeois, and a belief in the doctrine of "the withering away of the State." There was nothing particularly new or original in the contempt or the doctrine. What was new was the fatalistic notion of history—the certainty of success, and the fantastic ease with which a small group of determined men at an unguarded moment seized power by a stratagem, a stratagem found so useful that it has been employed deliberately by the Communists at least eight times since the historic revolution.

in October and was copied in its entirety by Hitler at the time when he set fire to the Reichstag. The stratagem was to circulate dire warnings regarding a sinister plot by the reactionary forces and by dint of ceaseless repetition make these warnings credible, and whenever possible there was made available some concrete and manufactured evidence of treacherous intent on the part of the enemy. If the Communists were employed upon a plot, they would suggest that the enemy was plotting, and by accusing the enemy of the very sins that they were themselves committing, they were in a position to baffle the minds of the people. Every conceivable means of subterfuge was employed, and not the least of them was the method of calling the kettle black.

To this subterfuge there was added a theory of violence borrowed from the anarchists. Shock troops of young, embittered men, determined upon power, were called out, and these shock troops, later to be called "action committees," placed themselves entirely above the law. "Is it so hard to understand," Lenin wrote to the Party's Central Committee, "that an armed uprising imposes the duty of everyone in all his public utterances to lay *not only the blame but also the initiative* on the door of the adversary? Only a child would fail to understand this." Children do not understand these things. Only the technicians of terror understand these things perfectly and are prepared to employ their knowledge to the uttermost.

Armed with a practical knowledge of mob psychology, the Communists were also endowed with the gift of mercilessness. The enemy to be exterminated was not imprisoned, but annihilated, as the Jews were annihilated in Germany; whole classes disappeared; and in the first eighteen months of the October Revolution the great majority of Russia's most talented scientists and artists vanished from the scene. Just as revolutionary France could not afford the killing of a Lavoisier, so neither the Germans nor the Soviets could afford in their long-term plans the destruction of their sciences and arts. When Gorky pleaded for mercy, saying, "Let there be a peace which will enable Russia to live honourably before the eyes of all the peoples of the earth—humanity has bled enough," Lenin replied softly that Gorky was full of philistine prejudice and had been weakened by too long a stay on the Italian Riviera. And in *The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution* Lenin wrote:

"The word 'democracy' is not only not scientific when applied to the Communist Party, but since March, 1917, it has simply become a blinker upon the eyes of the revolutionary people, preventing them from establishing *boldly, freely and on their own initiative a new form of power* the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies as the sole power of the State and as the harbinger of the 'withering away' of the State is such."

It was perhaps the most revealing of all Lenin's statements, but it was also the most incorrigibly romantic and therefore dangerous. The mesmeric promise of the 'withering away' of the State, the 'harbingers' who 'boldly freely and on their own initiative' seize power in order to institute rule by the deputies of two classes, which did not originally include the peasantry, and this for the very reason that the greatest obstacles of the revolution lay in the traditional political apathy of the peasants, whom Marx described bitterly in *The Communist Manifesto* as incompetent revolutionaries—all this belonged to the poetry of politics rather than to the practical application of government. The romantic prelude continued with a romantic theme, which is still being played—the theme of the self liquidation of all problems by the introduction of mythological factors and chief among them the mythology of power. The cry of the revolutionaries was not "freedom" but "all power to the Soviets" and "peace and bread." The first was obtained by a ruse, but peace was obtained only by surrender and of bread there was almost none.

This is not to suggest that the Communists have not accomplished an almost miraculous task, but it is necessary to insist that the tasks which confronted the Communists could have been executed without the employment of a fierce mythology, for mythology and the reliance on mythology involve unceasing cruelty. Ruse, stratagem, and shocks were the prerequisites of their rule, and to a lesser or greater extent they were to be extended into the peaceful occupation of Russia by the Communists. Nothing is so witless or so poor as the use of men in slave camps. Like concentration camps, they brutalize the prisoners to the lowest common denominator of their guards, and what is strange is not that the Soviets should have extended the use of slave labour further than the Czars, but that they deliberately

employed the techniques of slave labour when the authors of the Communist revolution had been themselves imprisoned in Siberia. The dream of Dostoevski that Siberia should become the first land of the free was not brought about, and immediately after the wave of killings that lasted until 1923, the Siberian camps were placed under the authority of the Cheka. That the secret police was limitlessly corrupt was shown in the evidence of the trial of General Yagoda, and it was by the reliance on that which was limitlessly corrupt and by the rejection of any formal opposition that the Soviets retained their power. Once again, seeing the waste of hope destroyed in unmitigated slavery, the moral equation was forfeit and a new Melville could speak of another continent in words employed with the most solemn effect previously:

*"I muse upon my country's ills—  
The tempest bursting from the waste of Time  
Of the world's fairest hope linked to man's foulest crime."*

But if there were falsities at the root of the Revolution, if the determined objective of power introduced new and disquieting mythologies, so that it was necessary even by a Stalinist interpretation of history to be continually accusing the enemy of the sins that the Soviets were themselves committing, some grave and important advances were made. Tyranny, the destruction, and subjugation of whole provinces, the wilderness maze of secret police, the gigantism, and the network of slave camps over the whole country—all these must not blind us to the social objectives which were sometimes obtained, and though in one sense the whole machinery of government was geared to power through industrialization; in another sense it was geared to the purely social aim of the greatest good for the greatest number. Women were given statutory equality with men, and obtained a large proportion of secondary government positions. Equality and cultural autonomy were given to the states that formed the Russian federation. A series of Five Year Plans, nearly all of them successful, revealed the mechanical efficiency of the Russians and even of the backward people of Asiatic Russia. They were not, of course, as efficient as the Americans or the Western Europeans, but a tradition of efficiency was being

created—a tradition that was proven in the great victories of Stalingrad. But a distinction must be made between the evolution of the Russian people under a more normal government and their evolution under Stalinism, and here it is clear that nearly all the advances made by the Soviets would have been achieved under almost any government, and the great strains to which the Russian people were put arose largely through the constantly changing mythologies of Communist power. Gigantism played havoc with the people: the constant adulatory odes to Stalin; the decline of literature, poetry, and music; the limitations on economic experiment, and indeed on experiment in all forms except those favoured by the government gave the casual visitor the impression that he was living under the rule of a Czarist czar, and it could only have been in a state so rigidly controlled and so absolute in its demand for obedience that a Nazi-Soviet Pact could have been signed. In America there are evils enough, but at least there is an unchanging moral code: there are democratic amenities, liberties, and individual rights treasured in theory, and for the most part in practice. In Russia there was no certain core, and the diverse wills of the Politburo—often conflicting, now directed towards the socialization of Russia, now towards the socialization under Russian rule of the world—parade over the unexpressed wills of the people, while a Great White Father, more majestically solemn than any European hero, descendant of a long line of Russian mythological giants, is heard and not seen from his place behind the altar. In Russia it is not Socialism alone but mythology that rules, and the worst that can be said of history seen in the guise of mythology is that there are always too many slaves, too many fears, too great a dread of the unknown. When John Steinbeck visited Russia he came to the edge of a field where cucumbers were piled high for the waiting trucks, there he saw a little boy named Grisha, who ran up to his mother after seeing the American and exclaimed with wonder, 'But these Americans are people like us!' O strange new world! The mythology of the Evil Foreigner, who continually and repeatedly sought the blood of little Russians was fostered in spite of the great achievements of the Western powers in bringing tools and arms to Russia. Because the Soviet Government was officially treacherous, the Russians were taught to see treachery everywhere. Because hatred of the foreigner was encouraged, fear of

the foreigner was widespread. The Soviet Government even hoped that one day the ruses and stratagems that yielded victory in October, 1917, would enable them to conquer the world. It was a shadow world in which the greatest artistic achievement lay in the films: the vast, clear-cut, and infinitely beautiful shadows of Sergei Eisenstein's last film were a measure of the whole shadow play.

It is necessary to insist on the influence of mythology in Communist Russia for the same reason that it would be necessary to insist on the mythology of Germany in any examination of the rise to power of Hitler. Nations live on dreams, take nourishment from words, seek prophecies, and gaze at crystals whenever they are unsure of themselves, but in Russia the process was quickened by the messianic nature of the prophecies included within *The Communist Manifesto*. Marx prophesied that the Russian Revolution, if it ever occurred, would be delayed long after the whole of Europe had become Communist, and in this, at first sight, he would appear to have prophesied wrongly: but if Communism as an egalitarian democracy, deprived of all its subterfuges and stratagems of power, were in fact to come to Europe, Russia is still the last country in which it would arrive.

The mythology of power remains to darken the Russian scene, as in another form it darkens the American scene. In Russia it is seen in the resplendent uniforms of the officers, the infinite bestowal of medals, the grandeur of the lives of the generals, and the increasing distance that separates the officer class from the common soldier. The uniform has entered the Russian Foreign Office, to the delight of the foreign caricaturists and the amazement of all European officials, who remember that a uniformed foreign service was ordered by Hitler. Endless parades in the Red Square seem to speak even now, though Stalingrad has been fought and won, of a secret weakness. In previous history only the Nazis gave themselves to the spectacle of so many wearisome engines of destruction interminably parading. Stalin has accepted by acclamation the title of Generalissimo, last used in Russia by Suvarov, and used in the interval only by some South American dictators, Dr. Sun Yat-sen when he was in command of the province of Kwantung and by Chiang Kai-shek, while for reasons that can only be mythological Stalin allowed himself to be addressed by the Russian title that is the exact equivalent of

*Faber* The mixed power of the Soviets was to become the instrument for socializing the world, but no terms were too savage to describe the Socialists of Europe and Asia who were actually socializing the world without the assistance of the Politburo. Instead of the revolution of the proletariat, a new feudalism complete with serfs and baronial lords arose in Russia, the vast acres owned, not by the state or by the king but by the anonymous managers in leather coats, those new symbols of despotic power employed to the uttermost. It is related that when the students of Charles University moved in massed formations towards the Hradcna to appeal to President Benes to allow a democratic form of government to remain a solitary official in a leather coat ordered them to return with what consequences we know to our cost. The bureaucrats, in possession of vast and intangible powers, judge, jury, and executioner are the final governors of a Soviet tyranny, grand inquisitors who perform the rituals of a messianic religion without delight, in constant jeopardy of treason, but dedicated to a wilful purpose of power. The Communists had seized their power prematurely, in spite of Lenin's pronouncement based on insufficient evidence that the time was "quite ripe," and the bureaucrats have been compelled continually to force events. The consequences in inhumanity might have been foreseen and were in fact foreseen by one of the greatest Communist leaders of all, Rosa Luxemburg who wrote from her German prison in 1918:

"The suppression of all political life throughout Russia must also result in paralyzing the activity of the Soviets. Without universal suffrage, liberty of the Press and of public meeting and freedom of debate, public institutions will atrophy and take on a shadow existence so that powers remain with the bureaucracy alone. Nothing and nobody is exempt from the action of this law. Public life gradually ceases. A few dozen Party leaders possessed of tireless energy and inspired by boundless idealism direct and control everything. In reality, a dozen of the most outstanding intellects among them take charge of affairs. A selected number of workmen are from time to time summoned to meetings in order to applaud the speeches of their leaders and to pass unanimously resolutions that are laid before them. In fact, it is government by a clique—a

dictatorship of a handful of politicians, i.e. a middle-class dictatorship, like that of the Jacobins."

This classic description of Russian tyranny should be compared with the description offered by Aristotle:

"Tyranny must endeavour by every means to keep the people strangers from each other, for knowledge increases mutual confidence, and to know what everyone under their power does and says, and for this purpose to employ spies.

"It is also advantageous to a tyranny that those who are under it should be oppressed by poverty, that they may be unable to compose a guard; and that being employed in earning their mere bread they should have no time to conspire against tyrants.

"There are three objects which a tyranny has in view:

"The first is that citizens should be of poor, abject dispositions.

"The second is that they should have no confidence in each other.

"The third is that they should be totally without means of doing anything, for no one understands what is impossible for him to perform, and without power no tyranny can be destroyed."

Now, it would be the grossest foolishness to believe that Communist tyranny conforms to the pattern of tyranny described by Aristotle in every essential. The Russians are not citizens of "poor, abject disposition," nor are all of them oppressed by poverty, for in the south the great majority of the peasants have sufficient to eat and the distribution of food is improving every year. Just as America is an imperfect democracy tending continually to improve, Russia is an imperfect tyranny tending continually to become more tyrannical, and it becomes more tyrannical, not because there is increasing poverty, dissatisfaction, and rebellion—for none of these are true—but because the habits of tyrannical government, once assumed, tend to prolong themselves by default of any opposition, with the result that as the standard of living rises in Russia, the strength of the tyranny will rise in direct proportion to the standard of living. What Aristotle was describing was not far from a democratic despotism,



for he added remorselessly that it was a good idea for tyrants "to seem rather like the father of a great family than like a tyrant." Because benevolence under a dictatorship is purely arbitrary, just as the acquisition of wealth under a democracy is often purely arbitrary, the social pattern suffers the tensions that arise from arbitrariness: envy and jealousy result. In a democracy every effort is made to acquire wealth by the most anti-social means; in a tyranny every effort is made to acquire the benevolence of the State by following the preordained path dictated by the State without inquiring whether this path is just or even socially useful, so that the G.P.U. for example, will execute hundreds of thousands of prisoners in the belief, sometimes mistaken, that their execution is demanded by the purposes of the State, and hundreds of thousands of prisoners will be deported for the same reason though common intelligence would suggest that the great majority of the prisoners would be fulfilling more useful social functions outside the prison houses. On this plane the extremes of capitalism and Communism meet. There is subservience to an unalterable pattern that is not dictated by any social logic, but is dictated by the logic of expediency, a logic so powerful, remorseless, and cunning that we may well surrender our hopes of destroying it if it were not that we felt in our hearts that our children deserve something better than to be cast upon a world where expediency rules.

It has been necessary to discuss the nature of the Russian tyranny at some length in order to understand how it may best be combatted. That tyranny involves the use of treachery in acquiring power and a huge population of slaves to support it should be self-evident. What is not so self-evident is that even treachery can be explained away by the Communists in social terms and that the slaves by propaganda may find themselves at last willing victims of the system that destroys them, because they are forcibly submitted to propaganda, propaganda that is not inherently different from the propaganda inflicted upon those who are not in the labour camps.

When Hitler said in *Mein Kampf* that everyone tends to believe a great lie, and the greater the lie, the more likely it is that the people will believe it, he was stating a fact that may have been true of Germany, but is not essentially true of all nations. No propaganda can succeed unless it possesses at its core a hard,

tenable, and relentless truth. That Germany was stabbed in the back was in a very real sense true, that the Versailles Treaty was criminally disastrous was also true, that foreign nations were attempting to encircle Germany was equally true, and these three truths repeated *ad nauseam* produced for a while a sense of great hopefulness among the German people. The more immediate dangers of poverty and decline were translated into the common recognition of an imaginary enemy within and an encircling enemy without. Meanwhile, a precisely similar pattern is being followed by the Russian tyranny. Though Russia stretches across the whole length of Asia and reaches out into half Europe, encircling enemies are discovered, and the imaginary enemy within is imprisoned in the labour camps. But Russia possesses one advantage that was denied to Germany, for there remained a core of hard truth in the statement that the great majority of Asiatics and perhaps half the Europeans were exploited by their masters, and under the guise of benevolence, to conceal imperial ambitions that date from the times of the Dukes of Muscovy, she called upon the exploited to flock to her banners, and there began, almost immediately after the October Revolution, a process of slow accretion by which Communism gathered to itself innumerable cellular organizations abroad, which regarded Russia as their fatherland in much the same way as the Christians at the time of the Crusades regarded Jerusalem as their motherland. A *mystique* was created beyond anything that Marx could have dreamed of—the *mystique* of a mysterious parental home, rarely visited, in which the social organization was so perfect that merely to step on the shores of Russia was to receive a blessing. But it is necessary at this stage to insist that if this *mystique* was encouraged by propaganda, it could not have been successful if the desire for such a fatherland had not existed.

If America is to survive, it must realize that the peculiar successes of the Communists, once the initial treacheries had been accomplished, were inevitable and demanded by the times, and it is only by understanding the patterns of Russian success that we can hope to achieve a democratic victory over the world, for these patterns were not so much dictated patterns as human patterns, satisfying human needs, and until recently the gravest failures of American diplomacy and activity abroad have arisen through a misunderstanding of the human needs of other nations.

Because it was difficult to enter Russia and travel freely over the country, and because it was absolutely impossible for foreigners to visit the labour camps except under the most careful supervision by the G P U, it is on the whole possible for Russia to present to the world the picture of a young, vigorous, and creative nation untrammelled by the conventions that motivate the rest of the world. A young boldly defiant country can be interpreted photographically by strong handsome peasant girls and by the battles of a revolutionary past. These films were rarely untrue: they recorded in simple terms the aspirations of a people and they were concerned to show that those same aspirations were universal. Few American films were concerned to exploit accurately the splendours of the American revolutionary past, of her great expansion across the frontiers and of her great men. It is true that there were occasional films depicting the lives of Lincoln, Wilson and some others and that the Civil War was employed copiously as a background for the love affairs of *Scarlet O'Hara* but the full implications of the war were not revealed in films and too many sinister influences were at work in the historical films to suggest that there was a real effort to obtain either accuracy or the aspirations of the people living through those times. The accent was on individual actors, not on history, and America with her vast technical resources lost the battle against Russian films without firing a shot and without knowing that a battle had been engaged.

The precise extent of this tragedy may never be known. The strange superficiality of Hollywood, the legends surrounding the American tourist, and the nervous brutality of some Americans abroad gave rise to a portrait of America that was not only hopelessly inaccurate but seemed fated to be opposed in every way by the similarly inaccurate portrait which the Russians painted of themselves. The Russians were shown living out their lives as social groups, keenly interested in the affairs of one another, delighting in the seasons and waging continual battle against the forces of reaction. The Americans were shown to be in possession of large private incomes and they were continually attempting to seduce one another. Problems were resolved by individual acts of brutality even in the case of films that, like *Crossfire*, claimed to represent the careful evaluation of social themes. *Unconquered*, which pretended to tell the story of

the Pontiac Conspiracy, was produced, according to Mr. Cecil DeMille, with the assistance of six researchers who consulted 2,500 volumes in quest of authentic data, and their notes "were contained in 93 loose-leaf folders in DeMille's office." The end product of this film produced at so great a cost was an orgy of bloody massacre, seduction, flagellation, and intolerably bad history such as had rarely been seen on the screen before. Such films exert a powerful and irresponsible influence on the people. The lowest depths of popular taste are exhumed, and the very greatness of America is reviled by these follies, with the result that there is hardly a film that can be shown abroad with any measure of profit to American prestige, and hardly any that convey the humanity possessed by Italian, British, and French films. And if it is argued that the American public has given its consent to these productions and delights in them, the argument fails absolutely on the grounds that Hollywood dictates the taste of millions by enjoying a monopoly, and the anti-social stupidities of Hollywood would have been repeated endlessly, and might still be repeated, if it were not that other kinds of film are gradually being introduced from abroad. It was no accident that *The Birth of a Nation*, even though it was a magnificent technical achievement, was followed by a revival of the Ku Klux Klan. The writers and producers, living in an unreal landscape, subsisting upon emotions that sustain hardly anyone else in America, flagrantly ignorant of the real lives of the people, responsible only to the box office, continually astonish the world by the superficiality of their genius and throw over America a net of dreams that may be ripped apart only in a generation. They neither know nor care for the real purposes of America. They are not concerned to show to Americans or to foreigners the real purposes to which America is dedicated: there have been no good and accurate films of the Revolution, of the Civil War, of the emergence of the forty-eight states, and very rarely are they concerned with the real lives of the people. In the rare cases when a film of genius has been produced, it occasionally happened that some of the finest parts were deliberately thrown away, as being incomprehensible to the American public, as when a whole reel describing a Mexican festival was cut from *The Treasure of the Sierra Madre* on the plea that "anyway the film is too long, and Americans don't want to see Mexicans

enjoying themselves" The deceitful disrespect for the level of American intelligence is carried on with the utmost effrontery, and it can be said of the films, as the Commission on Freedom of the Press said of newspapers

"The Press must know that its faults and vagaries have ceased to be private vagaries and have become public dangers. Its inadequacies menace the balance of public opinion. It has lost the common and ancient human liberty to be deficient in function and to offer the half truth for the whole. The Press must remain private and free *ergo* human and fallible, but the Press dare no longer indulge in fallibility—it must supply the public need."

It has been necessary to speak in this way of the films because the screen possesses in our modern world incalculable social importance, for with the decline of religion the cinema is gradually becoming the only place where people congregate and suffer emotions together. The harm they have done in America can only be examined in the light of criminal statistics—and in particular those statistics that refer to violence. But the harm that has been done to America may be accounted less than the harm which has been done to foreigners who tend even now to see America through the eyes of the Hollywood camera. The Chinese and Indian audiences of American films are not impressed by wanton brutality, seductions, and glamour. If they could have seen films showing the real lives of America, and if they could have been shown the whole story of the emergence of America into a great power, and if, further, they could have learned by implication the pattern of American democracy at its best, something might have been achieved. In effect, nothing was achieved except great harm.

In spite of technical advantages so numerous and so brilliantly conceived that Hollywood still remains the world's headquarters of photography as photography, all the social advantages that might have accrued to the cinema are wilfully thrown away, with the result that American films, which should have been the heralds of America, are viewed with suspicion and often with distaste abroad. The social weapon, which has been sharpened by the Russians into an instrument of continual and successful

propaganda, was thrown away by the Americans. The theme of American freedom, which could have enlightened and invigorated other nations in their quest for freedom, is rarely if ever employed, and though the films depict individuals abstracted from their social group, they seem incapable of showing tragedy or high comedy; burlesque and the Mack Sennett girl hunt take the place of the uproarious emotions of *La Kermesse Heroique*, and the long-thighed pin-up girl, brainless and impudent, and with as much social consciousness as a leech, obtains her empire over men.

The strategy of the Russians was to employ all weapons: the strategy of the Americans was to employ only those that could be exerted diplomatically by the State Department. Schools and scholarships for foreign students were established, though they were not so numerous as the schools and scholarships secretly established by the Russians: there came to America in one year as many foreign students as Russia absorbed in three months. Eighteen universities in Russia admitted students from abroad; a vast institute in Moscow catered to Asiatic students. It was not only in the films that the Americans failed to show the full strength of the nation. In radio the voice of America is rarely heard to advantage, and often to great disadvantage, as when it was discovered in May, 1948, that as a result of farming out the programmes to private enterprise a kind of insane sabotage had been allowed to take place, and the American radio itself announced that "New England was founded on hypocrisy and Texas on sin." Where there should be a bold, defiant, and creative use of radio, there are only soap opera, disc jockeys, and crooners interrupted by the weary blaring of advertisements. The aims of advertisers are not social aims, and even the Metropolitan Opera on the air is interrupted by a casual advertisement for U.S. Steel. Neither radio nor the films are yet mature, and their very immaturity is of grave consequence to the American scene.

It is important to realize when social weapons have been thrown away. The real horrors of the Soviet tyranny were continually hidden from the world by the projection by means of films and radio of an unreal, ideal existence lived behind Soviet frontiers. These formed the spearhead of the propaganda attack; they were based upon purely social motives, and they succeeded

in their effect beyond the dreams of the planners. The vast network of international Communism was fed by radio and film, and international Communists could hardly have exerted the power they undeniably exert if it were not that they employed all the resources of film and radio, and were themselves in a sense projections of these projections, living in a completely mythological world which bore only the faintest resemblance to actual conditions. But though the Soviet government deliberately exaggerated the happiness of the Russians under Communism, it did not for a single moment relapse from the contention that social justice could only be achieved under Communism and that Communist Russia was the inevitable fatherland of the oppressed everywhere. The theme was stated unambiguously by Lenin and later by Stalin with so many repetitive superlatives that the reader is temporarily blinded into reluctant acceptance. Examine, for example, the following paragraph taken from one of the programmes of the Communist International:

"The internal consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the U S S R, the success achieved in the work of Socialist reconstruction, the growth of the influence and authority of the U S S R among the masses of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the colonies signify the continuation, intensification and expansion of the International Social Revolution. The U S S R inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the centre of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. The U S S R is the only fatherland of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of its achievements and the most important factor for its international emancipation.

The load of superlatives goes on endlessly, with no power on earth capable of stopping the diarrhetic flow, but the reason, held in suspension for a moment, returns from the imprisonment of the emotions and asks why the privileges of messianic prophecy should be granted to one race alone. The privileges of prophecy are not granted to one nation alone. Melville's prophetic dream of the estranged children of Adam restored to the hearthstone of Eden is at least as valid. Unfortunately, the Americans were reluctant to believe in their greatest potentialities and chose to

show themselves to the world by radio and film unburdened with any social consciousness and therefore irresponsible toward the fate of all other nations.

Because Communism from its beginnings was an offensive and not defensive philosophy, because it allowed itself a logic of history which permitted every kind of deviation as long as the main purposes were held in view, because it became increasingly possible to identify the revolution of the proletariat with the imperial ambitions of Russia, it possessed all the advantages of a purely imperialist attack upon the world. Since every kind of deviation from the principal tenets was permissible to the rulers in power, every kind of alliance and conspiracy was also permissible. Because the revolution of the proletariat was identified with the expansion of the Russian bureaucracy, a Communist world empire with all the tribes of the earth owing allegiance to the sacred capital of Moscow also became intelligible. Because the philosophy was offensive and contained the requisite germ of truth, and because other nations did not possess even the germ of a social consciousness, the Communist threat becomes increasingly menacing. But once there has been created a more valid social consciousness, and once the evils of Communism have been exposed, the whole fabric of Communist penetration is deprived of its validity. Meanwhile, it is necessary to insist that there is nothing difficult in exposing the evils of Communism: what is difficult is the creation of a keener and more explicit kind of social consciousness.

It is here that Americans can learn most usefully from the Communists themselves. They have employed mass visual and auditory images to convey their dubious message. America must do the same, and must do it better, more honestly and with considerably more effrontery. America must make films and employ radio ceaselessly for her own democratic purposes, repeating continually the advantages of freedom and driving home the disadvantages of tyranny, of which not the least is the perpetuation of a state of terror. Wherever the Communists have overplayed their hands, there are advantages for us, but we must be very clear that we speak loudly, continually, and truthfully. Their lies must be made to cancel out. And if, as so often, they give hostages to fortune, we can no longer afford to deprive ourselves of these hostages. The perpetuation of a tyranny can come



only by the reign of terror, a continual night of the long knives, a night that falls on peasant and labourer alike, however much they smile into the faces of the camera or repeat what they are told over the radio. The Communists have made the most strident and wanton generalizations upon their own inevitable victory, we, who know that our own victory is also inevitable, have a right to reply in kind.

But radio and cinema are not the only weapons of the Communists. The intricate network of cells must also be introduced. We underestimate in an imperfect democracy the number of young men and women who desire it to be perfect and who are prepared to lead lives as self-sacrificing as the lives of the Communists, for it would be the gravest folly not to believe that they are self-sacrificing. There are democratic partisans as there are Communist partisans: if men love freedom they should at least travel to foreign countries and fight there for the freedom they desire, and for all the more reason they should fight for their own freedom in their own country. Armies of free men can be recruited: their purpose is not to fight with military weapons, but with the weapons of knowledge, encouragement, and fervour, and if we confess that we do not have young men and women who are prepared to do this, then we confess ourselves vanquished before the fight, for our freedom is worthy of preservation only in as far as we are prepared to sacrifice ourselves for it. The Communists, with their irregulars, partisans, and mysterious secret cells and watchwords, employing all the shock tactics of strikes and lies and terror and revolt by 'self-elected' 'action committees,' must be opposed by an open conspiracy of free men. In this struggle America has every advantage in playing in the daylight. Half the evils of Communism have resulted from the old secret conspiratorial attitudes of the revolutionaries, who in exile tend to distrust one another as much as they distrust one another when in power—hence all the self-destructive time-wasting idiocies of the secret police. To some extent the private conspiracy of free men is already in operation. The Friendship Train is so far the most successful invention of the private conspiracy. The villages that adopt villages in France, the American schools that adopt foreign schools, the ten million dollars' worth of gift parcels that are sent from America to Germany each month—these are excellent and enduring

examples, but it is not enough to give food and money. It is necessary to raise the social potential of all freedom-loving nations, to help them with social gifts and social actions, to give them reason to believe that Americans are *humanly* beside them as well as politically beside them, and to erase from their minds the desperate fear that America may be acting only for reasons of expediency. All the nations of the world inhabit America. Now, what is demanded of Americans is that those who have roots in other countries should return to these countries and speak of freedom and show how it can be brought about. It is not too late. And if these armies of free men are formed now, there is one advantage at least that is gained: it will become impossible to say that Americans are acting out of pure expediency.

This matter is so serious that I am anxious to be interpreted correctly. I am not talking here of armies of free men in the sense that implies any kind of political oratory. I am talking about concrete organized armies of men who are given their allotted tasks and who set to these tasks with a will. I am talking about people from the ages of sixteen to forty or even older who are prepared to sacrifice themselves for little payment in a war against a desperate tyranny. I am suggesting that these armies can be formed, and must be formed, and that at the same time Americans must employ all the visual and auditory means available to them to convince the people of the world that they have no desire for conquest, that they believe in democracy, and that they believe in a renascent and revolutionary America. It is not only because the Communists have employed their cellular organizations with such surprising effect that they must be copied, rivalled and outmanœuvred; it is because Americans can become missionaries for a faith that has meaning for them, and unless they proselytize and convince others by actually going among them and spreading the very revolutionary gospel of democracy, who will believe them? America is not only a fabulous engine-room; it remains the hope of the world. If freedom is fought for, there must be more freedom in America and the social coefficient in America must also be increased, whatever the cost to vested interests, boss rulers, and those who believe that we can fight a philosophy by dropping atomic bombs on it. Philosophies do not die that way; they are enriched by the violence of others and pauperized by every violent action committed in their name. It is

not violence but common humanity that should go in conquest of the world. And in our present age it is only common humanity that can conquer.

It is difficult to understand why these armies of free men have not yet been organized. Perhaps the reason lies in the traditional belief that peace is secured by diplomacy and wars are fought by armies, but peace is not secured by diplomacy alone, and armies in the sense of military invaders are not necessary to win wars, while diplomats have probably caused as many wars as they have prevented. The tragic belief that man may surrender his responsibilities for the peace to the government, the diplomat, and the army continues, but if these armies of free men were organized the responsibility would lie more generally on the people themselves for almost all of us would become members of this army. Meanwhile there is a race. In a race, as the Red Queen pointed out to Alice, you have to run as fast as you can to keep your place and twice as fast to get ahead. For every day that Americans do not employ to the fullest extent the resources of radio and cinema, and fail to oppose the network of Communist cells by armies of free men, they fail in the general purpose of freedom.

The organization of these armies should not be entirely in the hands of the government. The help of the universities, the schools, and business is needed. A campaign for moral rearmament is ludicrously insufficient, it is not the abstraction of morality that will enable us to win the victory. Nor is there any time left for oratorical platitudes on freedom and democracy, though these terms are not so tarnished by repetition and misuse as the proletarian revolution and Communism. To-day Americans are fighting Communism like men who are hog-tied to outworn principles, their terrible faith in military power riding high above their faith in themselves, but it is precisely faith in man that is required.

When Edmund Burke said in 1784, 'The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion,' he was not only repeating a timeless phrase of Aristotle, but he was insisting upon the nature of the mythology by which tyranny comes about, for in a very special sense the mythology of tyranny is the mythology of delusion. Tyranny produces a world where everything possesses

the same value; the disappearing rabbit is no more and no less important than the disappearing hat. Whole provinces are uprooted, disbanded, exiled, or sent to their deaths, and this is of no account whatsoever to the men who rule, for will not the vacuum be filled? But the theory that Nature abhors a vacuum and that all vacuums are automatically filled by Nature is not true; the process by which vacuums are formed in the world of experience and geography results in wounds. The Russians, like the Germans, but for different reasons, regard themselves as the master race, and they have accomplished this feat of self-absorption by continually repeating the fact to themselves, as when Leonov proclaims that "Russia is the home of the greatest art because in Russia everyone knows that Communism leads to great art." The tautologies are meaningless, but they are also dangerous. There are virtues to be found in humility after all.

But it is one of the qualities of the free man that he is humble before his freedom, as though he was surprised by it, wondered at it, and found nothing so enjoyable as the practice of his freedom, not in the sense by which freedom is interpreted as irresponsible power to do as one pleases, but in the sense of comradeship with the whole world. In this world, where there is real humanity, unshadowed by oppressive laws or by the secret police, there are no vast and sinister parades of force beside the tomb of an embalmed king, no elevation of leadership into gigantism and no worship of statues, and above all there is no fear of freedom. "They that can give up essential liberty," wrote Benjamin Franklin, "to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."

So it is that those who fight for the preservation of American liberties are fighting the essential battle for America. If they surrender more of their liberties they will be still further along the path that has brought them halfway to democratic despotism. But at this stage it is necessary to point out that the mirror language employed by the Communists is such that it is not always possible to tell when a Communist is speaking whether the word "liberty" should be translated as "tyranny." The tragedy of the recent debates on freedom in America is that the intolerable spoke to the unendurable, and neither Mr. Thomas nor his opponents were in any sense fit to take part in the debate or large enough to add to it. The extremes of reaction and

Communism queered the ground of freedom and produced, to the delight of the Russian Communists, a situation extremely desirable to them, for reactionary Communism demands that the people should be continually deluded and confused. And nothing is so profitable to the enemies of freedom as the deliberate encouragement of delusion. It is one of the miseries of America that a free radio and cinema have for many years possessed a virtual monopoly of the methods of confusion and delusion, and the Hearst Press has added its shrill little pipings to the larger orchestras.

Nothing could demonstrate the theorem of deliberate confusion so much as the announcement made at the inauguration of the Cominform in October 1947. All the savage reprisals, all the tricks and sleights of hand employed in the capture of Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia are described as being precisely those tricks that are employed by the enemies of Communism.

"The arsenal of tactical weapons used by the imperialistic camp is very complex. It combines direct use of force, blackmail and intimidation, all sorts of political tricks and economic pressure, bribery, the using to its own ends of conflicting interests and disagreements with the aim of strengthening its position, and all that is camouflaged by a mask of liberalism and pacifism in order to deceive and befuddle people not too dexterous in politics."

*After exhorting the moderate Socialists now in office in Western Europe, the incredible mirror continues:*

"In this situation the Communist parties are faced with a particularly important problem. They must grasp in their hands the banner of national independence and sovereignty in their own countries. If the Communist Parties stand fast on their outposts, if they refuse to be intimidated and blackmailed, if they courageously guard over the democracy, national sovereignty, independence and self-determination of their countries and place themselves at the head of all the forces ready to defend the cause of national honour and independence, then and then only no plans to subjugate the countries of Europe and Asia can succeed."

That eighteen men in their right minds should have come together in Poland to discuss a programme so essentially outworn and meaningless is not only beyond comprehension, but actually beyond belief. What is certain is that they did not come in order to "guard over the democracy, national sovereignty, independence and self-determination" of the peoples of Europe, but to accomplish precisely the contrary, and they proposed to accomplish this by employing precisely those means that they attributed to the United States and the United Kingdom. The conspiracy against freedom and men's inalienable human rights was to continue unhampered under the banner of President Wilson and the Fourteen Points! At a time when all free nations are seriously considering that the time is soon coming for an abandonment of the principles of sovereignty and have in fact already begun the long march to world federation, sovereignty is adored and self-determination is insisted upon, though nothing whatsoever is said about the right of the people to vote for the representatives they choose or the secrecy of the ballot box. Furthermore, the old parrot cry of "all power to the Soviets" is solemnly repeated by the Communist parties of Europe under the impression that the people will surrender their power entirely to the Communist governors who have put themselves at the head of the Communist Parties, forgetting that they are opposed by the invincible cry of "all power to the people."

It is hoped that nothing that has been said here will give comfort to the Hearst Press. The enemies of Communism find themselves by accident in the camps of enemies as destructive of human dignity as Communism itself. The battle for freedom must be waged on two fronts and is therefore much more difficult than the battle *for* Communism or the battle *for* economic royalism. The duty of the free man is not to fall before the threats of either of these extreme camps, and to both of them he may reply in Jefferson's words, "I am not for awing the human mind by stories of rawhead and bloody bones to a distrust of its own visions."

But "the rawhead and bloody bones" surround us; they are the evidence of our times. Americans must live with them as they will, but they cannot vanish them without the most arduous self-sacrifice. The defensive against Communism and economic royalism has lasted too long. The time demands an offensive as

merciless, as controlled, and as organized as that of our enemies, and with luck and good fortune America may yet take the lead against the two most sinister evils of our time. Mercifully, the Marshall Plan has already pointed a way. An American offensive was long overdue. It has begun at last, to the horror of the Communists, but the full force of the offensive will only be felt when the people themselves take part in it.

The desolate theorem of Communism like the desolate theorem of expediency on which it is founded can be confronted, but only by offensives along the planes where Communism is effective. The diplomats are powerless against Communism, armies are powerless, the greatest naval and air forces cannot obliterate the messianic hopes of the people. Americans tend to regard the Russian Communists as only slightly more fanatical Nazis. Nothing could be more mistaken and if we are to find a useful analogy, we would find it among the Arabs who also possess a fanatical devotion to a promised land reached along a promised way. It is significant that though Communism has spread to almost every corner of the globe it has been least successful among Arabs. Almost a Moslem devotion to the faith is required of free men now that the challenge has been stated so squarely: we live or die by the strength of our fanatical devotion to freedom.

We know now that the defensive against Communism can no longer save the peace, but the offensive for peace and freedom can sweep Communism with all its messianic prophecies into the same limbo that we reserve for the prophecies of Nostradamus. Americans must give up their small fears for themselves and take on the greater fear, fear for the world, and they must assume the power and the stature and the organization that go with it. What must be realized now, before it is too late, is that Americans must guard, cherish, and expand their freedoms for the very reason that freedom is a power greater than unfreedom, and it is precisely because the Russians are not free that they possess power. "Russia," said the Marquis de Custine over a hundred years ago, "sees Europe as a prey which sooner or later will be delivered to her by our dissensions among us she foment's anarchy with the expectation of profiting from a corruption which she assists because it assists her ends, it is the story of Poland re-enacted on a grand scale. For many years Paris has been reading revolutionary journals paid for by Russia. 'Europe,' they say in

St. Petersburg, 'is taking the road that Poland has followed; it is enervating itself with liberalism while we remain powerful precisely because we are not free.' " In fact, Russia did not remain powerful because during the hundred years that followed the Congress of Vienna the autocrats of Russia were confronted with a rising demand for real freedom by the people, and even by the members of the court. It was because Russia herself was swinging between freedom and unfreedom that she was not capable of forming a united nation against the West and could not implement her Pan-Slavic dreams. The same danger faces us to-day: we must guard our freedoms because our real power is intimately connected with them, and if we are not free, we may find ourselves as impotent as the Russians during the century that saw them expand to Asiatic frontiers and free the serfs, but left them at the mercy of the seductions of mythology because the emperor retained quasi-absolute powers to the end.

Meanwhile, the battle rages: no demand for an interview between the President of the United States and Mr. Stalin, no agreement on spheres of influence, no political manoeuvre against Soviet Russia can be effective, for all of these imply an abdication on the part of the people of their responsibilities. The battle is to be fought by the people individually, for the Soviets fight their battle very largely through the individual compulsions that are aroused by the messianic dream of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship that they have been incapable of enforcing or even desiring. Americans do not answer the Soviet thesis by merely saying, "I prefer the American way of life," for there are many American ways to live. They answer it by saying, "I insist on freedom, which is the birthright of this republic, and I shall so go about my life as to attempt to bring as much freedom as possible to others. It is for this that I live and may have to die."

It is necessary that the nature of the tyranny should be understood in order that we should be clear on ways of fighting it, for nothing is so certain as that Americans are not fighting Communism on the levels where it hurts. Americans have shadow-boxed their way through the years following the war. Already many of their advantages are gone. They could have employed illimitable resources in order to keep Czechoslovakia free; they could have sent, as the Russians did, their own missionaries;



they could have so assisted the government that a higher standard of living might be enjoyed by all and so strengthened the hand of the government that free elections would have had to be held. Instead, they demonstrated their military power they hurled abuse at the Russians, repeatedly announced that they were perfecting more and more terrible weapons, developed the Muckow Plan and continued to claim sole trusteeship of islands as far away as Okinawa, and by not putting themselves in the right at all times, forfeited the sympathies of the Czechs, who realized that they could not depend on help at all times, but only on help when it was most expedient. *Military valour, a code of honour, a deep sense of loyalty to friends, the certainty of final victory—none of these things at the time seemed appropriate manifestations of American power.* It may be too late to save Finland, and if Finland goes, the whole of Scandinavia may follow, but Scandinavia will not follow if Americans send, together with food and mechanical supplies the assurance that they can be relied on, not only as a government but as a people. One of the major tasks of the present time should be to send the first detachment of an army of free men to Scandinavia.

Ultimately we are faced with the problem of deciding in what way America is more socially responsible and more moral than the Soviet. According to James Grafton Rogers, a former assistant Secretary of State, America has engaged in five declared wars and committed 144 instances of undeclared war, armed hostilities, or armed occupation in 45 countries. *The experience of American dominance in South America still remains raw on the nerves of nearly every nation south of the Mexican border.* It is too late to go into details of these wars of which the first invasion of the Philippines was perhaps the most outrageous. It is necessary to be conscious of guilt before a reform can come about. In their search for allies, it is not sufficient to say that in the next war Americans will make England their main base—England may be neutral or completely destroyed. American allies should be found all over the world but they will not be found unless Americans themselves cease trafficking with social injustice in China, Japan, and the Philippines if they desire allies in Asia, and they will not be found in Europe if there is the least hint of imperialism. It is wholly criminal to place reliance upon the atomic bomb when weapons equally dangerous may be employed

by the smallest, the most corrupt, and most inefficient governments. Americans can neither defend themselves against force nor employ force any longer successfully. The thing to do is to try to create a new world.

It cannot be true that the impervious will of the oppressed people, of the world for a greater share of the creature comforts of life, for a higher standard of living, and for the assurance that their human dignity will no longer be suppressed will be deflected by the stalemate of military power. The hungry will continue to be hungry, the unsheltered will continue to be unsheltered, human dignity will be violated by slave camps, and the fools of Sovietism will continue in their folly unless America sets her will, the will of her individuals, against tyranny in all forms and so acts that tyranny is stopped dead on its track. To-day the peasant of China sees two predatory powers let loose upon the world and knows that each of these powers would only be too happy to see China as the battlefield. But let America banish tyranny within herself and act abroad as a nation that singularly loves freedom, and then Sovietism can be seen as the vestigial stump of an outworn creed, descended not from Marx but from the ruthless monarchical system of ancient Russia, which must die as ancient Russia died, with the abrupt disenthronement of its rulers. There are more important wars to be fought later on: the war against the earth, to make the earth provide for us all, the war against ignorance, disease, and prejudice. For a little while longer we must fight unnecessary wars. The real wars, demanding even greater heroism, remain for the future.

Meanwhile, it is necessary that Americans fight with the disciplined will, as individuals. The Communists have created their information offices and their publications are to be found in every news-stand in every railway station on the Continent. They are so sure of themselves that in Germany they are prepared to allow the newspapers of democracy to be sold side by side with their own as long as the British, French, and American sectors sell the Communist newspapers. Americans have lived so long with the fundamental beliefs of freedom and democracy that, when these are challenged, they are apt to think that they can only be challenged by fools—which is true enough, though the fools are dangerous fools, but there exists among the Americans themselves a folly that may be still more dangerous. There

is not freedom if there is boss rule, and one might as well have a Soviet boss as a Crump or a Hague. Effective action is needed, there must be real and effective contact and exchange of ideas between peoples. Americans must challenge their own beliefs and grow steel hard with their own certainties if they are proved to be certain, and the armies of free men must be set in motion. What does it matter if these men, by travelling abroad and by cleaning up the admitted remnants of corruption in America, affect to some small degree the industrial production of America by putting themselves to more necessary and urgent tasks? For what is certain is that the Americans will need a real army, like the real armies of penetration employed by the Soviets, and an army is not composed of a few handfuls of men wandering abroad under government auspices. Much may grow out of the Marshall Plan, but the mere fact that it has been placed almost entirely in the hands of business administrators presages a kind of bad faith. If it had been placed in the hands of a social worker or a sociologist, much more might be expected of it. Even so, it remains the greatest change in American thinking since the time of the Civil War. To deny its power and the abrupt change it has introduced into American foreign policy would be the highest kind of folly, and that the Communists are capable of amazing folly is shown by their opposition to the plan when, by taking part in it, they might have wrecked it more successfully than they will ever be able to wreck it by remaining outside. Communist stratagem, because it is simple and inextricably based upon violence, does not always succeed. What is certain is that an honest but inactive liberal is no match for an aggressive totalitarian. Liberalism without moral purpose and social force is as dangerous as a pipe dream. We cannot afford any longer to allow the great power vacuums of Europe and Asia to remain unfilled with our own purposes. The answer to the Communist cell, to every kind of Communist aggression and vituperation is still the free man marching towards all men with a gaunt and terrible purpose—the destruction of despotism. Such a man carries a terrible responsibility, for all the powers of reaction and despotism of criminal madness and the utmost evil are ranged against him. He walks in the terror of twilight, knowing that he must fight through the long night until the dawn. He knows that without freedom the world dies, and we have come to the stage

when the mastery of the world for freedom or for despotism must perhaps be decided once and for all.

Meanwhile, it is profoundly necessary that Americans understand Communism, what virtues and vices it has and what vacuums it fills. It is necessary that they should realize all the concomitant dangers of complete subordination to the state, how easily tyranny arises, where it ends, and by what means it can be combatted. The responsibility is on the individual American to ensure his individual and common liberties, and his task is clearly set before him. By invigorating the social arm, by education and ceaseless propaganda, by travelling abroad and setting up unbreakable cells of freedom, and by the most urgent self-dedication, the battle may be gained; it will assuredly not be gained with less.

Neither Marx nor De Tocqueville drew a portrait of the world when at last a common philosophy and a common form of statehood descends upon it. But we can guess that the neo-Marxian vision comprises a world subjugated to the imperial conference of the new Russian empire, and we have reason to believe that for De Tocqueville the end in view was a world where most things were shared equitably and each man was an imperial conference in himself, where power was one of the arms of freedom and human dignity was exalted, where there were no slave camps, and where the bureaucracy was truly the servant of the people. Here is the final frontier to be won before man goes in search of the stars for his living places, but it would be the gravest injustice to believe that this frontier can be established easily or that it can be obtained by purchase. The declaration of ideological war was made by the Cominform, but the answer must come not from politicians, but from the hearts of men everywhere, and the time of the missionaries of freedom, backed by the resources of America and the Grand Alliance, has come. We cannot delay. The prize is conquest and life and freedom, and no other war was so much worth the prize. Of these missionaries, at least, history will not say that they perished vainly or were eaten by the locusts.

## AMERICA AND ASIA

*I have come on this earth to do good, and this good I shall do to the very end of my life, if God permits. Let no one forget the great power of goodness which lies in India and in the Asiatic nations as a whole. It is not inconceivable that by our truth and goodness we shall cause a revolution in the West.*

MAHATMA GANDHI

THOUGH THE CHALLENGE presented by Russia is beginning to be met, the challenge presented by a new, revolutionary, and insurgent Asia has never been fully faced by America with sufficient awareness of the problems involved. A mysterious screen, like the trembling dust of the atomic explosion, hangs over the coasts of Asia, and with the greatest difficulty Americans penetrate this screen.

There are many reasons. Among the Asiatics are people who look like the wildest savages and others who seem to have obtained an empire over themselves that gives them an especial and tangible dignity, men of large culture who distrust machinery and believe according to the intricate patterns of archaic thought. Their sensualities, their sense of holiness, and the particular value they place on human dignity—all these are largely foreign to Americans, who think in simpler terms and find it inconceivable that men should delight in man-made complication. The result is inevitable confusion. Faced by the prospect of a resurgent Asia, which still regards America as the source of the world's conspiracy for freedom, American policy blunders, supporting the reaction wherever reaction raised its head. The Koreans found themselves treated like prisoners of war. The Indonesians, who had placed greater hopes on America than on any other nation, found themselves confronted by American tanks, though the gunners were Dutch and for a brief period Englishmen. The Marshall Plan of mediation in China failed utterly for reasons that were not difficult to seek, while the revolutionary Indo-Chinese who

had assisted the Americans to bomb Japanese installations in Indo-China were abandoned to their fate. The Bell-Tydings Act placed intolerable strains on the Philippine economy, while the Hukbalahaps, whatever their Socialist and Communist origins, had reason to complain against being bombed by American aeroplanes when they represented the only vocal support for agrarian reform in a country where feudalism had long lost its attraction for the common people. In Japan, the most recondite and complex of all Oriental nations, General MacArthur introduced democratic reform by *diktat*, forgetting that democracy can never operate under a military government. The sorry history of American intervention and lack of intervention in the Far East seems to show a failure of nerve. The challenge of Asia has not been met, and in the face of a social revolution unparalleled in history the United States failed to implement its historical task.

In *The Revolt of Asia*, the author explained the causes and the historical background of the revolt. Here it is necessary only to insist that the events of August, 1945, were determinative to an extent that no one could have foreseen. The revolt was released by the destruction of Japanese power; it could not have occurred otherwise, and it took a great measure of its strength from the suddenness of that defeat. The tempo increased; vast plans were made by the revolutionaries, thrown aside, redrawn, and put into operation on a scale, in time, that would have taken centuries before. A new, hustling Asia took the place of the old formal bureaucracies, while the promise of the four freedoms accelerated the impulse to social democracy. Gandhi asked whether the four freedoms included the freedom to be free, but, even while he was speaking, the fifth and perhaps most important of all freedoms was being announced in all the revolutionary camps of the East. It was a significant addition, for it implied freedom not only from the imperialist powers that dominated the East until the defeat of Japan but from the potential imperialisms of Russia and the United States. The Asiatics were determined at last to stand on their own feet and to ensure that their huge man-power should not be placed at the service of foreign governments.

It would be easy enough to destroy this argument superficially by pointing to the civil war in China, and to say, as so many have said, that no social consciousness has yet arisen in the East, that

feudal antagonisms, religious scruples and the rise of Communism cut across the rise of a social consciousness and tend to destroy it. Having said this, we are in a position to wash our hands of the very real social revolution taking place not only in China and India but also in Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, and even in the countries where American influence dominates—in Japan, the Philippines, and Southern Korea, where the social revolution has largely been compelled to go underground. Yet the revolution remains in all these countries, it is not necessarily inspired by Communist influence, and it would have arisen even if there had been no Communist parties in the East. If the Communists have been more spectacularly successful in drawing attention to themselves, it is not always because they<sup>2</sup> have accomplished the greater aims or succeeded in acquiring for the masses greater gains, but because they are the most certainly addicted to violence and possess the passion for inventing slogans, though often the slogans are conceived cold bloodedly for the purpose of deceiving the people. This is not to suggest that the Communists are not an important factor in the advance of the subjugated and oppressed peoples of Asia—they are a very powerful factor indeed—and tend to become more powerful the more the peoples of Asia are oppressed.

At the end of World War II the Asiatics looked toward America, Britain, and Russia for leadership in their struggle for independence. Though almost all of the emergent Asiatic states looked toward America first and wrote their declarations of independence on the American model, it became clear to them that the State Department possessed no carefully thought-out plan and seemed almost wilfully determined to obstruct the evolving pattern of social democracy wherever it appeared. The Navy retained its feudal outposts in the Pacific, the Army ruled in Korea and Japan, the power of the Zaisatsu was not broken, the Emperor of Japan and the dictator of China were confirmed in their powers, arms were sent or sold to China for the deliberate purpose of fanning the Civil War, nearly every action during the year immediately following the war seemed to have been taken with an instinctive sense of fatality, of going against the grain of history.

It was in the power of the United States in August, 1945, to have assisted the revolutionary birth of Asia, to have acknowledged

the inevitable change in the *status quo* and to have led revolt. Nothing was so admirable in those early days as reliance on the good offices of the United States. The Freedoms possessed a more concrete meaning in Asia than elsewhere: want lay close to men's skins, and tyranny was broad shouldered through the multitudes of peasants, a tyrant so powerful that in China, for example, no efforts were made to disguise it, and indeed every effort was made to make it appear as it was, so that men should be afraid to speak aloud. In China, Korea, and to a lesser extent in Japan freedom of speech was by default. So it was to some extent in India and the British colonies, where the Tory legacy of colonial government outlasted Tory power. For Asia it was one of those rare critical times in the world's history comparable to the time when Luther appeared before the Diet of Worms, or when the States-General met at Versailles, or when Lenin descended at the Finland Station in Petrograd—a time of decision and terrifying responsibility for the leaders of men, who had it in their power to alter the current of history.

In these new states industrialization and revolution went hand in hand. Nature had provided the Asiatics with boundless untapped resources, considerable mechanical skill, and a way of living perfectly appropriate to agricultural communities, especially in India, China, and Indonesia—and, of course Japan—the agricultural mode of life was giving way to industrialization, not slowly, as in Europe and America, over the passage of centuries, but in sudden explosive bounds. Industrialization came to Szechwan, close to the Tibetan border, as soon as the Chinese armies fell back below the Ichang Gorges; it came to central Java with the machine shops erected by the Japanese in 1942; it spread into the remotest Indian villages, changing the old forms of village government, subtly altering even the configuration of the age-old land plots, giving to radio and transport powers that seemed unthinkable to the peasants of a generation before. The family was gradually breaking up, the sense of solidarity with some formal group was vanishing, and men were confronted with a new tyrannical world of machinery which came for the most part from abroad and represented the conquest of their most intimate habits of daily life. The whole customary fabric of Asia was dissolving before the eyes of millions.



and there was nothing to take its place. In the days that followed the ending of the war, America, Great Britain, or Russia could have taken the leading strings, in fact, the leading strings were taken by the Asians themselves.

It was greatly to their advantage that they did so and that the leaders were on the whole men with subtle and keen minds, conscious of their vast responsibilities to the future. Jawaharlal Nehru, Soetan Sjahrir, and the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse tung spoke in the same terms, fought for the same causes, and looked to the same ends: all three were distinguished by a peculiar lucidity of thought and a determination to see their aims accomplished. Not one of them was a tool of Moscow, though all of them recognized the importance of Russian Communism in so far as Russian Communism sought an increase in power for the workers and peasants. They were Socialists and showed a greater inclination to follow the British pattern of Socialism than any other, and their Socialism was based on the unshakable conviction that the peasants and workers of Asia had been exploited too long not only by the colonial powers, but by the Asians themselves.

To the Western mind Jawaharlal Nehru was the most easily comprehended, for he speaks more like an English aristocrat than any Kashmir Brahmin before him, but it was Soetan Sjahrir who had come to understand most deeply, during his long imprisonment by the Dutch, the nature of the Asiatic revolt and how it must follow for its own success the pattern of the established revolutions. This humanist lawyer had come to regard all Asia as *one* and spoke over the Javanese radio more as an Asiatic than as a Javanese. A student of Spinoza, he realized that the crisis of Asia could be equated with the European Reformation and demanded that Socialist action should be based on humanism and while the battle raged against the Dutch, he said over Radio Indonesia:

'We have learned to handle instruments of power, but we neither worship nor swear allegiance to power. We have faith in a future of humanity in which life on humane principles will no longer be suppressed by power, in which there will be no wars and no reasons for hostility among human beings.

"As a renewed nation we seek our strength as a people in

high and pure ideals. We do not believe in the possibility or the advantages of a life dominated by a thirst for power. And in our endeavours to secure a place among other nations, we remain true to the principles of life, which we desire for our people. We are prepared to exert to the utmost our energies, and we are prepared to sacrifice all we have, even our lives, to obtain the high and pure ideals of our people, but we must not use deceit and intrigues in our struggle. We fight by the code of the Kshatriyas."

That a Prime Minister of a struggling newborn state, a Christian ruling over Moslems, should invoke the code of the race whose chief exemplar was Gautama Buddha should not surprise us; it was a time of almost fanatic idealism throughout the Far East, a time when any great gesture or deed on the part of the Western nations would have been received with religious delight. In the West we have forgotten the value of great and symbolic deeds, which regenerate those who perform them as much as they regenerate those who come under their influence. We tend to regard India as a potentially powerful country, already the most industrialized of Asiatic nations, split between Moslem and Hindu camps, forgetting that the Indians still regard themselves as essentially a spiritual nation determined upon spiritual ends. It is significant, for example, that military aeroplanes were employed to throw flowers on the ashes of Gandhi and that the ashes themselves were thrown into the river from a military motor-boat: military power entered casually into the religious scene. The Indians do not possess, as we do, that tragic dichotomy by which spiritual and material things are seen to pursue differing aims. If the Western nations failed to perceive the sanctions that ruled family life, they were still more unaware that *satya* (truth), *ahimsa* (non-violence), and *brahmacharya* (chastity) were rooted, not only in the Indian scene, but in nearly all the countries of the Far East.

The revolt of Asia was not essentially or even greatly directed against the Asiatic past. The more superstitious elements in the Asiatic religions tended to fall before the presence of the machines, whose calculated precision shocked people more than the vast powers that the machines controlled. A new element of time invaded the Orient. Men were not in the habit of paying attention

to split seconds, it was enough to live by the seasons. But the machine demanded the utmost obedience on an entirely new time scale. Dials and thermometers were taking the place of the faces of the gods as entities to be obeyed, and these entities had power to offer greater creature comforts than men had ever enjoyed before. But the gods still remained, for they enjoyed a very real power over the seasons, over men's private lives, and over the unending rituals of worship. When Jawaharlal Nehru came to power, he was compelled to follow the ceremonials that accompanied the enthronement of ancient Hindu kings, holding a golden mace and wearing a gown of scarlet while the priests daubed his forehead with the sacred ashes. Similarly during the war years in Chungking an effort was made to offer Chiang Kai shek replicas of the ancient Chou tripods that were the visible emblems of victorious Chinese kings three thousands year ago. On all levels from the government leaders to the peasants, the archaic Asiatic past obtruded on the revolutionary scene.

The revolt was of Asia but it was not in Asia alone. The whole world was seething with the dawn of the atomic age. To the confusions of the Asiatics there were added the confusions of the West dramatized by the conflict between two mechanistic powers—Russia and America. That both these powers worshipped material energy and seemed singularly lacking in spiritual energy only confused the Asiatics more—they could understand the machines by rule of thumb, but by what means could they understand Western man? The experience of colonials, subalterns, district officers, and magistrates gave them on the whole little understanding of the historical processes by which the West had achieved its strength. The fact that we have exploited them and ruled them to our own advantage compromises us still and will probably continue to compromise us in their eyes for a long while, for they argue reasonably that if we are suspect in our actions, surely we are suspect in our thoughts and hopes, and all the bases of our civilization are suspect as well. It was Soetan Sjahrir who insisted that the only possible basis of understanding lay in humanism. Unfortunately, humanism in the West is in decline.

It is necessary to insist on the grave respect for tradition and religion, and for all that we understand by human dignity, if we are to understand the East. The East is no longer the dark,

scented garden described by Conrad. There is nothing whatsoever mysterious in its cycles of starvation, its rising birth-rate, its despair of the West, and its new determination. The young have the idealism that comes only at times of momentous discovery; they have read the birth-rate figures, and know that their children will be twice as numerous as the children of the Westerners. Yet it is doubtful whether they desire power in the world: great federations of Asiatic states are extremely probable, and power will come to them as it has come to all great states, but the influence of traditional religion and the hopelessness of conquest in the modern world will tend to make them comparatively peaceful. They have not gone through the process by which the European states were sundered from the Roman Empire. Their sovereignty was given to them with no more than a formal struggle, except in Indo-China, where the nation that first announced "liberty, equality, and fraternity" seems determined to prevent any of these from coming to birth.

The complexities of the Asiatic scene are endless, predetermined, and of such a kind that Westerners will always fail to perceive the nuances, but it is precisely in its nuances that the East is rich. The politician, confronted with the spectacle of an expanding Asia, the fabulous wealth of minerals, the fabulous man-power, must make his way warily; hysteria will come to him almost too easily unless he is aware of the evolving pattern, which is a purely Asiatic pattern and owes nothing to the West except knowledge of machines. When Mr. William C. Bullitt, a former Ambassador to Russia and France, visited China for two months and returned with the hysterical nightmare that Stalin would eventually mobilize all the forces of Europe and Asia against the United States—"He will organize 450,000,000 Chinese. He will organize 350,000,000 Moslems and Hindus of India. He will organize all the Arabs. He will organize all the French, Italians, Germans, Poles, Scandinavians. He will organize them into overwhelming masses of men and machines"—he was showing a profound and shocking ignorance of the Asiatic scene, for the evolution of Asia has been consistently toward a form of social democracy, and not toward Communism, and the fact that the Communists are powerful in China derives from the feudalism of the Kuomintang, not from the nature of Asiatic social development. Because Asia is predominantly

agricultural and the peasants have not yet owned their land, co-operative farming on the Russian model can only be employed experimentally. Because they have only recently received their statehood and are moved to a grave respect for their own traditions, there is no reason why they should put their wealth at the service of the Politburo. It is here that the case of China assumes peculiar significance.

During 1946 and 1947 Kuomintang China received the bulk of \$713,000,000 worth of U.N.R.R.A. aid (\$535,000,000 in goods, \$178,000,000 in transport and administration), \$855,000,000 worth of war surpluses and fixed installations, \$645,900,000 in purely military aid (though the war against Japan had terminated during the previous year). To this Government, which had flouted all four freedoms and acted with impatient tyranny towards the demands of the people for land reform and a thousand changes in the standards of government, Mr. Bullitt proposed a further loan of \$1,350,000,000, though the total of \$2,263,900,000 already given had done nothing more than increase the cost of living to unbearable proportions and allowed the government to become more intolerant of opposition than ever before. The fact that arms were sent to the Kuomintang Government made it almost inevitable that the Chinese Communists would be compelled eventually to attack the railroads and seek armed help from Russia, though no evidence has ever been adduced that such armed help was asked for or granted. Not weapons, but ideas, were struggling toward a conclusion, with the scales so heavily weighted in favour of social democracy against opportunistic feudalism that even with a full flood of American arms and money the Communists could hardly help foreseeing their own inevitable victory, if only because they were measurably closer to social democracy than the Kuomintang. There were no trained sociologists on General Marshall's staff. There were, however, trained sociologists and anthropologists on the staff of General MacArthur, and it was due to their knowledge, foresight, and estimation of the significance of the walls of *Haji* (shame) that surround all Japanese from birth that the decision to occupy the mainland with a comparatively small body of troops was taken. The imponderable had been weighed, and one of the gravest risks ever undertaken by the American armed forces came to a successful conclusion.

In Japan the peasant has no immemorial right of rebellion against an unjust and capricious emperor; in China he has this right, a right sanctified by Confucian philosophy and the most ancient traditions, and it was largely by virtue of this customary right that the peasants flocked to the Communists, not because they were Communists, but because they were determined to enforce a right so traditional and historical that not to have enforced it would have been to deny their own privileges as Chinese. This is not to suggest that there were not good men in the Kuomintang, but so many military officials, bankers, and merchants had employed the privileges of party membership to amass intolerable wealth that the whole party was coloured by their actions and had either to be destroyed altogether or rejuvenated. In the immediate years following the end of the war the hope of China lay in a moderate centre party; the hope failed when the Democratic League was banned by the Government, and it was no accident that immediately afterward feudalism sustained its most bitter blows with the loss of almost the whole of North China.

For America, faced with the prospect of China becoming a terrorized feudal province of the Kuomintang or a Communist enclave, the immediate benefits of supporting the Kuomintang seemed clear, however much the Government and the State Department detested the waste, corruption, and inefficiency of the supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. Credits were eventually advanced to the Kuomintang Government; the port of Tientsin was employed as a base for American naval forces; a military advisory group remained on Chinese territory to assist the Kuomintang armies, while large quantities of arms were placed at their disposal. Yet it is difficult to understand why such a programme should have continued while Japan remained as a potential military base and while the responsibility of America to the whole of Asia made it increasingly necessary that America should align itself with the forces of social democracy against the forces of pure feudalism. The long-term policy should have included a deliberate effort to strengthen the Democratic League, and it should have been possible to lengthen the negotiations between the Communists and the Kuomintang long past the stage they actually reached. It was not, of course, entirely America's fault. Under amazingly difficult circumstances

cease-fire teams had been organized which included American, Communist and Kuomintang officers, but the American officers were not trained to understand social changes, possessed little knowledge of Chinese history, and could hardly be expected to understand the forces at work. Nor was any effort made to retain in Yen-an, the Communist capital, a body of American officers who could mediate directly with the Communist leaders. A solitary major was the lone representative in the valley citadel where the actions of over a hundred million men were regulated.

The pattern of a nation's mistakes is continually repeated, just as the pattern of its successes is continually repeated. With considerable detachment the historian perceives the same basic stratagems employed so consistently that it is necessary to accept the existence of quite definite patterns of national behaviour, even when such behaviour is not dictated by necessity. The Japanese must attack Port Arthur in the identical way that they were later to attack Pearl Harbor. The Russians and the Germans must divide Poland between them in 1939 according to the same plan employed a hundred and fifty years previously. The British in 1918 must once again attempt to hold the balance of power in Europe, and the French must put down an uprising in Indo-China in exactly the same way that they put down the Moroccans, and by one of those tricks of fate that are only too common in history, they must send to Indo-China a descendant of the religious princes who first conquered the country for the French. So it is that the pattern of American policy in China is most likely to follow traditional patterns, of these patterns two are of major significance—the policy of the 'open door' and the policy that may be translated as the most generous assistance toward the Chinese people. The first policy is gradually losing all meaning, for no policy of this kind can be imposed upon a free country, there remains the second policy, which until recently owed its impetus to a widespread popular regard for the Chinese as a race with their amazing wealth of history and tradition. They were felt to be the most advanced of all Oriental nations, the most civilized and the most benevolent, but it would be the greatest disservice to regard them now, as so many people do, as a picturesque race that has unaccountably stumbled into a civil war and who, at the successful conclusion of the war, will revert to their ancient ways. The same civil war is being fought in every

and the enforcement wherever possible of the "open door," though in the Philippines the door was closed tight by the Bell-Tydings Act. Yet balance of power in the modern world depends upon social causes, and the enforcement of "open doors" and "closed doors" is almost beyond the powers of any administration. Ultimately, the forces that move the world are social causes, and social tensions, once resolved, lead to a statement of real power, for it is in their social groups that men exert themselves to the full. Nor is there any other real power, since warships and even atomic bombs depend upon the men who man or manufacture them, and these men are to a very large extent determined by social tensions. The first Chinese revolution failed because Chinese experience, so long at the mercy of a feudal and foreign court, was not and could not be, related to the growth of a social consciousness at the time. Other Chinese revolutions have failed for the same reason. Violence solves no social tensions except on the occasions when whole populations of people are massacred, or when foreign rule must be overthrown because it is exasperating social tensions beyond bearable limits, or simply because it is intolerable in itself.

It would seem therefore to be to America's advantage to encourage real democracy in the East. If strictly democratic voting is possible in Venezuela, it is absurd to suggest that the Chinese, the Indians, or the Indonesians are incapable of democratic elections, or that these historic nations must pass through a period of tutelage. The orderly nature of elections in Korea and Japan offers a sensible hope for the future and suggests that the Far East may eventually become more democratic in action than the West. But what is known as a democratic spirit depends upon a minimum of social education and freedom from the inevitable tyranny of one-party rule. If the Venezuelans could make their choice between five parties, it should not be impossible for the Chinese to make their choice between three. Nor can a democracy exist at the present time without an expanding educational system. When Nehru said, "If we can educate India sufficiently during the next five years, we can be sure of a peaceful India," he was speaking for the whole of the Far East; at the same time he was only repeating very similar words uttered by M. Strésemann, who foresaw that the educational programme of the Weimar Republic would by



its barrenness lead to war. The failure of the military government in Japan to understand the nature of constitutional rights and the significance of education—a failure highlighted by the incredible constitution that General MacArthur introduced and the ease with which the Japanese have included in their textbooks the most feudalistic statements concerning the rise of the imperial dynasty—is a measure of their failure to understand the nature of democracy itself.

That Americans have however compelled themselves to think in terms of expanding education abroad is shown by the excellent provisions of the Fulbright Act by which countries purchasing American surplus property may make partial repayment in foreign currencies for educational purposes, an extension of the doctrine by which the Boxer Indemnity Fund helped to build Tsinghua University in Peking. Unfortunately, since the grants are made in the currency of the foreign country, American students will be enabled to study abroad but foreign students will be faced with the same compelling difficulties that make study in America nearly impossible except for the richest and those who have received the favour of their government. The Fulbright Act fulfils an essential social function and heralds a much wider extension of the doctrine that the evolution of democracy depends upon the educators, but though each country is permitted to purchase a maximum of \$20 000 000, it remains a fantastically meagre sum in view of the immense potentialities of education for binding together the democratic areas of the world. In 1947 a record number of foreign students came from foreign nations to study in America but of these 18,000 considerably less than a quarter came from Asiatic countries in the following year these figures were reduced by rather more than a half owing to currency restrictions. Nations in need of dollars are more concerned with keeping the dollars they have than purchasing scholarship script. Meanwhile considerable numbers of Asiatic students are turning their eyes towards Moscow, where no complications of currency face the students who are admitted into the Lenin Institutes, and where they are fed and lodged at the expense of the Government. There is a special need in Asia for the training of skilled mechanics, a need that was met to some extent by the British during the war when Indian apprentices were invited to England to study under the Devin Plan. There has

been no similar plan in America. What is needed is the recognition of the vast Asiatic demand for education. The enlightened Chinese scholar may well succeed in time where the corrupt Chinese general has failed. Universities of the East in both England and the United States to train Oriental students are long overdue, not only because the Russians have such universities where most of the trained Communist agitators of the East have studied, but also because the establishment of such universities is intrinsically desirable for the purpose of bringing the East closer to the West, for it cannot be too often repeated that the major task of this generation is the understanding of the East by the West, and of the West by the East. Not only does the East possess the potential balance of power between Communist tyranny and the imperfect democracies of Europe and America, but the intrinsic value of the East expressed in its spiritual values and generous impulses is more than ever necessary for our own awakening. We fear what we should love. Like Mr. Bullitt, we tend in spite of ourselves to become horribly confused when we confront the Asiatic scene, and it may be that we are confused for good reason since the Asiatic revolt in extent of numbers and potential resources of power implies a far greater revolution than anything that has so far occurred.

We must realize that it is only by education that this particular tension can be resolved. In the final instance the challenge of Asia is a challenge most clearly stated in terms of education and educational policy. It is in this field that America can most satisfactorily touch the social consciousness of an awakening Asia, for a virile social consciousness and a virile democracy must depend on the extent of education in a country. It is only on this level that assistance can be clearly distinguished from interference. The bridges that in the past have been broken by guns and by threats can be built up again by books and by learning and by the encouragement of the interchange of the arts; in this field perhaps nothing is so important as the training of young apprentices. Too often the interchange of scholarship has been pursued as a side line; the immense importance of these exchanges must be recognized. What is needed is a long-range plan of interchange on a scale never before envisaged. No harm and a very great good would result from the establishment of universities in America and Britain for Oriental students. Nor

is it necessary that these universities be equipped upon the scale of the large universities already in existence. Short courses in technology, followed by practical work in the factories, together with education in Western history and the social sciences, would cover most of the required field. It is precisely in these three departments of learning, as Mr. Soetan Sjahrir has observed, that the East has most to learn from the West.

It is evident that the challenge can be met, but it cannot be met in terms of power politics. The new generation of Asians are not impressed by military power, nor can they be held down by power, and it is not only a residual fatalism that leads them to believe that the military power of Russia and America negate each other. Since the ultimates of power lie within the social body, it is only here that power can be applied. In these areas the doctor is more significant than the priest and the professor more effective than the greatest generals. These are realms where mythology does not penetrate where everything is clear-cut, tangible, and fruitful. Let us extend our authority over China," Senator Brewster recently exclaimed forgetting that there is little difference between "extending authority over China" and the rape of an empire. In fact it is still possible for the great powers to extend their authority by offering all possible resources of education to the Asiatic students and this authority is of the kind that never relinquishes its hold or vanishes for it is based upon compelling human motives, it is an authority that extends in both directions, compelling the West to an understanding of the East as assuredly as it compels the East to understand us. If America desired seriously to see a free world, I would have thought that the problem of enabling Asiatic students to understand its mechanical and social techniques would have acquired paramount importance, for if America succeeds in establishing itself in the empire of their minds, it has gained the whole world by gaining them as future allies.

Asia stands as a challenge to America and what is remarkable is that the challenge has not yet been accepted. The military government of Japan is not an answer to the challenge, nor is our assistance to the feudal government of the Philippines anything but an evasion of the present issues. The challenge may never be accepted. It is conceivable that the whole social revolution in Asia may pass through all its phases without any significant

contribution from America. The short-term results of American indifference may not be of great importance, but it is inevitable that by the end of the century this indifference will begin to accumulate tragic dividends. It is only too possible to foretell the decline of dynasties. Faced with the overwhelming growth of man-power and resources of Asia in fifty years, the history of tragic differences acquires the starkest overtones.

During the last days of July, 1946, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, the wife of the father of the Chinese Republic, addressed a message to the Chinese nation. She said, "Every person with human feeling must speak out. The present crisis is not a question of who wins, the Kuomintang and the Communists. It is a question of the Chinese people, their unity, and livelihood. It cannot be settled by balancing armies or bargaining for this city or that territory. Not party rights, but human rights, hang in the balance." And she added privately: "There is no civil war in other countries of Asia. I am obsessed by the shame which comes over me when I think of what is happening here, and how reason has departed, and how foreigners will tend to think of us as soldiers or profiteering merchants, but even now the heart of China is robust and you will see it in the faces of the young, and this will endure."

It is necessary always that we should remember how great a part the concept of human dignity plays in the East, not only in China and India but elsewhere. The Moros and the Balinese stabbing themselves in despair before the invasions of the West, the deep currents of pride that afflict the Malays, the simple dignity of the most obscure Tamil rubber planter, the feverish despair and energy and triumphs of the Hindus are displayed to us without ostentation and with a naturalness that defies our most careful analysis. They seem to have been on the earth longer than we have and to own it as we have never owned it. When Mme. Sun Yat-sen speaks of the civil war in China entirely in terms of human dignity and human rights, she is speaking essentially as a Chinese, but at the same time she is demonstrating the power of the four freedoms to be accepted among the inhabitants of the East as a basis for their social progress. The Asiatic peasant, reading *The Communist Manifesto* with its strange diatribes against the peasants, is not impressed. An American

manifesto, relating to the social tasks America has set before herself, would even now, at this last moment, have a surprising effect on the Asiatic people, who are beginning to dislike Americans more than they have ever disliked them before. It would be necessary, however, for the manifesto to be written bluntly and solidly, and it is also necessary that the terms of the manifesto should be rigidly upheld.

For the Asiatic peasant the most urgent problem of all concerns agrarian reform, but if he examines the land reform practised by the Americans in Japan he sighs for a Russian invasion, for by June 1, 1947, only about 33,000 acres of a total of 5,000,000 acres had been bought by the Government for redistribution, and up to this date not one acre had been allotted to a tenant farmer. If he looked to the reforms of the Kuomintang he would find himself at a loss to discover any land reforms whatsoever, on the contrary, he would find that the feudal estates were increasing in area and that the Government for the twenty-seventh time, was instituting a small 'model area' where land reform could be practised only to show, as Chiang Kai-shek declared in *China's Destiny*, that land reform is impracticable. If he looked to the reforms in the Philippines, he would see that in theory the large holdings are being bought and redistributed on long-term loans to the individual farmers and that by law 70 per cent. of the produce belongs to the peasant and 30 per cent. to the landowner, but this law is no more efficient than a similar law in China, and the peasants are convinced that the heart of the Government is still with the *hacendados*. On the other hand, the peasant would discover that large land reforms are being put into operation in India in spite of the struggle between the Moslems and the Hindus and that Jawaharlal Nehru has pledged himself to reform in such a way that there can be no possibility of error. In fact, in the whole of Asia, India is the only nation where such deliberate and far reaching plans are being put in operation. In many districts these plans will fail, it is too much to hope that the agricultural habits of centuries and the powers of the great *zamindars* will be completely broken. But at least in India there is a vast hope, and the Plan of Economic Development of India, popularly known as the 'Bombay Plan,' envisaged agricultural and industrial developments that called for the expenditure of \$35,000,000,000 and looked forward to

"a doubling of the present *per capita* income within a period of fifteen years, by raising the net output of agriculture to a little over twice its present figure and that of industry, including both large and small industries, to approximately five times the present output." These fantastic totals were a measure of Indian self-confidence and of the amazing resources of the nation. Plague, famine, and civil war were to come, but in its essentials the "Bombay Plan" of 1944 still remains the blueprint of the new India.

There are at least three important regions in which American assistance to the East will help towards the peaceful development of Oriental countries—by education, by utilizing the resources of American knowledge of hydroelectric power and soil conservation and by loans. The first and the second are primarily academic and are most urgent and most easy to put into operation; they are also the least expensive. Though loans may be necessary, they are by no means the most important, and if an A.R.P. is to follow an E.R.P., they should be placed high on the list, if only because the peasants, who form the greater proportion of Asiatic populations, are lacking in western "know-how."

The picture that Asia presents must be drawn in sharp outlines, with jagged shadows. An entirely new world is erupting with volcanic force, and there is no power on earth that can restrain it. To imagine that Russia could direct the flow of more than a thousand million Asiatics and hold them by her leading strings is to credit Russia with greater strength and purpose than she possesses. It is not Europe that will decide all the issues of peace or war: the balance of power is held by the millions who are still unconscious that they possess power at all. These violent forces, let loose in uncharted directions, tend to follow democracy because only democracy permits and encourages the survival of human dignity, and it is because democracy can be so easily and spontaneously adapted to the Asiatic scene that the real power of America can be demonstrated and utilized in Asia. <sup>6</sup>

But it is important to remember that Asia will not remain as she is, stunned by the acquisition of new powers, at loose upon a world at conflict, but will tend increasingly to make her weight felt. The existing states may not last long, for in a period of great social tensions, there is a tendency at work that may be

characterized, in Dr Toynbee's words, as "withdrawal-and-return." Nations may split apart, whole segments withdrawing into isolation, but at the same time the Asiatic nations will tend to form larger wholes. Though Pakistan is separated from India, and North China may separate from South, vast plans of federation are already afoot, and it is unlikely that they can be indefinitely postponed. The League for the Federation of South East Asia, formed under the auspices of King Sihanouka of Siam, Prince Souphouvong of Laos, and Le Hi of Vietnam envisages a territory that includes Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the islands north of Australia, together with the Philippines forming a new nation of over 150,000,000 with a single defence system, joint foreign relations and co-ordination of economic life. The establishment of this federation is still far in the future. Siam, Burma and the Philippines are free, and so also are parts of Indonesia in spite of a theoretical dependence on the Dutch Crown while the issue of the war in Indo-China cannot long be prolonged. Starting with a loose federation based upon common interests there is no reason why a formidable federation possessing fabulous resources should not come about, with the result that the whole configuration of power in the Orient will be changed: nor is it unlikely that India, the first country to recognize the Indonesian Republic, will form a close alliance with the new federation. Meanwhile, the literacy rate in Asia is mounting, and the fantastic heights of the Asiatic birth rate are already beginning to make themselves felt, 2,700,000 new babies are now born annually in Japan. If India's death rate could be lowered to the level of that of the United States, India alone with her present birth rate could fill five worlds. The problem of the Asiatic birth rate begins to assume huge proportions. There is no evidence that the Japanese Government or the American Military Government have given thought to any solution of the problem, which may be the decisive problem of our time. It is hardly a solution to suggest, as some Asiatics have already suggested, that when America and Russia have destroyed one another by atomic bombs both of these huge continental countries will be wide open for Asiatic expansion. But nothing is more likely than that the Asiatics will be compelled to expand into Africa, Australia, and even perhaps New Zealand. These changes may occur more quickly than we

now believe possible. Only one thing is certain; it will no longer be possible to play one Asiatic group against another, for they are conscious already of their invisible bonds.

No one can doubt that Russia has eyes on Asia, that every effort of penetration short of war is being utilized, that at least nine thousand Asiatic students are studying in various colleges in Siberia and Moscow, and that Russia is attempting to exert pressure in Afghanistan, Tibet, Singkiang, and Mongolia, while the great new industrial centres round Alma Ata are strategically situated to supply pressure along the Russian frontiers of Asia. The announced Russian objectives are the control of Manchuria and India, which contains Asia's greatest industrial potential; but the successes of the Communists in India were weakened by Gandhi's continual disapproval of their methods, their constant shifts in policy and their inability to penetrate the peasant *kisans*, already for the most part captured by the Indian Socialists. The Russians in conquering Manchuria and then stripping it of all its turbine generators, to the astonishment of the Chinese Communists, themselves showed very clearly the path they were inclined to follow in Asia. This has been remembered against them, and the Chinese students who hate the Kuomintang Government for its corruption find no reason to love the Russian for their robbery. Distrust of Russia is increasingly growing. Soetan Sjahrir, who borrowed some of his Socialist concepts from the Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, has fought Communism in Java vigorously. Nehru's horror at many aspects of the Russian experiment has been expressed in his books. Unless Communism succeeds in capturing the social consciousness of the young Asiatics by the drive and simplicity of a new programme for Asia diametrically opposed to the programme enforced in Russia, her chances of winning seem slight indeed. Meanwhile, if America desires to win them, profound changes of policy will be needed. Most important of all is the need to change her attitude toward the social demands of the Asiatic peasantry, who will be swayed by the Communist cry of "imperialism" if our policy continues to be mainly concerned with the support of feudal and vested interests.

Because the power of the Zaibatsu was not effectively broken and because neither in Japan nor in Korea has agrarian reform been introduced on any scale commensurate with the demands



of the people, the Americans have failed to win over the Japanese and Korean peasants. There is still time to reverse a policy as tragic as it is stupid, but this reversal can come about only when civilians have power, and the military governments are disbanded. There is now no reason why large military forces should be kept in Japan, it would be sufficient to base a small force in Okinawa, but there is every reason to ask that American educators, sociologists, teachers, and students should be sent to Japan in force. There are social and human aims to be accomplished, and nothing whatsoever is gained by the non fraternization rule that exists in Korea, and much is indeed lost. Moreover, by sending to Asiatic countries young soldiers who have not been trained in the peculiar usages and customs of the East, far too often we earn the disrespect of the Asiatics. Haired for the military too deep in the Asiatic soul while reverence for scholarship is more intense in the East than it is among us. The Americans have advantages over Russia in the very great respect that exists in the East for American scholars and scientists, but to them, accustomed to foreign domination for so many years, all soldiers wear the same colours and possess the same purpose. The gravest mistake in our dealings with China has been to send military men as our ambassadors. The strange Indian war-cries of General Hurley did not go unappreciated in Yenan, though he was assumed to be insane, General Marshall's intransigence while in China fared little better. There is a temper in the military mind that defeats the processes of meditation, wrecking these processes by a fatal instinct to show a hidden strength. On the day when the last military governor leaves Asia, American relations with Asiatic countries will take a turn for the better.

As an iron curtain fell over Eastern Europe, so another iron curtain rose with tremendous force over the wealth of Asia. Because the Japanese had armed Malays, Indians, Indonesians, and Chinese, the Europeans and Americans saw them elms for the first time facing the Asiatics on equal terms. The slaughter of the battle fleet in Pearl Harbor followed by the sinking of the *Rem on* and the *Prince of Wales* taught us, though we should have known it before, that the Asiatic could be as mechanically skilled as ourselves. He was our equal in nearly all things, and he was our superior in spiritual power. "For too long," said Jawaharlal

Nehru at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March, 1947, "we of Asia have been petitioners in the Western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. *We do not intend to be the play-things of others.*" It would be the very gravest mistake to assume that these words were not understood by the two hundred and fifty delegates of twenty-five countries who attended the conference.

In a sense, these words were a warning to depart. Note had been taken of the intolerable injustices that had been committed in the past, and if either America or Russia possessed imperialist ambitions, they were warned to forsake them. The grave injustices in Korea, China, Japan, and Indo-China, and the hardly less grave injustices in the Philippines and Malaya, remained and would not be pardoned so easily.

It is too late in the world's history to think of Asia in terms of power politics, and by introducing the threat of military power we create opponents who are not to be numbered by visible forces, but by whole generations of descendants and by the unused resources of Asia employed against us later at a time when we shall have need of friends. In Asia, as in Europe, expediency is the long way round. There will come a time when Japan is not occupied any longer, when the Dutch are no longer powerful enough to hold Indonesia, when the Philippines are no longer compelled to accept parity with the Americans, when the whole force of Asia may be used to throw off every vestige of a foreign yoke, and this will happen, not because there are Communists but because the nature of the Asiatic scene demands this freedom. Already, in every country of Asia, the United States is regarded as a country which, though essentially democratic itself, desires to establish Fascist governments in Asia. By refusing to encourage the just aspirations of the common people, by resolutely assisting unpopular governments, and by displaying military strength rather than the strength that springs naturally from her culture, America forfeits the best and gains the worst.<sup>1</sup>

The pattern is now clear. Believing that there is a grave danger to the Indonesian leader, Amir Sjarifoedin, who left the Socialist party and went over to the Communists because "America is deliberately planning to help the Dutch retain their empire," may be continually repeated.

of Communist penetration in Asia, America is prepared to back with armed force every single government, however tyrannical, that pretends that its interest lies in combating Communism, even if it so exerts itself against the common people that the Government itself creates the conditions under which Communism flourishes, and by continuing to create those conditions automatically creates an atmosphere in which America will be reviled and hated throughout all Asia. Americans must learn in Asia, as in Europe, that Communism cannot be fought with guns and threats, but can be fought on social terms, on social battlefields. We must accept the fact that nearly all Asia is Socialist, but there is no reason to believe that Socialism implies Communism after the Russian pattern and it cannot be a coincidence that the governments of Burma, India, Indo-China, and North China are all Socialist in their practice, paying considerably more attention to Fabian Socialism than to *The Communist Manifesto*, which includes by a strange error of judgment an almost incredible attack upon the peasantry. "The successful revolutionaries," wrote Marx in 1850, "should never give the land to the peasants as free property, for by so doing they will inevitably become members of the reactionary bourgeoisie." The experience of the Russian Government, which first gave the land to the peasants and then expropriated it, is still remembered in Asia, where men have long memories.

The character of our time demands that we should adjust ourselves to a situation in Asia that now assumes critical significance. It is clear that we cannot any longer behave as we have behaved in the past, or even as we have behaved in the past few years. The urgencies that face us in Europe face us elsewhere, and they face us most acutely on the shores of the new Middle Sea. As the centre of gravity of the world veers towards Asia, so the Pacific acquires a significance never before possessed. The Asiatic century has begun, and the problem of our time is not how to make peace with Russia but how to create a world in which the people find peace enduring. And if it is necessary to restrain the advance of the Russian tyranny, it is all the more necessary to make an enduring peace for those who are not yet touched by Russia and who will exert themselves to retain the freedoms they have acquired through American help. If America retains its youth and shows that it is conscious of a revolutionary

purpose of change, demanding and supporting social changes with the same vigour with which it has demanded bases, a seventy-group air force, and U.M.T. (for if military strength is necessary sometimes, a social purpose is necessary at all times), then the roots of democracy may be fruitful. "The roots of democracy," said President Truman, "will not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic distress. It is part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabilitation and development of the Far Eastern countries." But so far too little has been done; there have been altogether too many pious phrases; the urgencies of the situation have been disguised; and the armies of America are still for the most part her only contributions to the Asiatic scene.

Time and hope are running out. In Asia a kind of weariness toward all things American is becoming only too evident. The British at least had the courtesy to depart and thereby gained for themselves an affection they never possessed before: weeping and cheering, the Indians said farewell to the last regiment of their conquerors as it left Bombay. So they will weep and cheer and be grateful when the last American marine leaves China, Japan and Korea. The Russians might come down through the Khyber Pass, for India is wide open to them, but it is in the highest degree likely that if they came down into the plains, the Indians would fight successfully, having the best reason to fight, summoning their allies, and there is as much reason to fear a Russian invasion of China as to fear a Russian invasion of India. Fear has made tyrants of us; it is time we refused to tyrannize ourselves with fears.

There are good reasons why Americans should look forward with admiration and confidence to the rebirth of Asia. A basis for an enduring friendship exists, but only if we assist them in their social struggle. To-day, two great problems confront our generation. One is the understanding of Asia in all its complexity; the other is the continual revolutionary struggle for freedom: neither problem can be separated from the other.

Five factors, in particular, must be seriously studied with regard to Asia. First and foremost is the emergence of the social revolution with all its diverse phenomena of nationalism, Socialism, a rising programme of education, an electorate exalted and inspired by the promise of full control over its

government, the rise in the literacy rate, and the emergence into political power of people who have been oppressed for centuries. Second we are confronted with a swiftly changing economic system in Asia. Pre-war Asia no longer exists. The whole fabric of its economy is now under grave strain, and the process of adaptation, though speeded up by Socialism, can only increase the strain. The economic focuses have changed. Japan, in spite of considerable exports in textiles, will never recover her economic foothold in Asia if only because hatred for Japan is too deep-seated among the peoples she conquered. Meanwhile every Asiatic nation is desperately attempting to become nationalized, industrialized, and to a greater or lesser extent socialized. Nothing will convince the Asiatics that the primary sources of power and production should be left in the hands of private enterprise, they have learned that private enterprise is rarely private, and it has been enterprising in the past only on behalf of foreigners. Third, we are confronted with the changing relations between Asia and the West: our primacy is forfeit at last. Though for a brief space we shall still be conquerors in Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Malaya, our rule is hardly more than shadow play, a charade performed before a backdrop on which is depicted the beautiful and tragic spectacle of the nations of Asia aroused at last to a consciousness of their own powers and their vast fertility. Our day in Asia is ended: their sun is rising, and we would be fools of conquest to imagine that their sun can be postponed. Best always is to leave with the greatest grace before their acquiescence turns to anguished bitterness. Then, fourth, we are confronted with the tendency on the part of Asiatics to form large federations on the principle that they need greater security against the temptations of revised imperialism. Last, we are confronted with Asiatic Communism, which may and probably will follow a path opposed to Russian Communism simply because the problems that face Russia are so often dissimilar to the problems that face Asia. If Communism emerges in Asia, it will be as a result of our own moral weakness, for more than we imagine, the Asiatics are opposed to tyranny, and it is hardly likely that they will exchange the tyranny of one imperialism for the tyranny of another.

The greatest revolution that has ever occurred continues almost unnoticed by our daily Press. There is no reason why that

revolution should not be accomplished for the most part peacefully, as in Indonesia; the emphasis is on the social struggle and not on war. We must realize that the revolt of Asia will eventually change the pattern of American economy, just as the desperate revolt of the Japanese changed the economy of America—the west coast of America, already a centre of migration, will continue to absorb more and more of the American Middle West, and the ports of Los Angeles, Seattle, and San Francisco will become of even greater significance to the development of Asiatic trade. Now more than ever it is necessary for America to face the East with a clear, untroubled mind, conscious of deliberate purposes to be fulfilled and of responsibilities so great that a single mistake is dangerous. The curtain has lifted on a new world, and for the adventurous spirits of America new frontiers are opened out, as they opened in the last century, for in the most concrete sense the Asiatics are the men we must know if we are to survive.

## THE CRISIS OF THE SPIRIT

*I said this once, & propos the enemy, who is also shut in man's  
egoistic hide "It is the beastly of demons that they rush in to  
struggle with a cry of hate you must hear if you will answer  
them"*

CHARLES OLSON

SOMEWHERE AROUND THE year 1921 the traditions that formed America snapped. The old idealism crumbled, the easy days of expansion during the second half of the nineteenth century had at last come to an end. There came onto the American scene a sense of revulsion and fear of the future, and the refusal to take part in the League of Nations was no more than a last gesture of defiance against the invisible and mysterious powers of a threatening world beyond America's frontiers. For a little while longer the sense of isolation remained, in the same way that some drugs will leave a curious sense of infinite distance between the observer and the objects that surround him. But when World War II ended there was no sense of isolation, for had not American soldiers flown over every inch of the earth's surface and for a brief while enjoyed a real sense of community with the rest of the world? One could draw a PX card in London, which was still good for cigarettes in Karachi and Chungking, and a soldier fighting his way into Germany found himself in possession of English pennies, French francs, Dutch guilders, and strange bills acquired in North Africa. There were no frontiers for the soldiers who flew from America to China by way of Brazil, North Africa, and India. The world, as Wendell Willkie said in a forgotten phrase, was one, and all its fruits belonged to all men. But the fruits were not gathered, and the dream of peace came to a sudden end. What happens when a dream ends and sleep ends and you are still awake, but the nightmare continues? The nightmare knew no boundaries, for everyone knew that with the ending of the war the difficulties only began. American isolation was gone for ever, so were all

other isolations. But could one live in this world where the barriers were down but the old hatreds remained?

There was not only one nightmare, but several. There was the one that began at exactly 3.53 on a wintry afternoon in 1942 when an Italian scientist working in the closely guarded athletics field-house on the campus of the University of Chicago said quietly, "The curve is exponential." There was the other that began in 1848 with the messianic prophecies of *The Communist Manifesto*. There were a hundred others. The destruction left by the war on Hiroshima and Berlin was hardly more than a portrait of a common destruction, which was felt in the remote villages of Minnesota and in the snow-fields of Kolyma. There was, as Coleridge said in another context, "in some sense, a Fall." In the most complete sense it was a fall from grace, and it was not only the traditions of America that had snapped but all traditions everywhere. It was midnight at the birth of a new age.

It was not easy, opening one's eyes wide at midnight, hearing the echo of the drumming thunder of explosions and the whine of shells, to adapt oneself to a new age. Strange things had happened. Two places on the earth's surface had been pulverized into coloured clouds of funereal splendour; two small bombs, weighing little more than twenty pounds, had altered the destiny of a great naval nation. It was fantastic that it should be so, but it was still more fantastic that we gradually grew accustomed to that fact that men had in their possession the very secret of the sun's powers. The dreams of the Americans, even the dream of Columbus, had been anchored on the earth, as a skyscraper is anchored, but this was something beyond human computation altogether: it was only later that we learned that the scientists of Los Alamos genuinely feared the destruction of the whole world. They could say with truth that never in the history of human invention had there been anything quite comparable to this. Men who had lived in the shadow of the machine saw themselves henceforward living in the shadow of a power infinitely greater than the most ruthless machine. And then, almost in the same breath, they realized in America that the huge land mass of Eurasia was straddled by another kind of power inimical to everything that America stood for, and for the first time a huge continental power was facing America on three



sides. So vast were the distances that could be travelled by aeroplanes in a single flight that Americans on the East Coast saw themselves directly facing Russians in Berlin, those on the West Coast saw themselves directly facing the Russians in Korea and Manchukuo, and those in the Middle West saw themselves facing the Russians driving down from the North Pole. Up to 1940 some kind of a sense of isolation remained. Now, because the world had grown so small as the result of American inventions, Americans felt themselves surrounded on three sides.

It was not so simple as this. The conscious leap from a sense of isolation to a sense of shattered insecurity came gradually. The spy trials in Canada focused attention on the road over the North Pole. Maps began to appear in increasing numbers showing the pole as the centre of the world. The old maps showing the world as a great square divided by the equator no longer possessed validity, they belonged to the age before the superionic aeroplane. And while the Americans saw themselves menaced on three sides, the Russians in the same way saw themselves menaced even more, for did not the Americans possess the atomic bomb? The menaces felt by the two surviving continental powers remained in spite of the deliberations of the United Nations. The next act of the tragedy has yet to be played.

But even though we cannot foretell what will happen during the next act, certain things are at last becoming increasingly clear. It is clear, for example, that man has been thrown even more decisively under the shadow of the machine, that he will tend increasingly to lead a collective anonymous life, that the severance from any kind of appropriate tradition makes him fearful and angry. He is like a man walking through the deserted streets of New York at night, afraid that the skyscrapers will fall on him and with no power to support their fall. The founding fathers believed in the pre-eminence of reason, but the modern man asks himself whether the atomic bomb is reasonable, whether it is reasonable that the two great continental powers should be preparing themselves for a mortal struggle in which it is clear that millions upon millions will be killed, whether it is reasonable that mankind, on the verge of mastering the elements, should be so blindly tormented by a fatal instinct to suicide. Almost inevitably, because the forces arraigned against him are so great, he abdicates his responsibility, in much the same way

as the medieval Christians, conscious of an impending Day of Judgment, serenely abdicated their responsibilities to the Church and to the State.

It may be that this abdication of responsibility, in an age so collective and anonymous, will be complete. It may be that men will surrender to the blind forces of mechanics, dropping atomic bombs and filling the air with bacteriological poisons only because these things, by their very existence, demand to be used. The Russian people, by abdicating their responsibilities and accepting the rule of the fourteen members of the Politburo, who do not represent them because they have not in any proper sense been elected by them, would seem to be the first to have abdicated their responsibilities, those very responsibilities that men possess as the sole justification of their existence. The inevitable result, if the process of abdication goes much further, is that the Russian scene will resemble the stage of *The Emperor Jones*, ruled by a mad emperor and peopled by Little Formless Fears, Convicts, Prison Guards, Slaves, Auctioneers, Congo Witch Doctors, and a Crocodile God.

There is no reason on earth why the process of abdication should not be halted in the countries outside the Russian pale. The abdication of responsibility by so many citizens in the democracies is the greatest threat to the survival of the democracies. In every village or town where the citizens allow themselves to be ruled by uncovenanted rulers, in every municipal committee that is not duly elected, the Congo witch doctors and the crocodile gods have their day, for the whole purpose of democracy is violated by the presence of officials who are not elected by the free vote of the people they govern. Freedom is violated, democracy is violated, and human dignity is violated wherever there is boss rule; and in the last instance there can be no distinction except in scope between the Hagues and the Hitlers, the Prendergasts and the Stalins. Wherever they are to be found, the bosses violate whatever is most precious in our remaining traditions, for it is precisely in the exercise of our continuing freedoms that we acquire our dignity as men and women on this earth and precisely by the exercise of these freedoms that the bosses are destroyed and our human dignity vindicated. As long as the sense of human dignity remains there is still purpose in lives lived under the shadow of the machines and

under the shadow of tyranny, but without the sense of human dignity no purpose remains, and no final conquest can ever be made.

Here it is that we meet the great numbling block that confronts us throughout the history of the democracies. The sense of power that comes from election under free institutions is not measurably dissimilar from the sense of power that comes through the exercise of despotism. Under the complexities of modern life power tends to be lacking in responsibility. The final decisions, even the most important decisions, would have to be based on so intricate a knowledge of so many involved details that in fact the decisions are not made on the basis of knowledge but on the basis of "fair judgment." The mayor of a large city, dealing with a multiplicity of organizations must make snap judgments, and against those snap judgments there is no appeal, for it would be impossible for him to attend to his work if he were continually being faced with the appeals of those who are dissatisfied with his judgment. And where there is no court of appeal, continually enforced, there is not in any final sense a court of freedom. There are even worse dangers than the danger that lies in the fact that power itself tends to be irresponsibly employed, there is the danger which has existed throughout the histories of the democracies that the wielder of power will attempt to consolidate his power, even though it is against the direct interests of those who have voted him into power. There are simplicities in a Communist régime that defy those who put their faith in freedom, but those who love freedom remember that eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.

"Freedom," said Aristotle, "is to govern and to be governed." No other definition has the validity of this definition given more than two thousand years ago. That the governed must assume their responsibilities and be themselves the governors may be a paradox, but it is the paradox by which freedom moves. What is in question is not so much the rights of man, or even his duties, as his essential dignity. It is from his dignity as governed and governor that his rights and duties flow. Tongues and flames of prophecy are no longer necessary, what is necessary is that the fundamentals of freedom should be enforced, that the governors should also be the governed. If we are to save the world from the new dark ages of slavery, we must fall in love with freedom again,

but it must be an active love, not a love delegated capriciously to the politicians. Each man must be the home of freedom, the protector of freedom, and the herald of its advancing frontiers. Men who are engaged in building free institutions at home must find a way to build these same free institutions abroad, and they cannot do this except by their personal example.

It is in these regions that we face the most catastrophic crisis in the human spirit. The task of freedom has been delegated to others; the machines hedge us in; less than two thirds of us vote; we are not educated enough to realize the benefits of freedom; economic tyranny saps the strength of free men. Above all, we are confronted with the grave and often deliberate purposes of dehumanization. We are treated by the Press as though everyone were part of an undistinguished mass of jelly that reacts in exactly the same way throughout, and by dint of telling us that this is what we are, we begin to believe it. We buy the products of spurious advertisements; we believe or half believe all the voices that come over the radio even though these voices talk at cross purposes; and deadened by barbiturates and deriving our emotions from the electrical shadows thrown on a screen, we are in process of losing our human dignity altogether. Violence and vulgarity are deliberately or unconsciously employed in the cinema to deaden us further. How effective this violence and vulgarity can be is seen from the Orson Welles' broadcast from Mars, the great majority of Hollywood films, and the increase in the crime rate among juveniles, which can only spring from a growing addiction to the films. Brutality has become commonplace in our literature. The extremes of violence are explored, and tenderness among friends has become old-fashioned. The absolutely arbitrary nature of life in the concentration camp is different only in degree from the arbitrary nature of life in our great cities. Where is freedom when all men belong to a collective anonymous life, with no hope of escape from the roaring shadow of the machine? If freedom survives, it will be through the wise and passionate efforts of the young who will dedicate themselves to freedom again, will insist on freedom, will fight on all fronts in order that the standards of humanity beloved by their forefathers shall remain. As far as these things destroy the human life and dignity of the individual, they will destroy the machines or make them work to man's advantage.

We have no right, like Tolstoy, to ask, "What must be done?" Humanity demands another question altogether, "What can we do?" And there are so many things we can do, privately and publicly, and some of these things must be done soon. There are many things we cannot do. We can no longer call upon the archaic fathers of the race, the heroes, to help us—the heroes of the modern age, blown up in newspaper photographs, thrown in their huge shadows on the screens, the Roosevelts, the Churchills, the Hitlers, and the Stalins—draw away our elementary energy and lead us into the temptation of abdicating our rights altogether. They were great in their time, but as free men we cannot afford to tolerate that particular form of greatness which takes so much strength from ourselves.

There is a sense in which the Great White Fathers destroy our human dignity, even more than the repetitive rapping of our human strength that comes from mechanical entertainment. Lenin the pure mechanic, was never surrounded with the multiplicity of shining haloes that surround Stalin. Obedience to the powers of Mysterious Authority was never as great as in our own day when our minds are conditioned by the headlines, the work of the unhallowed copywriters. There were occasions when Hitler would speak against the back round of a television screen on which, immeasurably eloquent and sinister, there was printed the continually featuring portrait of the insignificant little man who ranted below. Huge shadows feed our minds, as though we were Titans wrestling in twilight, but the real and urgent things still retain the size of human beings. In this ghostly twilight the human tragedy loses focus and dimension—and indeed there is nothing more significant of our age than the fact that tragedy has almost become meaningless to us. The newspapers bring us photographs of the dead, the tortured, and the agonized dying, but we have grown so accustomed to these things that even death has no fear for us—it is only another newspaper headline. The car smash with the ribbons of twisted metal takes the place of Hercules poisoned shirt, the anonymous death provided by the machine takes the place of a death ordered and summoned by destiny. Tragicomedies survive no better, and comedy itself has become so light mannered and fleshless and cunning that its greatest modern exponent is a pale wisp of a man with a toothbrush moustache, chalk white with horror at the

world around him. "Not as I will, but as the machine and the newspaper headline and the radio demand——"

This is not a parody. The very greatest of all dangers to which a free man is exposed is the mechanical world around him. It may become necessary to resurrect the wreckers in order that we can breathe again an unpolluted air. We do not know yet the destructive powers of an entirely uncontrolled radio on the minds of the young, but it is not difficult to believe that incessant radio plays describing murder are having an intolerable effect. Here, as elsewhere, abuse of freedom tends to destroy freedom altogether, destroying it not only for those who believe it is expedient to exploit freedom, but also for those who believe in freedom most passionately. The free have a right to destroy unfreedom, and must destroy it if their freedom is to remain. The radio and the sensational newspaper must be held to account for the blunting of our sensibilities equally with the films. The brutality that accompanied the Nazis on their progress came from people who were not unlike us in outward aspect as we saw them coming into the courtroom, looking shabby and pale in the arc lights, men who were greying at the temples, weighed down with cares, loving their wives. It was these men who by a singular perversion of the brutalized human spirit saw nothing wholly improper in erecting a concentration camp with its electrified barbed wire, watch-towers, and water-filled ditches; its cremating ovens and gas chambers and morgues; with mounds for execution by shooting, vegetable gardens fertilized by human ashes, hooks for mass hangings, and patches of clay to drain off the blood of the victims. By a peculiar refinement, it was even arranged at Dachau that the water for the showers was heated by the burning of corpses. Brutalized, shouted at over the radio, ordered by newspapers, our eyes clouded by the cinema, can we be sure that we shall not allow the same things? We know now, though we half suspected it before, that the animals have been maligned when we said they were savage.

What can we do? Faced by the judgment of things outside our power, almost nothing remains except that we should refuse to abdicate our responsibility, not in any negative sense, but in the sense that we must claim our responsibilities as our right. Violated freedoms have already been violated too long. We have thought too often, under the impact of a mechanized world, that we

deserve our peace of mind, or that it is enough to make friends and influence people. Opuses are not the prerequisites of free men, and in our present age there may be better reasons for making enemies and influencing them. We are living in an inflammable age, lit by bright curtains, but this itself should be a challenge—famine, pestilence, wars are easy to bear in comparison with the devaluation of man. It is when men bend before a point of honour that harm and blemish discolour them. The dignity of man, the sacredness of life, the holiness of endeavour must be upheld, what is needed is the doctrine of devotion to life and the artist's glory in it. It is even possible that as life becomes more insecure it will be more highly prized, but it is equally possible that men will become panic-stricken. Against panic, as against the machines, only human dignity has value and only the promise of greater freedom gives encouragement. The beauty and promise within every man, seen as a whole, must be the watchword.

To-day, faced by the dominance of the machine, licking traditional patterns, knowing that the world may be destroyed, conscious that ages of history have come to an end and that with us a new historical cycle is beginning, we are confronted by only one comfort: that in every child born on this earth there are unending potentialities, and these potentialities, when they are for good, must be encouraged. In the most complete sense the only mediators between ourselves and our fate are our educators. It is not the poet but the schoolmaster and the professor who are now the unacknowledged legislators of this world, and it is on them that there reposes all the weight of responsibility in training the free men of the future and awakening in them those vaster responsibilities that will weigh down our descendants. In a very real sense the destiny of America is in the hands of the underpaid teachers, just as the destiny of Asia lies almost wholly in the hands of the village schoolmasters. To the extent that they themselves give dignity to life and meaning to the tasks of their students, to that extent democracy is assured; and to the extent that they are callous and indifferent to the dignity of life, to that extent democracy will fail. When Thomas Jefferson wrote, "Above all things I hope the education of the common people will be attended to, convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty,"

he was not writing the usual formal panegyric to education, but insisting upon a very real danger, in words whose every syllable is important to us. In the light of the conflict for and against the free societies of the world, the President's Commission on Higher Education assumes strategic importance; for in the menacing world of the present it is not soldiers but scholars and rational men who hold the forts against tyranny and gigantism. The very training of a soldier works against making him a free man in a free world, nor does the cut-throat greed of competitive free enterprise entirely assist the development of a peaceful society. The menacing potentialities of cinema, radio, and yellow journalism can be combated only by those who are educated to more reasonable standards, and it is in this public conspiracy of the educated against the morons that St. Thomas' implied definition of freedom most aptly applies, *the whole cause of freedom is founded on reason*. Against a widely educated and responsible electorate there are hardly any powers that prevail, and least likely to prevail are the powers of mythology, those strange shadows and compulsive dreamlike forces that come from Eastern Europe. That the students of the Prague universities were halted by a man in a leather jacket does not prove that education bows before tyranny, for the students of Kunming fought off an equally powerful tyranny which was armed with Mausers. By offering free education up to at least the first two years of college, by vastly expanding public education through community colleges, by eliminating in schools all segregation and racial discrimination, the foundations can be laid. The pity of it is that the prime importance of education was not realized before: the unhappy result is that three hundred and fifty thousand teachers have quit the teaching profession since 1939, and five million children of school age are not in school at all.

It is necessary to relate the crisis of the spirit to the crisis of education. A nation is not founded necessarily by educated men, though the standard of education of the Pilgrim Fathers and some of the earlier discoverers was extremely high, but a nation must be settled by them, must be continually replenished by them, must acknowledge their leadership, for the future development of a country depends upon their guidance as much as it depends upon production, and Americans have paid sufficiently for the absence of educational facilities in the South by the



fallibility of Southern legislators, a Bilbo does not arise when there is an educated electorate. Nor is it true, as so many imagine, that in America there are more opportunities for education than elsewhere, both Great Britain and Russia spend more *per capita* on education than America. It is not only that modern democracy demands a highly trained and skilled electorate conscious of very definite obligations to the State and the social community, but the experience of the past few years must have convinced us that we are dealing with vast and intricate enemies and that we can combat them successfully only by having cooler heads and greater intelligence, by being intellectually tougher in the aggregate than they are. Toughness is not in this sense one of the qualities most generally taught in American schools. It needed a war and two million veterans returning to school to show that intellectual toughness was desirable. The future may well depend upon the veterans and the toughness they have acquired in the last three years. We are beginning to learn that James Madison was right when he wrote "Popular government without popular education is a prologue to a farce or a tragedy."

Nothing is so revealing of the failures and triumphs of America as its progress toward a system of compulsory education. James Madison wrote at a time when Horace Mann was attempting to establish the first system of free education in Massachusetts. By 1880, when the system of free enterprise was encouraged and the responsibility of the state towards its citizens was discouraged, education had reached a pathetic state of inefficiency and corruption. The Twentieth Century Fund's educational survey in *America's Needs and Resources* says that in 1880 there were "no effective compulsory education or child labour laws, and almost no provision for adult and technical education or for the teaching of handicapped children. A man with a secondary school education was unusual, and women found it particularly hard to obtain education above the elementary level. Only a small percentage of public school teachers had any professional training for their jobs, school buildings and equipment were woefully inadequate." The position has since changed remarkably. In 1917 41 per cent of the enlisted men had finished high school, and twenty five years later 23.3 per cent of the men in the ranks had finished high school. Meanwhile the President's Commission on Higher Education has already stated new aims

and entirely changed the atmosphere of education in America with a simple enunciation of the principle to be followed. "The American people," wrote the Commission, "should set as their ultimate goal an educational system in which at no level—high school, college, graduate school or professional school—will a qualified individual in any part of the country encounter an insuperable economic barrier to the attainment of the kind of education suited to his aptitudes and interests." At the cost of rather more than a billion dollars during the first year of the huge educational expansion, tuition fees in public institutions would be eliminated for freshmen and sophomores, and the federal government would give subsidies to colleges that allow the expansion to take place. Other encouraging signs are seen on every hand. The Taft Bill appropriating \$300,000,000 a year in school aid for the states, based on a *per capita* figure of \$50 for each child, is only one of these signs. This Bill is deliberately aimed at equality of opportunity. "I believe we should give assurance, that no matter where a child is born, he shall have an education, because unless a child can have an education he does not have an equal opportunity." What is surprising about Senator Taft's words is not that they should have been said, but that they needed to be said; the facilities for education of Negroes remain even now pitifully small and so ill organized that they stand as a reproach to the whole system of education, but the immediate future in education looks brighter than it has ever been. Senator Taft has insisted that the aid-to-education bill should "to a large extent improve the coloured education of the South, for it is the coloured people who have had the least opportunity," while the President's Commission on Higher Education looks forward to having 3,385,000 students in college by the year 1952.

Though the standard of education in America is constantly improving, the standard of illiteracy, which is not directly connected with education, but rather with opportunities for education, still remains mischievously high. The hard fact remains that virtually ten million Americans are illiterate. The reasons for this high rate are not hard to find. It was Soetan Sjahrir, the revolutionary leader of Indonesia, who observed that the Japanese, by introducing radio to the Javanese villages, helped to bring about the revolt of Asia. The peasants, who

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could not read newspapers, were brought into the main current of revolution by radio and by wall newspapers. The American equivalents of these wall newspapers are the tabloids, the cinema, and picture magazines like *Life*, which tend to confirm the illiterate in his habits. Since the radio is playing all day long, and all knowledge can be absorbed through the ears, there is no reason why many millions of Americans should take the trouble to read. Moreover, opportunities for education are still lacking and this is particularly true of the Negroes. There are still three million adults living in the United States who never attended school, and not all of them are Negroes. Indeed it is in the states where there is a predominance of Negroes that educational committees make greater effort than the educational committees in states that are richer. But nothing except transparent injustice can justify a median expenditure per classroom unit of \$4 000 in New York, \$400 in Mississippi, \$3 600 in California, and \$500 in North Dakota, or variations in Illinois stretching all the way from \$6,000 to \$300: nor is there the slightest real justification for charging in some colleges such high fees that any approximation to equality of opportunity of entry must be forfeited. The independence of the universities and schools must to a very large extent be maintained: but it is doubtful whether even the federal government should be in charge of expenditure for education, a very potent argument could be brought forward for demanding that the cost of education should be a first charge on the United Nations, and that a conference of the nations should be held to provide the elementary justice of education for all the children of the world. Meanwhile, even to-day, America has succeeded in being able to keep 2,500 000 young men and women out of the labour market until the age of twenty-one or twenty-two. It is an achievement that no other nation has been able to rival, even Britain, with about 200 000 students at universities and training centres, has failed to reach any comparable proportion.

If there is increasing dissatisfaction with the standards and opportunities of education in America, the recognition of the intrinsic advantages of universal education is no more than a natural progress from Jeffersonian tradition: but there is another sense in which education is part of the over-all strategy for retaining a working democracy. The defiant invasions of boss

rule have been recognized as dangers to the State itself; with a wider educational suffrage, boss rule is likely to disappear. Moreover, the demand that the Negroes should be educated foreshadows a time when segregation will be nothing more than a bad memory: the returned G.I's were the first to break down the walls of segregation in the universities. Still other reasons for the enlargement of the franchise of education are evident. In spite of the Manhattan project, it is recognized that scientific pre-eminence may not rest for long in the hands of the Americans, who are determined not to make the mistake of Nazi Germany, which, by introducing a corrupt philosophy, corrupted the universities at their source. The mistakes of German scientists, who possessed before anyone else the secrets of uranium fission, led to total defeat. By education America hopes that she will retain her pre-eminence in the sciences whatever the cost.

Meanwhile a moral, intellectual, and spiritual revolution is taking place in America, unobserved by Dr. Robert Maynard Hutchins of Chicago, who continually prays for it and sees no evidence of its second coming, but it should be clear that the rainbow signs of this revolution are now evident among the returned G.I's, who are not particularly vocal because they are attending to their studies, but whose potential power will soon be realized. A revolution on this scale works slowly; it does not demand open leadership; it works as quietly as freedom herself and demands as much. And if this revolution can be said to have a focus, that focus is the greatness of America herself and her power to rejuvenate a weary world. Badly housed, ill fed, supported on a Government grant that remains considerable by European standards but fails continually to supply a good standard of living during a period of inflation, the veterans show the marks of the beast—the beast that will tear down the inequalities and idiocies of untrammelled free enterprise and put in its stead some kind of system, not yet discovered, that will arm business with a social armour. There is a sense in which both untrammelled free enterprise and State Communism are offenders against human dignity. It will be the inevitable task of the next generation to make the present system more egalitarian, and nothing is so promising as the determination of the returned G.I's, and nothing is so fortunate as the decision to make every child the gift of education.

'It is very late, perhaps nothing can save us," wrote Dr Hutchins. 'But if we can take as our motto, 'Enough—and no more', if we can gain for ourselves a coherent system of ideas concerning the world and humanity [by reading the hundred best books], if we can mean the fatherhood of God when we say the brotherhood of man, then we may have one more chance.'

It is a strange philosophy that demands of the Americans that they should say, after a victorious war and the beginning of their great emergence as a world power, the sacred words 'Enough—and no more,' and stranger still to demand a coherent system of ideas when no such system has ever been presented to the world, and it was the most non-coherent of systems that produced the discovery of the fatherhood of God. What is needed is not a coherent system or the acceptance of any revealed religion [but the discovery of all the remaining frontiers, and the sense of brotherhood will come on the rising wave.

America is too young, too demanding to be at the mercy of her instructors. We shall not come nearer the millennium by reading Aristotle—a little is enough and most of what is necessary is contained in a sacred definition of freedom—and America will not conquer the world for freedom by remaining academic. The drive is outward through all frontiers. All imperial ambitions are extinct. The measure of American power will be in her own resurrection from the ignominies of bad government and the even greater ignominies of free enterprise pushed to its abject limit of which the present situation in housing is an example to be afraid of. One cannot create revolutions from the study, or by hiring speakers, or by giving away the hundred best books or by attempting to cast a spell on people by means of a basilisk stare and the threat of some final dissolution. The final dissolution may come, but it will have nothing whatsoever to do with an organized spiritual revolution—it will have far more to do with a crazy fool opening the Pandora's box which contains the germs of some irremediable disease. For over the final fate of the world we have no control, but over the temporary and perhaps enduring fate of the country we have through democracy at its best all the control we need.

Leon Bloy said somewhere that the world was like a cave where the rebel populations crowded in with their cattle, and were smoked in with fires, so that man and beast, suffocating

and maddened, massacred one another in the dark. It is a precise and accurate picture of the world we have known, but by luck and good sense some people survived. The Germans might easily have pulverized Britain with V-bombs if they had been produced in quantity, in time, and since they were already in the experimental stage in 1939 it was only the imbecility of the Nazis that prevented Britain from being hideously defeated. So, too, the Japanese might have conquered India with half an army division if they had not been so intent on taking upon themselves the consequences of an unnecessary war with America. We might have lost the war. We may still lose the peace. If we do, it will be as a result of the same imbecilities that led the German and Japanese high commands to their fates. It is conceivable that the next president of the United States will be hanged in Moscow, but this is not conceivable if the Americans exert themselves to the uttermost in the fields where exertion is most necessary. Not in armaments but in the discovery of freedom lies the hope of America. But if there is an abdication of social responsibility, and if American generals and ambassadors continue to threaten to drop atomic bombs on Russia for no better reason than that they are affected by the existing tensions, the sympathies of the world may go to Russia. It is conceivable that on the death of Stalin there will be civil war in Russia or even that a real democracy may emerge in Moscow, but the purpose of America should not be affected by what is only conceivable. We do not know what will happen to-morrow, but we do know that the moral justification of America is a strengthening of the social arm and the expansion of freedom throughout the world. Already there are indications that should be taken as warning by the Communists. There is less discrimination and segregation than there has ever been in America; there is a sense of hopefulness arising from the new frontiers in education, and this hope is not destroyed by the presence of Mr. Parnell Thomas or by the baseness of so many films. There were cowards in the army of Washington, but fools rarely destroy by their folly the course of history at epochs of great change. Freedom remains, not as something already acquired by right, but as the hope of the advancing world; for the sake of freedom men will still dare all things.

But the crisis of the spirit remains. The shattering discoveries

of science, the relentless nature of our present fears, the infamously corroding nature of so much of American radio and films, the reliance on armed force when men should be relying on principles and on the new discovery of the world for freedom, all these remain to torment us. It is a crisis that springs from the knowledge that the means are not sufficient to the ends, or from the fear of defeat (but there is no reason for the fear), and from the lack of direction (but if there was a single direction, we would be compelled to summon a *Führer* in our midst, or a Moses to lead the way). But there is no reason to doubt that the means will be at least adequate to the ends if Americans assume their full responsibilities. As Mr. Walter Lippmann has said, 'The social problem of the modern world arises not out of the objective difficulty of providing an adequate material existence, but out of man's subjective expectations which, because they are unlimited and insatiable, cause violence, inequality, hatred and frustration. Violence, inequality, hatred and frustration—these are the consequences if our motto is 'Get all you can.' They are equally the consequences if our motto is, 'All power to Russian tyranny.' Finally they are the consequences of indifference to responsibilities, and most particularly are they the consequences of that form of imperialism which states that the safety of the State demands bases on foreign territory even if the foreigners have no desire for those bases. Instead of violence, inequality, hatred, and frustration the weapons of America should be freedom, equality, brotherhood and the freest kind of assistance to the oppressed. The banners of the French and American revolutions are still their banners. The task is still to regain the fire of the early revolutionaries.

The physical frontiers are closed but the social frontiers are wide open and beckoning, and by passing through them we dissolve the crisis. No man is an island to himself, each man is a world, a constellation, a universe, and each must be discovered and must discover himself, and we are the losers by not taking part in the discovery. Not only are the social frontiers of America wide open, an infinite number of foreign frontiers are there to be claimed. And this way lies peace, for the weapons are spiritual weapons and invincible, and the raucous cries of the Communists need no longer be heard if America assumes her rightful role of bringing social progress to the world.

The time is short. Karl Marx said once, "No social form perishes until all the productive forces for which it provides scope have been developed." It was an inspired remark, but it was untrue, for the reason that all social forms suffer from accidents. We know now, as we knew long ago, that chance still plays some part. A bomb may fall by accident; another murder of another wastrel may occur in Sarajevo, which is after all not far from Belgrade. It may be that tragedy will put an end to the swift and luminous history of the United States and that all this continent will be laid waste by bacteriological locusts, all greenness vanish, all hope made grey. But the categorical summons remains, not for the mastery or the leadership of the world, which is vain, but for the freeing of the world by means of the social arm, poised for a final blow, not against Communism only, since Communism is an unworthy target for our aim, but against all the social injustices and miseries that plague the beautiful world.



## DESTINY OF AMERICA

*We must solemnly resolve that in the future we will not tolerate the economic evils which breed poverty and war. We are committed to the establishment of service to democracy.*

*We must keep it wide and vigorous alive to need of what is kind, always remembering that it is the things of the spirit that in the end prevail, that caring counts, that faith and hope count, and that without charity there is nothing good. That daring to live dangerously, we are learning to live generously and believing in the inherent goodness of man we may meet the call to stride forward into the unknown with greater confidence.*

JOHN G. WINANT in a speech to  
the Durham miners on June 6, 1942

**WE LIVE IN A WORLD** haunted by the ghost of an old love. There was peace once, though no one can remember the time or the place: our own fabulous ages are not so fabulous as the peaceful ages of the past. We look back to the Greeks and tell ourselves there was dew on their eyes and through this dew they saw everything slightly magnified and more brilliantly coloured, so that everything appeared strange and entrancing and infinitely delightful—so delightful indeed that we, with the dust of atomic powder on our eyes, see them across three thousand years with expressions of envy and hopeless desire to be among them, forgetting the ghastly massacres of Melos, Scione, Torone, and Egina. There are Chinese who can almost remember when men played archery to music and gathered mulberry leaves at the festivals. They remember these as peaceful times, but there were probably more massacres in their grandfathers' time in China than before or afterwards—forty million perished during the Taping Rebellion which is less than a hundred years old. In a single river valley of China there died by fire, hunger, and the sword more than the number of those who died by the intricate machines of the last war. There is no reason why we

should feel that we are improving, but there is every reason to believe that there have never been, except during the times of the great empires, and rarely then, long periods of peace. The final discovery of peace belongs to our own fabulous age.

But the ghost of the old love returns to haunt us even here: the kind of peace we imagined to exist in the past, the eternal *fête champêtre* among the forests and the rivers, the paintings of Poussin come to life at last, has no validity in our present mechanical age. Though we can hardly guess at the kind of peace we desire, we know for certain that the bells and the drums will not sound for the Chinese archers again, the Parthenon will never fill with worshippers. Our peace must be made of the same stuff as our daily lives. Leisure there may be from the products of atomic energy; all the devious exploitation of oil and coal for the purposes of power may come to an end; but even in an atomic age we shall expect to see the builders at their skyscrapers, the tractors rolling across the fields, the huge trucks roaring down the roads at night. The mechanical impetus remains; it will be a peace based firmly on the exploitation of the machine, and for this reason rather than "manifest destiny," the peace will be coloured by American industrialization and machine power. The backward nations of Asia will look more and more toward America for leadership in the task of taming the earth. "Americanization by industry" has come to stay, even though the forms the industry takes may not follow American forms; the Russians have shown that vast co-operatives may have a real purpose and may answer more closely to the needs of Asiatic peoples than free enterprise. And even if it is true that the machines may themselves dictate the forms of their use, so that men remain in some sense bound to them, an infinite variety of forms unfold before us. If atomic energy is owned by the State, and it is unthinkable that atomic energy should be employed by private enterprise, then the shape of the State will change out of all recognition in the future; the State becomes the source of power, its generator, and its possessor. It will be as though the State possessed at its beck and call a million T.V.As. It is in this sense that the socialization of power has come, or will soon come, to stay, but there are infinite gradations of the socialization of power, and free enterprise is not necessarily harmed when all the generators of power are owned by the State. The delicate

balance between Socialism and capitalism can still be maintained

Meanwhile, desperate tasks confront the Americans, whose industrial empire over the world is accomplished already. The future of American foreign policy is seen, in the final analysis, to depend on the rate of acceleration of three widely separated contemporary processes. The race itself is between the industrialization of the backward nations of the world and the reindustrialization of shattered Europe, and the political awakening of the Americans themselves. It was industry that made Europe strong, and it was the vacuum caused by the destruction of her industry that made her on the eastern marches wide open to Russian attack. It is significant that the countries that remain outside the Russian pile are those that are most industrially advanced. But industry itself is insufficient to stem that urgent tide, there must also be the consciousness of an expanding democracy, a sense of the value of individual life and a knowledge of freedom in action. The lesson of the last hundred years of our history is that political democracy and peace can only exist at a time of steadily increasing economic activity and a rising standard of living for the masses of the people. The story of America, like the story of the British Empire, and even of Soviet Russia is the story of an expanding economy. Just as a dictator cannot hold his throne without calling upon the people to sustain a foreign adventure, so political democracy cannot exist apart from an expanding economy. It was no accident that political democracy found its strongest citadels in Great Britain and the United States, both are countries that pushed on through frontier regions, until the end of World War II, continually opening new territories for expansion. The conquests may go on, the new frontiers may be formed by military arms but the end of this particular cycle is already at hand. Territorial frontiers already have lost their importance. the conquest of nations for the purposes of exploitation can only bring the pestilence of revolt in its train. There are no more lands to conquer, but there are more than a thousand million people ripe for the conquests of democracy. Until all Asia and Africa and Europe are free and every peasant has the means of a full livelihood, the frontiers remain

The tragedy of our times is that the resources of industrialization have been thrown away in war. Military programmes hold

up the advance of the backward nations just as they hold up the advance of Great Britain and America. In America alone fifteen million people are on the market for new cars, and ten million families are looking for new houses. Seven or eight million refrigerators, five million washing machines, and a quarter of a million tractors are urgently needed by Americans, and countless millions of these things are needed abroad. The Javanese peasant cannot have his tractor; the Indian peasant cannot have his Ganges Valley Authority; the Chinese peasant must sow and plough by hand until the machines are running off the conveyor belts. Industrialization, which gave men their greatest hopes for an enlarging life and greater control over the elements, is being wasted on the construction of implements of war. A tank has a smaller life span than a house, but a tank contains enough steel to help the fabrication of ten houses. No one can calculate the losses that arise as the result of funnelling so great a measure of industry into the machines of war. Because America and Russia rearm, whole provinces of China may become depopulated, though no wars touch that province—those provinces that might be saved by the construction of dams or by the introduction of tractors will turn to seed. So it is over half the earth, where the products of industrialization are so urgently needed. Within a few years the aeroplanes may become strips of abandoned wire on unapproachable mountains, the ships may be sunk, the tanks may have foundered in a desert; less than a third of the steel employed in war is ever recovered. The hope of the world lies in America—in American industrial power and the uses of democracy—but if American industrial power is employed mainly for the advancement of a huge war machine, dislocating her own economy and the economy of the world, all the efforts of free men cannot uphold the sociological arm by which America's best interests are advanced. It may not be the fault of America that rearmament has become necessary, but it is the fault of America together with all the Great Powers that there have not been sufficient efforts to disarm. High above all present urgent needs there is disarmament, not only that men can have a breathing space from thoughts of war, being trigger happy with their new machines, but because the resources of the world in steel, copper, and the industrial metals are insufficient for the livelihood of the world's inhabitants. The next generation will pay for our plenty

by an impoverishment that even atomic power may be useless to assuage power is useless unless it is coupled to sufficient machines

Almost at the moment when World War II ended, the Kremlin in the role of official prognosticator prophesied that American economy would fail under the impact of post war confusion. The holy books were reverently opened, and there was found written in them the words "imperialist rivalry," "spiralling inflation," "the revolution of the proletariat." None of these prophecies have come true. The prophesied imperialist rivalry between Great Britain and America did not occur inflation, though dangerous and shockingly managed, hardly affected the basic structure of the nation, which had nine million unemployed in 1939 and less than two million in 1948. In spite of inflation the income wealth of the country had never been greater, though the purchasing power of the dollar had never been less. The wider distribution of income showed signs of a healthy economy or at least of an economy that was not suffering from any mortal diseases. Nor, west of the Oder, were there any of the prophesied revolutions of the proletariat. The various revolutions that occurred in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria gave the impression of being engineered from abroad by small groups of desperate men. The real needs of those large agricultural countries were not answered by forced attachment to the Soviet Union. The fate of America, whatever that fate is, is hardly likely to follow the lines of a Marxist prophecy, if only because the intangibles that are associated with the championing of freedom are themselves the agents of political changes all over the world. As long as those freedoms are championed inside and outside of America, power accumulates. Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Chinese Communists, who have often shown a more exemplary pattern of democracy in action than the Russian Soviets, has pointed out that every unjust murder by a Communist, every unjust imprisonment, every action that tends to separate the Chinese Communist from the instinctively law-abiding Chinese peasant, means a diminution in Communist power, for the same reason the real power of the Russian Soviets is diminished by the acceptance of the rule that the end justifies the means, that secret prisons, mass arrests, rule by *diktat*, and forced migrations of whole provinces and whole classes are all

valuable and necessary as long as bureaucratic control is maintained. The principles of America do not lie this way, even though secret prisons, mass arrests, rule by *diktat*, and forced migrations have all occurred on American soil. The American principles are simpler, though the confusion between the two interpretations of freedom remains to cloud the issue. Basically, the American pattern is to be armed against all eventualities since the British Navy is no longer powerful enough to guard the seas, then to promote political and economic stability throughout the world, then to demonstrate that the sacred books of the Kremlin are in error, then to enlarge her industrial empire until the day, which cannot be far distant, comes when the world will be so industrialized and the countries outside of America will be so independent of American industrialization that the whole basis of the world economy may have to be changed. Meanwhile, there are more urgent problems. The promotion of political and economic stability is in the best interest of America, but enough has hardly been done to promote the sociological arm; the State Department does not yet recognize the incalculable power behind this arm; though a European Recovery Programme of immense dimensions has been passed, nothing has yet been said concerning the recovery of Asia. More dangerous still, the fiery insistence on freedom, the blaze that burns in free men and women, has given place to a formal bureaucratic code. For a year Senators and Congressmen debated on the European Recovery Programme, but it took only a few weeks to arrange that the "Friendship Train" should roll across America. The blaze, of a different colour, is not wholly dead in Russia, where the young are often more self-sacrificing and devoted to their masters than we are, seeing for themselves a future more colourful than ever in the shape of a world-wide Communist State. That may come, but it will come only if the blaze completely dies down in America. For a few more months or years America will remain the "last, best hope of earth," but the last, best hope does not exist in unalloyed capitalism divested of all social responsibilities. The remaining frontiers must be explored; the richness is there; and somehow the fire that invigorated Washington and Jefferson, that glows through the pages of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, must be made to glow again.

As the world's greatest creditor and industrial power, America

cannot be indifferent to the promotion of rising standards of education, health, and nutrition in the world, she cannot be indifferent to the general levels of sanitation and housing, because she is at the forefront of medical research, she cannot be indifferent to the expanding of medical research all over the world. The four freedoms are not enough, other rights are required. Every man has the right to a roof over his head, to sufficient food, to the free development of his potentialities. Every Asiatic peasant has the right to a university education if his intellectual standards are sufficiently high, every African has the right to be free, and therefore no government has the right to make him pay taxes in money if he lives in an economy where money is not the medium of exchange. The rights of governments have no ultimate priority on the rights of the governed, and though the rights of governments are outlined in constitutions, the American Constitution itself is not so advanced as some others. The Constitution of Uruguay, for example, contains provisions for social and economic guarantees of family welfare, financial aid to parents with numerous children, adequate food and housing and social security. The Constitution of Peru establishes a social security system that will relieve economic distress due to unemployment, old age, illness, and death. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 guarantees work, periods of rest, and material security together with freedom of speech, Press, and religion. Not all these guarantees are effective, and the last three would seem to be of dubious value. But a constitution is valueless unless there is a deliberate impulse to live up to it. For the most part American constitutional guarantees are negative in the sense that they constitute a series of limitations upon the powers of the federal and state governments. What is needed is a constitution revised to state in the most human terms possible the rights and duties of man. The American Constitution does not guarantee freedom from want and to this extent must fail to exercise power among those who look toward America for the source of their own particular freedoms.

Everywhere in the modern world people are demanding that the four freedoms should be made plain. Just as the Congress of Vienna was established on the principles of the legitimacy of the hereditary descent of kings, so the congress of the United Nations is founded upon the legitimacy of the rights of man.

Those rights and freedoms are still undefined. When President Roosevelt in his message to the Seventy-eighth Congress on January 7, 1943, explained that two of the four freedoms—freedom of speech and freedom of religion—"are an essential part of the very life of this nation," he added that the people were wondering about the third freedom—freedom from want—and proclaimed that "this great government can and must provide this assurance." Are they so provided? Can a system that proclaims the merits of private enterprise enforce this decision? And if it does enforce such a decision, what happens, for example, to the Chicago grain market? The ambivalence returns to confront us whenever we turn to the texts of the Constitution. The old Massachusetts Constitution provided that the necessities of life should be distributed at reasonable rates and that every man had a right to shelter. The Virginia Constitution showed a wiser encouragement of the rights of the individual. A new Bill of Rights is desperately needed. In a very real sense the hope of the world lies in the enforcement of a Bill so clear and so human that it will demand the allegiance of all men.

It is on these intangible and mysterious regions that the final battle between freedom and authority will be fought. We cannot, even if we would, dismiss the four freedoms from our minds; they are part of the mythology of our times, scribbled up on half the schoolrooms of Asia, repeated and debated by the villagers of the East, whose eventual powers may outlast our own. The four freedoms roared like a battle-cry through the world, and they will still be heard roaring when our present debates are over. If they affect Europe and the East more poignantly than they affect America at the present time, it is by them that America will continue to be judged. Accepted uncritically, repeated in all the languages of the earth, hurled down in millions of pamphlets from aeroplanes flying over the reaches of Germany, Japan, and the Italian Empire, they kindled a slow fire whose burning will continue through the centuries. Hardly anyone stopped to reflect that of the four freedoms, three were essentially negative and the fourth was the most difficult of all to attain. It is not governments alone that can provide against want; the whole structure of the earth and of the clouds proclaims that there is not yet sufficient food for all. What of freedom from fear? Did it mean, as men believed it meant, that the whole Anglo-American tradition of



*habeas corpus* was to be imposed and demanded of all nations, even those that had never come under the Anglo-American traditions? There are in existence three Acts proclaiming *habeas corpus* in China—those who know China realize how indelicately they are enforced. The evidence of the existence of vast forced-labour camps in the Soviet Union is overwhelming. We have known a time when prisoners of war were employed as labourers hardly to be distinguished from slaves. Though intolerance is decreasing in America at a rate that must alarm the die-hards who believe that everything that occurs in America must be intrinsically wrong, the greatest obstacle to a clear enunciation of the proper purposes of freedom is still the existence of segregation in the South. By mingled cupidity and cowardice the founders of great empires have been driven onward, but the empire of free men, toward which the world is hastening, will not be brought about by the efforts that formed colonial empires. The motives of free men must be stated clearly, unambiguously, and decisively—it is only in this way that we can be sure of our allies and our path to the future.

The four freedoms were not clear, nor precise, nor decisive, and they were unnecessarily ambiguous. It is not made clear whether they referred to all men or what force lay behind them. If they were simply slogans, they differ hardly at all from the calculated slogans of the Soviets or of the newspaper copywriters and were dangerously cunning because they offered hope where none could be promised. There were the further ambiguities that result from lack of definition. Thus, too, may have been unfavourable, but the men who read of them in the battle lines, amazed by the grandeur and simplicity of those phrases, which are in themselves more revolutionary than the Rights of Man, the Declaration of Independence, or Magna Charta, could ask themselves continually whether the four freedoms referred to themselves, and keep on asking, for at no period during the war was there brought into being a council that would examine these terms and identify their full meaning. The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations is couched in terms as vague and general, for what can be more diffuse than the phrase "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, except in the common interest," when there is no hint of what methods are to be employed or

what principles are to be invoked? "To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," which is another phrase in the preamble, begs the most dominant question of all, for what is a "larger freedom" if there was no freedom before? The four freedoms and the preamble to the Charter were revolutionary; they opened a new way. For the first time, in so important a contract, "we, the people" take the place of the "high contracting parties," but the people were strangely absent from the conference table, and the high contracting parties were unduly in evidence. The diplomats, the special envoys, the captains, and the generals were heard; the people had not yet come to the fore.

The American nation cannot, as Lincoln said, escape history. It can, however, misread its own history at a fearful cost to Americans themselves. Hideous mistakes have been made in the past, and each mistake revolved around the definition of liberty. Ten months after Aguinaldo had called upon the Filipinos to flock to the banner of the Americans, he turned against the Americans in alarm and fury, because the Americans were encouraging in the Philippines the very measures that, when employed by Spain in Cuba, they had hoped to outlaw. In a moment of feverish despair, Aguinaldo exclaimed that "America is a country of unrestrained liberty," which refused to countenance the popular will of the people of the Philippines, but must take over the whole of the islands for its own profit and possession. It was true that no promise of freedom had been given, but had not the Americans traditionally regarded themselves as liberators, and had not the attack on Cuba been made for the purpose of liberation? Was there one tradition to be enforced in the Atlantic, and another in the Pacific? It was not an idle question. The enforcement of the American doctrine of "manifest destiny" in the years of the turning century could hardly have been more unfortunate. The letter written by Theodore Roosevelt explaining why the Japanese should have the overlordship of Korea has brought its tumultuous dividends. It was the manifest destiny of Japan that she should possess the Koreans, with what result we know to-day. So it is throughout our present history. The world is too small for colonies and too small even for the existing military adventures on foreign soil. It is only by the most elastic extension of the meaning of national liberty that America could

enforce a claim to having her own soldiers in China, Persia, Greece, and Panama. Certainly the presence of soldiers did nothing to enforce liberty in those countries.

The danger becomes clearer when we take into consideration the preponderant military power of the Old World in comparison with the New. It is easy enough to believe that with atomic weapons America is virtually in a position to destroy all other powers. It may be true, though it has not yet been proved, that in the military sense the whole world is at the mercy of America, but it cannot be too often insisted that military power alone does not win wars. The Germans were defeated by overwhelming numbers of aeroplanes and men, but they were also—and perhaps more effectively, defeated by the absence of any philosophy by which men might live in peace with themselves. Because they were trained to see in the *Führer* the incarnation of all German mythology and power, the first defeats proved stumbling blocks to continual belief. One must fight for something. The Western Allies fought largely and very consciously for the four freedoms and for the restoration of the lands seized by German power. If by some fatal accident America fought Russia, it would be also necessary to ensure that the purpose of the war was not, in Aguinaldo's words, "unrestrained liberty" of the Americans to do as they pleased—that interpretation of liberty is already forfeit. Whatever else it is, it will not be a simple war, over in three days, with half the world in atomic ruin and the other half ready to surrender. In time the war will embrace the whole world. The whole southern extent of continental Asia will almost certainly be involved, and every nation will do its utmost to avoid being involved, though it is unlikely that they can avoid being involved for long. The question will then remain whether they are involved by their own will or by force, whether they will work with America or as far as possible against her, and whether their hearts are in the struggle or aloof from the struggle. It cannot be too often repeated that American military power must be harnessed to moral ends. America is still an island. Her most important potential bases are also islands—all of them at a considerable distance from the mainland. England, Japan, the Philippines, Greenland, Australia are all islands lying as Mr. Walter Lippmann long ago pointed out, "in an immense oceanic lake of which the other great powers control the shores." The

vast coastlines of these islands, which allow an enemy to choose his own point of attack, the grave difficulty of feeding the island bases with supplies, and the comparative immunity of the heart land of Asia are to be reckoned with. Nor does the possession of the atomic bomb mean an absolute superiority over other nations. Bacteriological warfare must be reckoned with. There exist poisons that can be manufactured quite simply, at no very great cost in laboratory equipment and materials, by which all the inhabitants of the earth may be destroyed at the will of a chemist. We have come to the stage when all the potential weapons of naked destruction cancel each other out, and men, if they choose to live, might do well to dwell on the fact that the finest, the cheapest, and the most decisive weapon of attack is now the weapon of the free mind harnessed to the determination of free men to ensure that the causes of war shall cease.

It may already be too late. It may be that the leadership of America has already forfeited the position it held during the last days of the war and can no longer determine, even if it desired to, the social evolution of all that part of the world that is outside the orbit of Soviet Russia. If the European Recovery Programme is based solely upon the belief that Communism will not survive a balanced budget, the Programme will fail; all the industrial equipment, all the food, and all the credits advanced are perishable. If social injustice and inequality remain, the advantages become dubious advantages; nothing is gained and much is indeed lost. If the European Recovery Programme accomplishes land reform in Italy, if it gives sufficient impulse to the moderate third force in France to survive so that the French workman will not cringe in despair before the Communists or the party of De Gaulle, if the Programme frees Greece of its notoriously corrupt government and gives the Turkish peasant a sense that a democratic Turkey is worth fighting for, then the Programme will not belong to the perishable things of this world but will accurately and inevitably foretell a resurrection of Europe. Unless American influence, as well as American money, can serve the ends of justice, both American influence and American money will have been squandered vainly and capriciously, and with the blindness that any theoretician could have foretold. It is not by Bills of appropriation that the pagans are converted, nor are great movements brought about by the gifts of the

Danaans Other Bills, infinitely more commanding, more subtle, and more intimidating to the enemy, are required, and most important among them is the Bill of Rights. It is not for nothing, at a time when we have almost forgotten the relevance of the four freedoms, that the Soviet Press denounces those freedoms continually, and that Marshal Tito can refer to them as "the sweet playthings of the capitalist class which allows itself to wallow in such pleasant generalities, when the Soviet Union alone is the guardian of freedom," and by the very vehemence of his attack show us how much he fears the day when they will be fully implemented.

There were great hopes in America at the end of the war. There came slowly, as the allies advanced across the frontiers of Germany and across the islands neighbouring Japan, a sense of the world's good fortune too long delayed. Those hopes have been shattered. Nervously, and as though oppressed by some fatal instinct to self-destruction, the Americans have found themselves in an unfamiliar land. A dangerous brutality shows itself in films and novels, in the increasing restlessness of the people, and in the mounting statistics of crime. The fingers are trigger happy, and the idiocies of Communism are feared by a nation that has full possession of the atomic bomb, a navy larger than all the navies of the world combined, vast potential and actual resources in industry, coal and oil, and the largest number of people—sixty million—ever gainfully employed.

To-day the engines of the fabulous engine room are producing power on a scale never attempted before, to what purposes no one yet knows. That there are weaknesses in the structure of the engine-room is evident. Some of these weaknesses are already known, others like the crystals in a block of steel can only be discovered by great patience and the use of X rays. The sense of security and stability that accompanied the great nations of the past at the height of their powers is peculiarly absent in America, though great courage and great ideals remain. There is an inherent weakness in the mere possession of strength: the roads of *habitus* are paved with the carcasses of fallen giants. Now, as before, it is the weak who survive, because they can most easily adapt themselves to changing circumstances and by the strength of their weakness avoid combat with the superior enemy. The great animals that roamed California in the past, whose

bodies are disinterred from the clay pits, were incapable of survival and seem to have perished as the result of the attacks of smaller animals. In the same way the giant tortoises of the Pacific Islands were killed off by roaming dogs left by seafarers: the dogs ate the eggs and nipped under the shells of the huge beasts. Thus it is only the weak lemmings that survive: those that are powerful follow their reckless course to the sea. It is not only that the vast power of America may conceal vast weaknesses, but it may be that there are no means to alter its direction once it is set on an erratic course. If the end is pure power, rudderless and uncontrolled, the old image of the ship of State must give place to another image altogether: the rocket with the atomic war head that was launched in New Mexico and of which no trace has ever been found.

It is necessary to speak in these terms because no other terms are available. In this apocalyptic age the issues are clearly defined. There are only two alternatives: a more abundant life or total destruction. We have come to the stage in civilization that is reached by a gambler whose last throw may mean the jackpot or the suicide's bullet. On this last frontier there are simplicities everywhere; the black was never so black nor the white so white. Whether we like it or not, we have come to live in the world at the time when the last, the most solemn battles are about to be fought, and it is not in the least necessary or even likely that the battles will be fought as battles were fought in the past. They will be battles of the mind, of loyalties and beliefs, battles of cunning, ruse, exile, intimidation, and threats, perhaps even without a single shot fired in anger, for the victory comes to those who are most resourceful in ideas and faiths.

Can the American idea outlast the Russian idea? It can and should. If America fails at this crisis, it will be due to the moral weakness of America rather than the moral strength of the Soviets. The classic entry in the margin of the text of St. Joan of Arc's trial—*responsio mortifera*, the penalty being death—provides the necessary commentary to the fate that overtakes civilizations when they fail to assume their responsibilities at moments of crisis. Hitler and Napoleon had the opportunity to free the world, instead they attempted to enslave it.

What is so tragic is that the means are at hand by which the world can be freed of slavery; the weapons are almost within our

grasp, there are sufficient Americans alive to the inherent dangers of the age, who could wield those weapons to the utmost. The hope of the world lies in America, but that hope can change easily into despair, and from despair to hate, unless the Americans themselves retrieve, at the last hour, the purpose of their historical development, which does not and cannot lie in the abasement of human values, in incessant limitations of freedom, in the loud closing of shutters so that the air we breathe grows tainted with the poisons that come inevitably from lack of freedom and the free growth of men's potentialities. What is needed at this stage is a relentless alliance of free men, not only against the new tyrannies of the East, but also against the resurgent tyrannies of the West. Russia and America are actors in a tragic play, but they are not the only actors and though the issues are clear cut for the most part each has something to learn from the other. Meanwhile they gesture and gesticulate and none of these posturings would have serious consequence for the world if it were not that the gestures were proclaimed over the bodies of so many dead men. The time has come to acknowledge that there is no inevitable war but there is only inevitable peace—the peace of the atomic desert where the rock glows through the long nights or the peace of growth and freedom. Nothing could be so absurd as to imagine that peace is some negative thing a mere temporary pause between wars. The captains and generals, with their resounding titles their heroism and their adventurous callings have weighted the scales heavily in favour of war, but the time has come for the peace men to take over where the war men have so disastrously failed. It will be the duty of peace men to see that freedom flourishes and that the frontiers of suffering are narrowed down. The real wars are not fought by soldiers, but by economists, sociologists, doctors, and all those who are concerned with raising the standard of living of the masses of the people. There can be no lasting peace until the men of the world have escaped from the barbarism of economic insufficiency.

What, then, are the weapons that lie in our hands? A Bill of Rights alone has no power to change the world, but determined men armed with a Bill of Rights may make the change. They will not change anything by sitting idly in their own homes, pretending to themselves that the sense of fatality that has

descended upon America has come to stay. What is required is open warfare against injustice wherever it can be found, the unremitting effort by the most powerful nation on the earth to see that men come to their full powers, not in America only, but everywhere in the world. The four freedoms are valid objectives here and now, and the author of the four freedoms was careful to add, "That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for the kind of world attainable in our time and generation." Much has happened since that day in January, 1941, to alter the course of history, but the validity of the four freedoms remains unimpaired.

More than ever before, a second Bill of Rights is required, to be put into operation in America and in all those countries where American influence dominates. The second Bill of Rights can only come into operation as a result of the overwhelming demand of the people, and that they are demanding this, sometimes incoherently, nearly always passionately, and often desperately, is certain to anyone who has stayed in America during the last two tragic and purposeless years.

Men possess inalienable political, moral, and customary rights, and governments must guarantee that they be fed and housed when they are poverty-stricken, for the dignity of man demands nothing less. These rights we know and recognize; they remain a part of the American tradition and must be conserved. The Americans cannot be content if some fraction of the people is ill fed, ill clothed, ill housed, and insecure, and for all the more reason they cannot be content if the rest of the population of the world suffers from the indignities of these things, and no lasting peace is possible until there is greater equality in the world. That America herself does not permit all these rights is an unhappy consequence of an ambivalent past, but at least it is certain that for many years to come, in spite of the folly of those who in their fear of Communism would like nothing better than to adopt the totalitarian principles of Communism, there is in America an undying thirst for freedom, and this will remain. There is at least one advantage that America possesses over the Soviet Union; the oppressors are fought the whole way, and no imprisonment or threats will ever silence the oppressed.

But nothing could be more dangerous than to imagine that in America alone there reposes the hope of the future. The



countries of Europe outside the Soviet pale, the resurgent nations of Asia, and many of the states of South America look for American leadership. It is not by America alone that the world will come into its necessary freedom, but by the alliance of the free nations determined upon reasonable freedom. It is for this reason that every diminution in the scope of freedom in America, every Bill aimed at subversive organizations but implying at the same time a deliberate progress towards the excommunication of ideas unfavourable to a temporary Congress, every effort to submerge the growing power of labour, every attempt to increase the powers of seizure and arrest already possessed by the police, must be looked upon with especial disfavour, for by every victory on the front of expediency America loses moral prestige among the nations who most favour her.

The fundamental question of our time therefore—a question far more fundamental and immediate than the threat of a new increase of Soviet power in Europe or the reform of the United Nations—is the method by which increasing freedom can be brought about. The sense of fatality that haunts our generation, making us see ourselves as hopelessly involved in a mechanical and unsympathetic world at the mercy of electrical entertainment and electrical machines, 'man in the shadow of the machine' and powerless to remove the obliterating shadow, the marionette dangling upon a mechanical string, conscious that even though he votes he cannot alter the scheme of things except to the extent of his single vote, the sense that comes from lost confidence and brooding upon the enchantments of an imaginary past, a sense that is most peculiarly visible in the fact that men even in the most powerful of states have so little to live for and feel entirely isolated from the current of the vast movements that draw them against their will—all this arises simply and clearly from the lack of any acceptable definition and elucidation of human dignity. Men know to-day that they can starve in millions, that there are weapons in existence which can destroy them in millions, that uncounted millions have perished in gas chambers at the will of a lunatic, and that uncounted millions may again perish in gas chambers at the will of another lunatic. They know that they are at the mercy of forces beyond their control, and until the end of the world these gigantic powers will remain to torment them, but they know too, in the caverns of their minds, or in the brightness

of their most percipient feelings, that not all is lost while human dignity remains. They know the power of freedom to excoriate and blast from the earth the merciless hounds of tyranny, and they know that if ever there are wars or battles of ideas, the victory goes to those who promise and enlarge upon their promises of freedom, for in the world of the machines there is nothing left to man but the exercise of those freedoms that remain to him, now that "all power to the Soviets" or "all power to the Americans" are meaningless terms, since we live in an age when power belongs almost wholly to the machines.

A long road has been travelled since the French and American revolutions. The rights of man were easier to satisfy under agricultural economies; there were no pressing populations hungering for limited quantities of food; shelter and a sufficiency of food were every man's birthright. Those times have passed; industrialization is coming to the remotest villages of the Far East. The shadow of industrial tyranny falls everywhere and cannot be avoided, but this is all the more reason why men will struggle desperately for their freedoms and look to the countries where freedom is in existence with especial delight.

At least we know where America stands. If the leaders of world Communism have never ceased their efforts to influence the intellectual life of America and to deride the weaknesses, cruelties, and follies that the Americans, like all other nations, have inherited from the unremitting urgencies of the past, if they derisively poke fun at the American way of life and compare it with their own, forgetting that there is no M.V.D. in control of vast slave-labour camps in America, forgetting that freedom is prized and venerated by the great majority of the people of America and will continue to be prized, if they continue to refuse Americans permission to enter the Soviet Union and keep their own people like prisoners within their walls, they have only themselves to blame for every man's uncertainty of their purposes. It was not the peasants of Russia, but the urban workers, who formed the core of the revolutionary party, and it is because the Communist Party in Russia is essentially a party representing a small proportion of urban workers that it has failed to understand the development of the countries in the Far East, where the peasantry outnumber the urban workers by fifty to one. In the same way the Communists have completely and perhaps

deliberately failed to understand the development of America and content themselves with believing in their own misinterpretations. That there is great poverty in America, that monopolies still exist, that there are still occasional lynchings does not alter the fact that more vehemently than any other nation in the past the Americans have sought out their freedoms and when the present uncertainties are over, they will return to the forty

The time has come for America to understand that the problem of maintaining peace must be approached in a new, unorthodox, and, if need be, startling manner, for the old methods have been proved tragically ineffective. What is required of Americans now is that the old and forgotten master plan of human freedom shall be resurrected and interpreted: that the freedoms which have been announced should be given real substance, that there should be an end once and for all of the game of whittling down human freedoms in actuality while celebrating them in the stultifying manner of a Monsieur Humeau. The time cannot be far distant when all our freedoms will be valueless unless we fight for them now. We have lived so long at the edge of despair that we are no longer frightened by the continual roaring of our lanchies—the worst that can happen is that we may individually and collectively perish. But such an attitude is not worthy of free men. Freedom must be battled for with the only weapons that are available—our minds, our hands and our feet. We have soldiers but we have no peace men who will go around the world trained in the understanding of freedom, encouraging it and establishing it wherever it can be built. It may be argued that freedom is not a tangible thing and no one can recognize it when he sees it but free men are tangible and recognizable. It is not only the European Recovery Programme that is important but the men who accompany and supervise it are equally and perhaps more important. There must be, in all those areas of the world where travel is still possible, increasing contact between the best Americans and the peoples of other nations, and during the next few years when this contact will become increasingly necessary it should be so arranged that every young American can have the opportunity of going abroad and mulling into the minds of those he finds the nature of freedom. Such a programme involves a huge expenditure of money, but expenditure on warships and atom bombs and a vast standing army is far greater.

Some may say that American youth may not always act as the best ambassadors of their country. It is an idle statement. If they are not the best ambassadors of America, heaven knows where the best ambassadors can be found. The time is short. It may take a year to put into operation a plan that would involve, in time, millions of young Americans travelling around the earth. Americans are already the most travelled nation on earth, but it is not only business-men, schoolteachers, and those who travel for pleasure who are required; it is necessary that there should be formed at the soonest possible moment peace armies among the young, dedicated to freedom and the encouragement of it wherever it can be found.

The practical application and the working out of the details can be left to others, but it is worthwhile insisting at this point that such a crusade for freedom places the responsibility for peace and freedom precisely where it should lie—on the individual. That these armies must be financed by governments is unquestionable, for there is probably no other source rich enough to supply the funds. These armies will have to be trained. It is not necessary or desirable that the peace men should spend their whole time preaching or encouraging others; it will be their duty to work as labourers, mechanics, students, chemists, doctors, engineers, flood-control officers, professors, dentists, apprentices—there is no limit to the number of things that can be done. It is not only the public officers who must do the job; the responsibility is on everyone. What is strange is that the idea has never yet been put into practice, and in spite of the fact that the preambles of our documents tend to be written in terms of "We, the People," the people feel themselves so submerged by the powers of Press, radio, books, and the Government itself that they fail to see their own importance in the struggle. We have no real right to place the responsibility upon Government alone. The United States contributed \$341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II; with an almost infinitesimal fraction of this sum a peace army could be formed.

It is one of the most unfortunate developments of traditional policy that though there are ministries and secretaries of war, there have so far been no ministries of peace. The State Department does not perform the functions that are required in a department of peace, for its main purpose must always be the

employment of diplomatic skills in a continual offensive on diplomatic levels against the diplomacy of other Powers. A department of peace would have no responsibility except to peace, and therefore its main responsibility would be to the world at large, continuing to exercise its functions even at times when diplomatic functions are suspended. A department of peace should encourage in every way possible the open conspiracy for peace, which already exists and which is not represented in the counsels between nations. In a sense in its cultural sections the State Department already fulfils some of the requirements of a ministry of peace, but so closely are the aims of the State Department identified with the grants of scholarships and funds to foreign students and universities that these grants are generally regarded as forming part of American propaganda on State Department levels. What is necessary is that the department of peace should act in a fashion that encourages propaganda for peace and freedom on purely human levels. As contagion of sickness makes sickness, contagion of trust makes trust, and this trust can come about only by the physical presence of Americans on foreign soil and of foreigners on American soil.

The terrible tradition by which the youth of the world meet each other for the most part only on battlefields must come to an end, there are other fields where they can meet at less expense and with greater profit to themselves. It should be the purpose of the department of peace to organize the peace men in so far as they can be organized, to increase a hundredfold and eventually a thousandfold the existing number of scholarships and exchange professorships, and to see that wherever there is freedom Americans shall be there, 'defending manfully,' in Cotton Mathers' phrase, the purposes of the freedom they desire. No religions have ever succeeded without missionaries, no great civilizations have come to birth without the mingling of races. Against the tide of free men invading the world no armies can resist, against the belief of freedom firmly held no other beliefs in our time are availing.

Meanwhile, the greater part of the world is still held by free men. The belief in freedom lights up the new democracies in the Far East, gives strength to the Germans who remain outside the Russian pale, vindicates the Italians, encourages the Greeks, who first discovered her and placed her upon the approachable

pedestal; it puts fire into the hearts of the Jews and fills the East with its ferment. It is still the freedom announced in the Declaration of Independence that moves men to incredible heroisms, and all the time men turn to America for vindication. America, in order to discover herself, must discover the world and throw a net of freedom over it. This will come about when the armies of free men have gone about their work. "The glory of the race of rangers" must be put to more hospitable tasks than the making of guns for offence; there are more important offensives at hand where guns are useless impediments. Whitman bandaging the sick and comforting the wounded, Albert Schweitzer searching the Congo for natives he can heal, and Roger Williams living among the Red Indians on Rhode Island to write the forerunner of all our modern volumes on toleration are the examples set before us, and if it is argued that there are some places in the world where free men cannot enter, this in itself should be sufficient challenge. Iron curtains do not drop for ever. There must be ways of breaking through them. It is useless to surrender to our fears. If we go about the world, the fears will be put at rest when we come upon the greater fears of the impoverished and the needy and those who are sick for freedom.

It is not only necessary in this crisis of our time that there should be armies of free men, but there should be a general agreement upon the nature of the freedoms they are demanding, not only for themselves, but for the rest of the world. A conference on freedom is required, not because the four freedoms are ambiguous or because the nine freedoms of the National Resources Planning Board are insufficient, but because every age must interpret its freedoms anew. So much history has already occurred since the war that we live, in a fashion, in an age completely dissimilar to the age we have passed through. The hopes and fevers of the war are not our hopes and fevers; we have come out of them with less optimism in the belief that, as soon as wars are over, a millennium descends upon us. It is not so, and all the experience of the last three or four years tends to show that we are as far away as we have ever been from the state we desire. At the same time the forces that move the world are working so speedily, events of great significance follow one another at so great a momentum, that we are justified in believing that if peace comes, whichever peace it is, it will come in our

generation or in the generation of our sons. And all this is all the more reason for making our armies of free men as soon as possible.

A conference on freedom, a new Bill of Rights to be accepted by all the free nations, the formation of armies of free men, the establishment of a department of peace, all these may seem to be startling and unorthodox changes, but we are living in startling and unorthodox times. The old weapons of diplomacy have failed. Alone, the United Nations cannot help us sufficiently, though it provides a sounding board by which ministers and foreign secretaries can appeal to the world conscience. The new weapons that are required must come from the people themselves. Ultimately, there is nothing novel in these new weapons: they are an extension of the ideas that formed the American Revolution. A Grand Alliance of the free states is already being formed. It includes America and Europe now: it may include India and Indonesia, it already includes the Dominions of the British Commonwealth. What is necessary is that it should be extended beyond even these wide frontiers: and the Grand Alliance should be an alliance of human beings as well as of governments.

At some time during the last century it should have been possible to have formed a constitution of the Americas, a single basic constitution to which all the states of North and South America could subscribe. The time of opportunity passed. At this late date there are no benefits to be derived from seeking into the causes why this opportunity was allowed to slip from men's hands. But it is worth reminding ourselves that every state in the continent of America except Canada arose as the result of the same revolutionary causes, and just as the political leaders of India, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Burma designed their declarations of independence on the model of the American declaration, so did the leaders of the South American republics. Two great waves of revolution: one in South America and the other in East Asia followed one another at an interval of a hundred years, and both these revolutions were directed largely against European influence. There is a sense in which the offer of freedom always gives strength. So the British, by giving India her freedom, immeasurably increased their own prestige among Indians, found firmer allies and realized at last that their influence had not been entirely in vain. By this offer of freedom power was gained, not by Great Britain, but by Great Britain

and India together. In a world so shattered by the presence of so many soldiers and such great armaments, this abdication of sovereignty on the part of the British Government—an abdication that was in no sense a complete abdication of responsibility—offered hope for the future. In very practical terms it was discovered that freedom paid out its increasing dividends, and the mere fact that the Indians no longer regarded the British as governmental superiors, but as human beings, was of inestimable advantage to the freedom of the world. The tragedy of Indonesia and Viet-Nam was that no similarly human solution of differences ever came about in those countries.

A generation that had accomplished a great revolution and debated and ratified the United States Constitution provoked Thomas Jefferson to a singular complaint. He found it difficult to believe that his contemporaries counted their blessings and remarked, "how little do my countrymen know the precious blessings they are in possession of." He wanted men to reflect and never to be so careful as when they evaluated and kept guard, *over their primitive liberties. The educated men of his time were in love with the virtues of the Roman Empire, forgetting that the Roman Empire had been built upon foundations of the most merciless greed. But there was at least one example that the readers of Livy were likely to remember and cherish, and no one was closer to Jefferson than Cincinnatus, who in old age left his plough at the first alarm of liberty.*

To-day, when our liberties are falling before a hurricane, the responsibility is far greater than it was in Jefferson's time. World federation is not the immediate solution. What is needed now is the more human and the more personal approach, and the belief in liberty that is at once deeply religious and practical, a private as well as a public conspiracy. The aim is to build, to improve, and to refine—never to destroy. It is for this reason that every act of vituperation against another nation, every contemptuous slight against the habits of foreigners, every refusal to face the candour of our neighbours, every enunciation of moral platitudes, becomes particularly dangerous—they are shots against the bridge we must build to safeguard the world of the future. But more dangerous than any of these is the growing fear and distrust of freedom in America itself. On the Statue of Liberty are carved these words:



*' Give us your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free "*

Meanwhile, the shores of America are closed to at least 400,000 of the 1,500,000 displaced persons of Europe, while anyone who has travelled in America knows that the land could hold another 50,000,000 people and could become richer by holding them. There are times when the enunciation of a platitude or a high moral phrase empty of content becomes a spiritual blasphemy, a scandal that shrieks to high heaven. Of such blasphemies free men are not guilty, and when we hear them, we can be assured that they come from the lips of the enslaved.

Nothing is more intolerant, more enervating and more consoling than fear, but the free man needs no consolations except his freedom, hates enervation and lives for tolerance. And the chiefest of his enemies must always be fear. It is for this reason that one looks to the prevailing fear in America with dismay, praying that it is no more than a passing phase, the result of the spiritual weakness that follows the end of a war. The indispensable condition of an American led resurgence of freedom in the world is that in America there should be no fear of freedom. It is still true that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

The private and the public conspiracies must go on, and the temptation to retire within the comforting borders of fear must cease. There are destinies that must be accomplished, tasks that history sets before great nations, only to punish them if those tasks are not assumed. Among these tasks are

- 1 The Declaration of a second Bill of Rights for people everywhere
- 2 The formation of peace armies
- 3 The gathering of a standing conference on freedom
- 4 The establishment of a department of peace
- 5 The definition of the obligations of private enterprise to the social community
- 6 The suffering of the sociological arm, so that guns, food, and machines are not the only contributions of America to the countries affected by the war
- 7 The acceptance of the axiom that freedom is the aim of the private as well as the public conspiracy

8. The assumption by America, internally and externally, with her allies of all the responsibilities that come from demanding freedom everywhere.

9. Oil to be placed under international ownership.

To those who suggest that these measures are impracticable, it is sufficient to reply that they have not yet been put into operation and that no other methods would seem to be available since we have exhausted or nearly exhausted the traditional means. Nor is there anything fundamentally startling in them: the first six of these tasks are no more than extensions of the Marshall Plan.

Meanwhile the destinies of America are in doubt. A period of conflict and uncertainty has descended upon the Americans who, having fought against a tyranny, suffer from the inevitable effects of contact with tyranny in a mechanical world. The errors of America are clear and proclaimed to the world by the Americans themselves; the errors of Russia are darker and more mysteriously impelled by the urgencies of the Soviet theme. But who is there in this day who doubts that what is open and revealed survives over what is mercilessly hidden and concealed? Must we believe that freedom is simply the state of being governed by an armed police and that those who are disliked by the state bureaucrats must once again be sent to work out their salvation in the mines? All the inferences of Aristotle's classic phrase are plain before us. Freedom is to govern and to be governed; the governor and the governed have their inalienable rights; there is a way to peace through freedom. The regulator and producer of abundance and justice is still public freedom, and in the plain history of human freedom there have been until this day few downfalls. The progression has been swift. From centuries of human slavery we have evolved a pattern for human freedom, and the last and most important of our conquests is the conquest of the human mind everywhere on behalf of freedom, not for our own sake but that the world may survive.

To-day we are not to be frightened by malevolence or false prophecies, for the battle is squarely between freedom and authority, the same battle that was fought between the emperors and the popes, between the feudal lords and the serfs. It is possible that the battle may never be finally resolved—the very

struggle may be a condition for the world's existence—but even in a continuing battle there are forces that prevail, and prevail they must, with America's help, in order that the human values may be upheld, since in our day and age there are no other absolute values. Man's misery, not man's triumph is the theme of our times, and the time has come to put the misery at an end.

Man is in the making, but henceforth he must make himself, and the conditions of his making lie in freedom and peace, in the strength of his resolution to give identity and splendour to these two things. There is only one end—that the lives of men with all their godlike attributes should be celebrated and adored and they cannot be celebrated and adored when they are at the mercy of the State. Great civilizations are those that can replenish their fruit and revive themselves from within, taking strength from the world outside. An awakened and resolute America can rule the world by friendship for America itself at its best, contains all the elements that go to form a free world. The promise remains the promise that was stated least ambiguously by Melville when he wrote:

'For who was our father and mother? Or can we point to any Romulus and Remus for our founders? Our ancestry is lost in the universal paternity and Caesar and Alfred, St Paul and Luther, and Homer and Shakespeare are as much ours as Washington, who is as much the world's as our own. We are the heirs of all time, and with all nations we divide our inheritance. On this Western hemisphere all tribes and people are forming into one federated whole, and there is a future which shall see the estranged children of Adam restored as to the old hearth-stone in Eden.'

In this darkness, in this last hour, remembering the bombs, knowing the sacrifices that have been made, conscious of privileges, we are confronted with the certainty that the struggle for human dignity must be upheld, or human values will become lost. It is not necessary that man should suffer like the gods on the Greek stage, he suffers already like a god in life, surrounded by miraculous and fabulous events, his own birth a miracle, his survival a miracle, his sufferings nearly continual, but in all this he is upheld by his human dignity and his freedom, and this must be preserved. Even if there were no totalitarian states in

existence, it would be necessary to uphold this dignity. It is not necessary that the totalitarian states should be fought; it is only necessary that freedom should be increased, not by power or might but by the spirit and by the heart, by the use of all social and common weapons, by whole armies of men determined to be free. The end is the conquest of the world by each man in order that the world shall become a single continent at peace, the destiny of America to be the first among equals.

*"Come, I will make the continent indissoluble,  
I will make the most splendid race the sun ever shone upon."*

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